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Preface 
 
In 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) asked us to prepare an independent 
assessment of its surveillance of the euro area during 2007-09. The resulting report (Pisani-
Ferry, Sapir and Wolff, 2011) was published by both Bruegel and the Fund. 
 
Having studied crisis prevention, we thought that it would be particularly interesting to 
continue with a further study of the results of, and lessons from, crisis management. It is an 
early assessment for sure, as all three countries covered (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) were 
still subject to financial assistance programmes at the time of writing. Yet it is necessary: 
three years after the first Greek programme started, in spring 2010, policymakers and citizens 
deserve to be offered a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of what has been achieved, 
and what has not. 
 
This evaluation was carried out independently by Bruegel without having been 
commissioned. We benefitted from many discussions with Troika members, and with 
policymakers and experts from crisis countries; we also benefitted from feedback on an early 
draft on the occasion of a workshop held in Brussels on 26 March 2013, and from detailed 
comments on a later draft, for which we are indebted to all those who commented. A 
preliminary version of the study was presented on 22 April 2013 at the Peterson Institute of 
International Economics (PIIE) in Washington DC and benefitted from input from Jörg 
Asmussen of the European Central Bank, Servaas Deroose of the European Commission, 
Reza Moghadam of the IMF and Jacob Kirkegaard of PIIE. We did not get access to any 
confidential documents. In particular, the data presented in this study is all from public 
sources. 
 
We are grateful to all those who helped us decipher the intricacies of the Troika programmes 
and improve our assessment. We would also like to thank Adrian Bosshard, Hannah 
Lichtenberg and Carlos de Sousa for their very effective assistance in the preparation of this 
report. The authors bear sole responsibility for any remaining errors, and for the views 
expressed in this report. 
 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir, Guntram Wolff 
May 2013 
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Executive summary 
 
Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial 
assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for 
implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, 
the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the 
same path. 
 
This study is intended to provide an early evaluation of these assistance programmes 
implemented by the Troika in these three countries (Cyprus and Spain are not included in this 
assessment because the programmes are too recent). The study assesses the economic impact 
of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up. The Troika is 
a unique institutional construction that involves an unprecedented degree of cooperation 
between regional and global financial institutions. 
 
Such an assessment is made difficult by two factors. First, at the time of writing, all three 
programmes were still on-going, including in Greece where a second programme was started 
in March 2012. Second, the circumstances are clearly unique, not only because the three 
countries are developed economies, but also because they belong to a monetary union and 
because the programmes were implemented at a time when both the euro area and the global 
economy were going through a severe financial crisis. 
  
The three Troika programmes stand out compared to typical IMF programmes because of 
their exceptionally long durations and the exceptionally large size of the financial assistance 
packages. One reason for this is that the build-up of imbalances in all three economies at the 
start of the programme was much more significant than in typical programme countries. 
Another one is that, unlike many IMF programmes, official assistance entirely substituted 
markets in the financing of sovereign borrowing needs. 
 
Economic and social hardship remains severe in all three countries. However, assessment 
cannot stop there and has to be based on a comparison between reasoned expectations and 
outcomes. Against this yardstick, the programmes have so far been successful though subject 
to risks in one of the three countries – Ireland, which at the time of writing is on track to exit 
the three-year programme and regain access to financial markets; potentially successful in 
Portugal, even though the economy remains structurally weak and the situation remains 
fragile to shocks; and unsuccessful in Greece, which is on a totally different trajectory to the 
other two countries. In Greece, early assumptions by the Troika about the ability of the 
economy to adjust and of the Greek political-administrative system to implement programme 
measures proved unrealistic. The subsequent European debate on Greek exit from the euro 
area further hindered progress in Greece. By contrast, the Irish and Portuguese programmes 
were based on more realistic assumptions, and implementation of programme conditionality 
was much better. 
 
A more subtle conclusion is that the programmes have been successful in some ways and 
unsuccessful in others. The main success has been the current account, with deficits shrinking 
much faster than expected, although, depending on the country concerned, the reasons for this 
are either encouraging (an improvement in exports) or discouraging (a collapse of imports 
because of the recession). 
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The three countries have by and large adopted the austerity measures prescribed to them by 
the Troika. In structural terms they all implemented significant consolidation efforts. They 
had little choice since lender countries were unwilling to provide more financing. The 
alternative to austerity would have been debt restructuring. 
 
In the Greek case, earlier restructuring would have been preferable, at least from a Greek 
point of view. In the Irish case, the bail-in of senior bank bondholders might have been 
desirable from the Irish point of view. But it would have improved the programme’s 
sustainability far less than in Greece, and it could have had significant negative implications 
for the funding of Irish banks. 
 
In the absence of expansionary measures elsewhere in the euro area, austerity measures in 
programme countries, the loss of confidence in the euro and the fragmentation of the euro 
financial system severely depressed growth. The recession was deeper or much deeper than 
anticipated. Together with the collapse of labour-intensive sectors such as construction, this 
also implied that unemployment increased far more than anticipated. This risks jeopardising 
the sustainability of the countries’ necessary adjustment. 
 
Compared to earlier IMF programmes, the drop in GDP and the slow adjustment in the real 
exchange rate in the three euro-area countries were exceptional. Also, unemployment 
increased much more dramatically. Moreover, the Greek debt restructuring was the largest in 
history. 
 
Turning to institutional matters, EU-IMF cooperation clearly played an important role in the 
design, monitoring and, ultimately, the implementation of the programmes.  
 
Though fraught with many potential problems, EU-IMF cooperation to deal with the crisis 
was inevitable in euro-area countries. From the EU side, despite various political misgivings, 
recourse to the IMF was necessary because the EU lacked expertise on, and experience of, 
crisis funding, and also lacked sufficient trust in its own institutions to act alone. 
 
Despite a number of tensions stemming from their different logic and rules, the EU and the 
IMF succeeded in cooperating in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The issue on which Troika 
members disagreed most was the risk of financial spillovers between euro-area countries, 
which led to divergent views about the Greek debt restructuring and about imposing losses on 
senior bondholders of Irish banks, two options that the IMF viewed favourably. 
 
Our evaluation of the functioning of the Troika reveals a number of problems for each of its 
members, which give rise to a number of reform proposals. First, we argue that the European 
Commission’s dual role as an agent of the European Stability Mechanism/the Eurogroup and 
as a European Union institution is problematic and can lead to conflicts of interest. We 
therefore propose that, eventually, the role should shift to a European Monetary Fund (EMF), 
which would replace the ESM and would be a true EU institution. A narrowly mandated 
agency would also be less exposed to different policy objectives. 
 
Second, the ECB is involved in the Troika in ‘liaison with the European Commission’. It does 
not offer programme assistance per se but provides crucial liquidity assistance to banks in 
programmes countries. We therefore see ECB participation in the Troika as necessary for it to 
have access to full information and to retain the ability to voice concerns. Yet, its role should 
not be one of a full negotiating partner because of potential conflicts of interest. Currently, the 
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ECB does not publish independent documents on the programmes but it does co-sign mission 
statements. We recommend that it discontinues co-signing such statements and behaves as a 
‘mostly silent’ participant in the Troika. 
 
Third, the IMF has become much more involved in the euro area operationally and financially 
than deemed sustainable by its shareholders. We envisage possible evolutions of its role, and 
conclude that it should become a ‘catalytic lender’ whose participation in programmes would 
be desirable – as long as the euro area has not set up an EMF and become a member of the 
IMF – but that could abstain from taking part without putting the whole package in jeopardy. 
In concrete terms this would imply limiting IMF participation to about 10 percent of total 
financing. More generally, we regard IMF-EU cooperation as an important template for future 
cooperation between global and regional financial institutions. In this respect, the euro-area 
crisis is an important test of the feasibility of such cooperation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With the decision in 2010-11 to establish large-scale financial assistance programmes for 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund 
embarked on an unprecedented endeavour. It was the first time assistance was provided 
within a monetary union and the first time the Fund and European institutions cooperated so 
closely. 
 
Other programmes followed, but they are outside the scope of this study since too little time 
has passed to properly evaluate them: in July 2012, Spain was granted financial support by the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), with the Commission monitoring the resolution 
of banks, and the Fund providing technical assistance on financial sector reform; in April 
2013 the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) board of governors agreed to grant assistance 
to Cyprus. 
 
Altogether, a new pattern for cooperation has been established, the consequences of which are 
bound to be important for the fate of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and for 
the future relationship between global and regional financial institutions. 
 
The Greek, Irish and Portuguese programmes are unprecedented in two respects: 
 
• First, because of the nature of the economic problem they are addressing. It is the first 
time since the second world war that financially open and mature countries attempt to 
adjust within a monetary union. This is a challenging venture, and it is no surprise that 
it involves significant hardship. Other countries have adjusted within the constraints of 
a pegged exchange rate system – most recently Latvia. But they were less open or less 
financially developed. Furthermore, EMU participation entails abidance by a number 
of rules that do not apply to stand-alone countries. The results of the euro-area 
programmes are therefore anxiously scrutinised in Europe and beyond. 
• Second, because of the institutional set-up of assistance. Since EMU in 2010 was not 
equipped with a crisis management regime, the principles and modalities of assistance 
had to be invented in real time in cooperation between the European institutions and 
the IMF. The result were the creation of dedicated European financing institutions – 
successively the EFSF, the EFSM and the ESM1 – which provide the greatest part of 
the financing; and the assignment of negotiations with programme countries to the 
Troika, composed of the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank (ECB). It was not the first time the IMF participated in joint programmes with 
other institutions, including the EU, but it had never been involved in such intensive 
cooperation with a regional institution.  
 
These three programmes have already proved to be controversial. Deeply disappointing 
economic, social and financial outcomes in Greece, disagreements over the treatment of the 
creditors of failed banks in Ireland and social hardship in Portugal have attracted criticism. 
The stakes are high for the citizens of these countries and all those involved: governments, 
European institutions, European partners and the IMF. Also, there has been continual 
renegotiation of the terms of assistance, especially in the case of Greece, and this has proved 
to be divisive within the Troika and among European governments. 
                                                          
1
 Respectively the European Financial Stability Facility, the European Financial Stability Mechanism and the 
European Stability Mechanism.  
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This study is intended to help draw lessons from the 2010-12 experience of financial 
assistance programmes in Greece, Ireland and Portugal2. Its aim is to provide an objective 
assessment that can serve as a basis for serious debate and reform initiatives. It addresses both 
the economic and the institutional aspects of the issue: the programmes’ achievements and 
shortcomings, taking into account the particular constraints arising from participation in EMU 
but ignoring the respective roles of the various institutions involved; and the cooperation 
between the IMF and European institutions within the Troika. 
 
The conclusions from this evaluation primarily apply to the programmes in the three 
countries. But they are of broader relevance for other EMU countries, for the European policy 
system and for cooperation between the IMF and the European institutions. The conclusions 
may also shed light on discussions about cooperation between global and regional financial 
institutions in Asia and elsewhere. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Time did not allow even an early assessment of the Cyprus programme. Nor do we cover the Spanish financial 
sector programme because of it is sectoral nature.  
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2. What is special about the crises in the euro area? 
 
2.1 Varieties of crises 
 
As documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Laeven and Valencia (2012), among 
others, financial crises are of various types, even though there is a rather high degree of 
correlation between them. In order to specify the role of international assistance, it is 
important to clarify what crises might occur within a monetary union and how they are dealt 
with. 
 
• Banking crises might occur, whatever the monetary and exchange-rate regime. They 
are normally dealt with by the sovereign and do not imply recourse to external 
assistance, unless the sovereign finds itself unable to mobilise adequate resources, in 
which case it may have to subscribe to a conditional assistance programme;   
• Sovereign debt crises are not specific to any particular policy regime either, although 
countries where the sovereign borrows in foreign currency, and countries in a hard 
peg, and therefore those in a monetary union, are more vulnerable because they have 
relinquished the option of debt monetisation;   
• Balance-of-payment (BOP) crises are a potential threat to most countries. A country 
can find itself unable to honour its international financial commitments in case of a 
sudden stop in net capital inflows because of a shock or a fundamental disequilibrium. 
Such payment crises can be overcome, if the country is deemed to be solvent, through 
IMF lending3. Such crises were thought to be impossible in a monetary union, but the 
recent experience of EMU has shown that this was wrong, as discussed below.  
 
Before Greek former prime minister George Papandreou called the IMF to request assistance, 
little thought had been given to the possible nature of crises within the European monetary 
union and the potential role for financial assistance. The crises that unfolded in 2010 and 
afterwards caught EMU unprepared.  
 
As far as banking crises are concerned, it had been understood that they could occur within 
EMU. But what was not understood was that the combination of strong interdependence 
between banks and sovereigns and the absence of a lender of last resort for sovereigns made 
euro-area countries particularly prone to such crises4. The potential severity of what would 
become known as the 'doom loop' was not foreseen. Furthermore, the EU relied on a rather 
loose framework of cooperation between national authorities, and lacked a comprehensive 
template for dealing with cross-border issues (Decressin, Faruqee and Fonteyne, 2007; Véron, 
2007).   
 
The generally prevailing view was that sovereign debt crises – also because of the prohibition 
of monetary financing – could occur. A substantial body of literature had emphasised that 
sovereign solvency would be a concern in a monetary union and that crises had to be 
prevented through fiscal surveillance. But no framework existed for such an eventuality and 
its potentially serious consequences (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). In setting up the EU 
policy framework, the focus was on crisis prevention mainly through the Stability and Growth 
                                                          
3
 If the country had adopted a fixed exchange rate regime, the BOP crisis might also entail a currency crisis if 
and when the authorities become unable to defend the fixed exchange rate. It is important to note, however, that 
as shown by international experience, a currency crisis is not quite the same as a payment crisis and that the 
presence of one is not a necessary or sufficient condition for the occurrence of the other. 
4
 See eg Pisani-Ferry (2013).  
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Pact and other surveillance mechanisms. No thought was given to crisis management. In 
addition, until 2010, interpretations of the meaning of Article 125 of the EU Treaty (the no-
bail out clause) differed in different countries and institutions, but these interpretations were 
not discussed, let alone reconciled. 
 
Finally BOP crises were deemed impossible since solvent agents within a country would 
always retain access to private funding. BOP crises were in fact ruled out by most authors. 
Writing in the 1970s, James Ingram thought that “the traditional concept of a deficit or a 
surplus in a member nation’s balance-of-payments becomes blurred. With a common 
currency, no individual country can be exposed to speculative attacks” (Ingram, 1973). This 
view was echoed in the European Commission’s 1990 ‘One Market, One Money’ report that 
paved the way for the design of EMU: “A major effect of EMU is that balance of payments 
constraints will disappear in the way they are experienced in international relations. Private 
markets will finance all viable borrowers, and savings and investment balances will no longer 
be constraints at the national level” (European Commission, 1990). 
 
2.2 Balance-of-payment crises 
 
BOP crises are the bread-and-butter of IMF assistance. However, even the Fund was 
unprepared for the possibility of BOP crises in the euro area. In their surveillance work during 
the period 1999-2009, IMF staff never raised the possibility of major sovereign or balance-of-
payment crises in the euro area despite their intimate knowledge of crises elsewhere and 
potential parallels with the euro area that should have drawn their attention, in particular 
consumption booms, real exchange rate appreciation and large current account deficits, which 
are typical in countries before a BOP crisis (Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff 2011). The 
Commission and the ECB were also unprepared.  
 
What was not well understood in Brussels, Frankfurt or Washington was that euro-area 
countries could face BOP problems like emerging countries. A BOP crisis happens when 
private markets stop financing viable borrowers because of the country they belong to. 
Because it is within the confines of its jurisdiction, the state, as the ultimate insurer of private 
agents – notably banks – tends to concentrate risk incurred by households, companies and 
banks. Banks with assets that are not diversified internationally also concentrate risks 
resulting from the potential insolvency of private agents as well as of the sovereign. As they 
rely on the state as their backstop, they transfer the risk to it. Finally, because in the euro area 
the state issues debt in a currency over which it has no control (De Grauwe, 2011), it is 
vulnerable to liquidity crises. This perspective in turn weakens private agents that hold large 
quantities of government paper.  
 
This web of interdependence between the state, banks and non-financial agents may lead 
markets to price country risk and, in the extreme, to shun all agents located in a particular 
country, irrespective of their individual financial health.   
 
After the Lehman Brothers collapse, financial markets reassessed their exposure to euro-area 
countries that had accumulated large current account deficits and net external investment 
positions before the financial crisis. They concluded that country risk existed in a monetary 
union and suddenly stopped the capital flows to those countries. The result was extreme 
pressure on the most vulnerable euro-area countries. But a classical currency crisis, which 
would have meant the partial disintegration of the monetary union, was avoided thanks to the 
provision of ample liquidity by the Eurosystem (reflected in TARGET2 balances). The private 
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sector could and did lose access to private funding contrary to the predictions in the academic 
literature. Yet, this did not lead to a lack in funding because the Eurosystem through its 
liquidity operations replaced outflowing liquidity. The private capital flow reversals led to 
acute liquidity shortages in the banking systems of the countries concerned. The ECB 
provided liquidity to the banks. It did so in the framework of its Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations (LTRO) as well as the Main Refinancing Operation (MRO) (see eg Pisani-Ferry 
and Wolff, 2012). This is in contrast to typical currency crises, in which national central 
banks cannot replace the withdrawal of foreign-currency financing, which then leads to a 
crisis. 
 
Nonetheless, sovereigns in affected countries did face a payment crisis. Because they had lost 
access to private markets or a least because they were facing escalating borrowing costs, 
governments in Greece, Ireland and Portugal had no choice but to seek foreign assistance to 
fill their financing gap. The problem, especially for Greece, the first euro-area country to face 
such a crisis, was to whom should they turn for such assistance? 
 
2.3 A special set of constraints 
 
Crises in the euro area are characterised by a number of features that distinguish them from 
the situations the IMF normally deals with: 
 
a. Irrevocably fixed exchange rates. According to Laeven and Valencia (2012), a 
majority (37 out of 66) of the sovereign debt crises that occurred between 1970 and 
2011 were accompanied by a sharp currency depreciation. A number of IMF 
programmes, however, were conducted under fixed exchange rates. In the last 20 
years, 44 out of 147 of all non-precautionary IMF Stand-By-Arrangements (SBAs) 
and Extended Fund Facilities (EFFs) were conducted under some variety of fixed 
exchange rate regime throughout the programme period5. Four (Ecuador in 2000 and 
2003, Panama in 1995 and 2000) were even conducted without a separate legal tender. 
Although relatively rare, the absence of exchange-rate flexibility cannot therefore be 
regarded as completely specific to euro-area countries. What was more specific was 
the combination of irrevocably fixed exchange rates and a regime of unfettered capital 
flows; 
b. Full capital mobility. Of the 44 programmes that were conducted under some variety 
of fixed exchange rate regime, only eight, in addition to the euro-area countries, had 
unrestricted capital mobility: Panama (1995 and 2000), Lithuania (2000 and 2001), 
Estonia (2000), Latvia (2008), Djibouti (1996) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002). 
Moreover, using the financial openness measure developed by Chinn and Ito (2007), 
only 21 of 118 non-precautionary IMF programmes for which this measure is 
available were conducted under full capital mobility. 
c. No-monetary financing constraint. In the euro area, national central banks are not 
authorised to extend credit to sovereigns or to buy government debt securities on the 
primary markets. Purchases on the secondary market are not illegal, but they are 
controversial within the Eurosystem, as demonstrated by the disputes that arose over 
the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme and its planned Outright Monetary 
                                                          
5
 Of these 43 programmes under some kind of fixed exchange rate regime throughout the programme period, 27 
were conducted under pre-announced peg or currency board arrangements and eight were conducted under de-
facto currency pegs (Egypt, 1996; El Salvador, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998; Moldova, 1995; Latvia, 2008; and 
Ukraine, 2008 and 2010). Other non-fully flexible exchange rate regimes, such as moving and crawling bands, 
were not considered for this subset.  
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Transactions. Such restrictions may exist in non-euro area countries as part of the 
framework that protects the central bank from government pressure, but they typically 
do not have international treaty status. This particular constraint opens up the 
possibility of a solvent sovereign facing a liquidity shortage, which the central bank 
cannot meet.  
d. Balance-of-payment financing by the Eurosystem. In the international context, IMF 
assistance to countries in a fixed exchange-rate regime typically substitutes the 
insufficiency of international reserves, or intervenes in response to a run on reserves. 
As noted by Holmström and Tirole (2011), the Fund acts as the provider of outside 
liquidity and through the provision of hard-currency loans, it solves the problem that a 
country can only pledge to international lenders income derived from the production 
of tradable goods. In the euro-area context, however, ample liquidity has been 
provided by the Eurosystem6. This stands in contrast to classic BOP crises, in which 
the national central bank cannot offset the withdrawal of foreign currency loans, which 
then leads to a BOP crisis.  
 
In combination, these constraints imply a very different role for international financial 
assistance and a very different policy assignment compared to standard IMF programmes. 
First, in a standard programme the key issue is the financing of the balance of payments and it 
is rare to face sovereign financing constraints once the balance of payments has been taken 
care of. In the EMU case, balances of payments were financed by the Eurosystem, but 
governments needed financial assistance to cover their borrowing needs. Second, in a 
standard programme, monetary and exchange-rate policy are expected to contribute to the 
achievement of a real exchange rate level consistent with a return to external equilibrium. In 
the euro-area case, monetary and exchange rate policy do not exist at the level of a single 
country and the role of adjusting the real exchange rate must be assigned to structural reforms. 
The relationship between structural reforms, domestic inflation and the real exchange rate is 
however very indirect, which makes real exchange rate adjustment particularly difficult in a 
monetary union. 
 
Figure 1 shows the role of international financial assistance and Eurosystem liquidity in the 
case of two programme countries, Greece and Portugal, and in two countries, Spain and Italy, 
that suffered from capital-flow reversals but which did not apply for a programme7. In Greece 
and Portugal, official financing has had to offset a complete reversal of private capital inflows 
accumulated since the beginning of the 2000s. This has been achieved through a combination 
of programme financing and Eurosystem financing. A nearly complete reversal of inflows in 
Spain and a sizeable outflow in Italy have been entirely offset by Eurosystem financing. 
 
                                                          
6
 It has been recorded in the TARGET2 balances.  
7
 Except for bank recapitalisation in the case of Spain.  
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Figure 1: Private capital flows, programme financing and Eurosystem financing, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy, 2002-12 
 
 
Source: Bruegel (updated from Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Note: Data for Ireland is not available on a 
monthly basis. 
 
Figure 1 seems to suggest that euro-area countries have not been confronted with any balance-
of-payments constraint because the Eurosystem entirely offset the withdrawal of private 
capital. This interpretation would not be correct: the Eurosystem does not provide unlimited 
financing of balance-of-payments deficits. ECB liquidity is being provided within the 
framework of its normal procedures such as the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) 
or through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) procedure.  
 
In the case of general liquidity provision procedures, the quantity and quality of available 
collateral sets a limit on the amount of liquidity private banks can have access to. By reducing 
collateral standards for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, the ECB made its liquidity more 
accessible. In spring 2011, the three programme countries together made up more than 50 
percent of total liquidity provided through the MRO and the LTRO windows (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Share of ‘periphery’ countries in ECB main and longer-term refinancing 
operations, 2002-12 
 
Source: Bruegel (updated from Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012). 
 
In the case of emergency liquidity assistance, the ECB can set limits on the amount it is 
willing to provide. ELA actually turned out to be an important source of balance-of-payment 
financing in programme countries (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Emergency liquidity assistance provided by the Greek and Irish central banks, 2003-12 
 
Source: Bruegel based on national central bank balance sheets. Data for Portugal is not available. Note: Buiter 
and Rahbari (2012b) provide estimates consistent with ours. 
 
The main features of the crises in the three programme countries are thus: 
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• Large-scale capital outflows;  
• The vulnerability of sovereigns that borrow in a currency they do not have command 
of; 
• No control over the nominal exchange rate, which implies a longer adjustment 
process; 
• Financing of the balance of payments by Eurosystem liquidity. 
 
This particular combination meant that financial assistance did not have to be tailored to the 
balance-of-payments needs that include the government and private sector needs8. In stark 
contrast to typical programmes, in which the size of an IMF programme is calculated as a 
function of the need to finance the capital outflows from a country and the current account 
deficit, in the euro-area programmes, financing needs were a function of the fiscal needs only. 
We provide below a simplified table of the computed financing needs for the three 
programme countries (Table 1). The financing needs in essence consist of the gross financing 
needs of the public sector less the expected debt roll-over in the public sector, plus the 
resources needed for bank recapitalisation, and, in the case of Portugal, an additional liquidity 
buffer. This is unambiguous evidence that the size of the programmes was computed on the 
basis of government, rather than balance-of-payments, financing hypotheses. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 Barkbu et al (2012) show that capital flow reversals are the main explanatory factor for the size of financial 
assistance in a sample of 40 years of IMF programmes. 
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Table 1: Financing needs and sources 
 
Source: European Commission programme documents (The Economic Adjustment Programme). Note: The 
assumptions for the debt roll-over are for Greece 94 percent (short-term debt) and 36 percent (long-term debt); 
and for Portugal 72 percent (short-term debt) and 42 percent (long-term debt). A more detailed version of this 
table can be found in Appendix 1. The financing needs of Greece are taken from the first programme in 2010 
only. 
 
2.4 Legal issues 
 
When Greece decided to seek international assistance it was a first for a euro-area country.  
Had it been an EU country outside the euro area, it would have turned for financial assistance 
to the IMF just as Hungary, Latvia and Romania did a few months earlier. Like these 
countries, along with the conditional IMF loan, Greece would have received an EU 
conditional loan under the medium-term financial assistance (MTFA) facility, the EU’s BOP 
assistance scheme based on Article 143 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
As a member of the euro area and a member of the Fund, Greece still retained the option of 
obtaining financial assistance from the IMF. However it was not eligible for MTFA assistance 
because Article 143 of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly reserves such assistance to member states 
outside the euro area. 
 
There are different views on why euro-area countries could not benefit from the EU’s BOP 
facility. One, which is often put forward in the discussion in Germany, is that it is the logical 
consequence of Article 125 of the Treaty, the so-called ‘no bail-out clause’. The clause 
stipulates that neither the Union nor individual member states shall be liable for the budgetary 
 Greece Ireland Portugal 
 10Q2-13Q2 2010-2013 2011-2014 
A) General Government deficit 53.0  22.0 
B) Debt amortisation 138.3  80.9 
C) Adjustment 1.5  2.1 
D) Gross financing need (A+B+C) 192.8 98.9 105.0 
E) Debt issuance/Roll-over 93.5 48.9 47.0 
F) Privatisation 0.0 0.0 5.0 
G) Net Financing need (D-E-F) 99.2 50.0 53.0 
H) Bank support 10.0 35.0 25.0 
I) Total Financing need (G+H) 109.2 85.0 78.0 
J) Contribution IMF 30.0 22.5 26.0 
K) Contribution EFSM, EFSF, ESM, EU countries 80.0 45.0 52.0 
Memo: Use of country’s financial buffers  17.5  
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commitments of a member state. This clause was viewed from the outset by the German 
political system as one of the central pillars of the common currency, and as a precondition 
for euro membership. However this interpretation is disputed. 
 
Marzinotto et al (2010) argue that the reason why Article 143 excludes euro-area countries 
has nothing to do with the no bail-out clause. Before the creation of the euro, the MTFA 
facility was available to all EU countries. According to Marzinotto et al (2010), future euro-
area countries were excluded during the Maastricht negotiations simply because negotiators 
believed that BOP crises would not occur in a monetary union. 
 
Irrespective of the exact motives for excluding euro-area countries from Article 143, the fact 
is that when the crisis hit Greece, the EU had no legal framework on which to base financial 
assistance or to work in tandem with the IMF, as it was already doing in non-euro area 
countries. 
 
As the crisis unfolded and more euro-area countries needed financial assistance, different 
financial instruments were created. The first help given to Greece was based on bilateral 
lending, which was pooled by the European Commission and then disbursed to the Greek 
government. In a second step, the balance-of-payments assistance foreseen under Article 143 
was further developed and the EFSM was created (see Council Regulation 407/2010).  
Simultaneously, the creation of the temporary EFSF was decided on by euro-area finance 
ministers. Finally, in October 2012, the EFSF was transformed into the ESM based on the 
intergovernmental ESM treaty. The ESM also required a change to the Lisbon Treaty, a 
modification of Article 136, which allows euro-area countries to take specific measures to 
strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline (de Witte, 2011). 
 
In practice, the three different cases of financial assistance all used a different instrument to 
provide the assistance. IMF lending represents about a third of the overall lending given to 
euro-area countries. The remaining two-thirds was provided through a combination of 
different lending schemes (Box 1). 
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Box 1: Financial instruments used to support the three euro-area countries and 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania 
 
Figure 4 breaks down the overall lending into the loans from different schemes. In the three 
euro-area countries, the size of the overall programmes was about three times the size of IMF 
lending. It amounted to more than 120 percent of GDP for Greece, while it is above 30 
percent for Ireland and Portugal. This compares with typically somewhat smaller programmes 
elsewhere in Europe.  
 
Figure 4: Composition of financial assistance programmes 
 
Source: European Commission, IMF. 
 
In the three euro-area countries, different assistance instruments were used. For Greece, 
lending was initially organised as bilateral lending by euro-area member states pooled by the 
European Commission together with IMF lending. Later, after the creation of the EFSF, 
lending by euro-area countries shifted to the EFSF. In Ireland, EFSM, EFSF and IMF lending 
was combined with bilateral loans provided by the United Kingdom (plus small contributions 
from Sweden and Denmark). Similarly, in Portugal, EFSM and EFSF lending was combined. 
 
In the other three EU countries to which financial assistance was provided, IMF lending was 
combined with the balance-of-payments assistance foreseen in the Treaty’s Article 143. For 
Latvia, the central banks of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Estonia provided 
additional bilateral support via swap agreements. Finally, the World Bank provided small-
scale support to each of the three countries. 
 
Consistent with the absence of a legal base and actual financial instruments, the euro's 
founding fathers also did not conceive that an actual institution may become necessary to 
provide the financial assistance in combination with a programme of conditionality. This 
meant that when the crisis hit, the EU was ill-prepared and did not have the institutional 
means to provide assistance. More specifically, the European Commission had very little 
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experience in providing financial assistance, and the ECB had no experience whatsoever. This 
was one of the reasons why at an early stage several member states insisted on involving the 
IMF in the design of programmes. 
 
In sum, the legal framework resulted in a number of constraints: 
 
• The European Commission is bound by the Treaty in giving policy recommendations 
to member states. This concerns in particular fiscal and macroeconomic policies. De 
facto, these Treaty provisions were overshadowed by programme conditionality, but 
they nevertheless played a role in the Commission’s approach to assistance.  
• Financial assistance to sovereigns in EMU was not foreseen by the Treaty and it was 
regarded by some as illegal, even though the legality of the ESM was later confirmed9. 
When the sovereign debt crisis escalated, creative solutions were used to provide 
assistance regardless. It took several years for a Treaty change to be agreed allowing 
for the establishment of the ESM. 
• There were no institutions in place that could provide such assistance. In practice, to 
overcome technical difficulties and to increase political credibility, a solution 
involving the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF – the 
so-called Troika – was found. 
 
                                                          
9
 European Court of Justice, Judgement of the Court (Full Court) of 27 November 2012. Thomas Pringle vs 
Government of Ireland, Ireland and the attorney general. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CJ0370&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=  
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3. The Troika 
 
In Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the men (and occasionally women) in dark suits come in 
trios: one from the IMF, one from the European Commission and one from the European 
Central Bank. The Troika, as it became known, is the basic structure for negotiation between 
the official lenders and the governments of recipient countries. 
 
3.1 Origins and mission 
 
The Troika originated in the 25 March 2010 decision by the euro area's heads of state and 
government to contribute coordinated bilateral loans to Greece as part of a package involving 
“substantial IMF financing and a majority of European financing”10. The agreement was that 
disbursement of the bilateral loans would be decided on by unanimity among euro-area 
member states. It would be “subject to strong conditionality and based on an assessment by 
the European Commission and the European Central Bank”11. A few days, later the 
Eurogroup announced that “the Commission, in liaison with the ECB”, would start working 
on a joint programme “with the IMF and the Greek authorities”12. On 19 April 2010, the first 
Troika mission started consultations in Athens. 
 
The same template was later applied to Ireland and Portugal (and to Cyprus, which is outside 
the scope of this study). The gradual build-up of a European crisis management regime did 
not result in any meaningful change in the structure and responsibilities of the Troika. 
However, the creation of the ESM in October 2012 and the entry into force of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in January 2013 resulted in a number of 
additional provisions formalising the role and responsibilities of the Troika: Since 1 March 
2013, access to ESM assistance has been limited to countries that have ratified the TSCG13. 
IMF lending, however, remains available to all EU countries in their capacity as Fund 
members. 
 
• The ESM has formally become the organisation responsible for deciding on financial 
assistance. Decisions to grant assistance are taken by its Board of Governors, 
consisting of the finance ministers of the participating countries (in other words, the 
Eurogroup under a different name); 
• Assistance decisions are to be taken by unanimity by the ESM Board, unless the 
European Commission and the ECB both assess that failure to decide would threaten 
the sustainability of the euro area14. In this case, the decision is to be taken by an 85 
percent majority, with voting weights depending on the size of the financial 
contribution to the ESM. 
• The European Commission is entrusted by the ESM with the responsibility of 
assessing the economic and financial situation in the member state requesting 
assistance and its implications for the stability of the euro area as a whole. If 
assistance is to be provided, the Commission is responsible for negotiating “wherever 
possible, together with the IMF”, the conditions for financial assistance. These tasks 
are to be performed “in liaison with the ECB”. Furthermore, the Commission is 
                                                          
10
 Statement by the heads of state and government of the euro area, 25 March 2010 
11
 Ibid.   
12
 Statement on support to Greece provided by euro-area member states, 11 April 2010.  
13
 This provision of the TSCG applies to any assistance granted after 1 March 2013.  
14
 ESM Treaty, Art. 4.4. 
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assigned the role of signing on behalf of the ESM the Memorandum of Understanding 
negotiated with country authorities15. Formally, the Commission therefore acts on 
behalf of the ESM and thus on behalf of the member states.  
 
These decisions are a mere formalisation of existing practice. Nevertheless, they could open 
the way to an evolution that would see the ESM acquire more of the roles currently fulfilled 
by the IMF. We return to this issue in conclusions. 
 
3.2 What is the Troika? 
 
It is important to understand what the Troika is and is not. It is a vehicle for economic and 
financial evaluation and for negotiation. Representatives from the Troika institutions jointly 
take part in meetings with national authorities; assessments are shared and discussed within 
the Troika; assessments are in principle common, although the IMF and the Commission 
prepare separate reports (the ECB does not publish assessments but the Commission reviews 
are prepared “in liaison with the ECB”); negotiations with the authorities are held jointly; and 
agreements on the conditions for assistance are reached simultaneously with the 
representatives of the three institutions. The resulting strategy, in particular as expressed in 
the Letter of Intent and the attached memoranda, is then addressed by the national government 
to the IMF and, on the European side, to the Commission, the ECB, the president of the 
Eurogroup, and the finance minister of the country that hold the rotating EU Council 
presidency. Formal expressions of disagreement exist but they are exceptional (for example, 
the ECB explicitly distanced itself from the inclusion of private-sector involvement in the 
October 2011 debt sustainability analysis for Greece)16. 
 
This modus operandi was adopted at the time of the first Greek programme (Appendix 1) and 
has not been substantially modified since. 
 
  
                                                          
15
 ESM Treaty, Art. 13.  
16
 See Greece: Debt Sustainability Analysis, unsigned document attributed to the IMF, 21 October 2011. 
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Box 2: Programme documents and the role of institutions  
IMF procedures are highly standardised: financial assistance is formally granted to a country 
after the finance minister and central bank governor have addressed to the Fund a 'Letter of 
Intent' outlining broad intentions, and a 'Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies' 
(MEFP) that spells out the policy strategy, planned policy actions and corresponding 
numerical targets. Although handed over by the country’s government under its own 
responsibility, these documents in fact result from negotiations with, and are drafted by, the 
IMF mission team. Once the IMF’s Executive Board has decided in favour of support, the 
implementation of the programme and the fulfilment of the stated objectives are monitored by 
the Fund on a quarterly basis. Each time a review is done and published, the Letter of Intent 
and the associated memorandum are updated and revised. 
 
Assistance to euro-area countries is given based on the same template, but with amendments 
and additions: 
 
• The Letter of Intent and the MEFP addressed to the IMF are copied to the vice-president 
of the Commission in charge of economic and financial affairs, and to the presidents of 
the ECB, the Eurogroup and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN);  
• An additional Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality 
is addressed to the European authorities (European Commission, ECB, Eurogroup and 
rotating EU Council presidency) and copied to the IMF. This is the document that serves 
as a basis for EFSF/ESM financial assistance decision17. 
 
The two memoranda are consistent but not identical. Especially, the European MoU is 
significantly more detailed and includes specific conditions, for example of a structural 
character, that are not part of the MEFP. IMF conditionality therefore has a narrower scope 
than European conditionality. 
 
The Troika, however, is neither a lending nor a decision-making institution. To start with, the 
IMF and the ESM (previously the EFSF, after bilateral loans were folded into a common loan, 
and marginally the EFSM) are responsible for lending. Lending decisions are taken neither by 
the Commission nor the ECB. Loans are provided under different terms by the IMF and ESM, 
even though their conditions and disbursement are coordinated. Consequently, recipient 
countries enter into separate and different financing agreements with the IMF and the ESM. 
The two institutions’ lending facilities are also not identical. Furthermore, the IMF enjoys 
preferred creditor status over the ESM18. 
 
Decisions to release loans are also made separately by the IMF executive board and by the 
Eurogroup. IMF decisions follow standard practice within the organisation but depend 
crucially on the agreement of European partners. European decisions are prepared by the Euro 
Working Group (EWG) in which euro-area governments are represented by state secretaries, 
                                                          
17
 In accordance with, respectively, paragraph (2) of the preamble of the EFSF framework agreement, Art. 3(5) 
of the Council regulation establishing the EFSM, and Art. 13(3) of the ESM Treaty. The MOU is concluded by 
the Commission on behalf of the Eurogroup in the EFSF case, in its own name in the EFSM case, and on behalf 
of the ESM in the ESM case. In the case of the EFSM, the MOU is communicated to the European Parliament 
and the Council.  
18
 As stated in the ESM Treaty (item 13 of ‘Whereas’ provisions).  
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and taken by the Eurogroup (or, since its creation in October 2012, the ESM’s Board of 
Governors)19. 
 
Table 2 summarises the roles of the three partners in the Troika. It is apparent that the main 
roles of the IMF (programme negotiation and monitoring; assistance decisions; lending) have 
been distributed among European institutions. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of roles in IMF and European assistance 
 IMF Euro area 
Programme negotiation and 
monitoring 
IMF Staff Commission services in liaison 
with ECB 
Decision to assist IMF Board ESM Board of governors (aka 
Eurogroup) 
Lending IMF EFSF/EFSM20/ESM 
 
 
3.2.1 The roles of the European Commission and the ECB 
 
An important question from the European standpoint is that of the exact roles of the 
Commission and the ECB and their institutional implications. 
 
The Commission’s role in euro area programmes is much narrower than its role in assisting 
non-euro area EU countries within the framework of Article 143 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which was seen in 2008-09 for Hungary, Latvia 
and Romania. For non-euro countries, the Commission participates alongside the IMF in the 
negotiation of programmes and the actual lending. Money lent is borrowed on the capital 
markets using the guarantee of the EU budget. For euro-area countries, however, the 
Commission has no authority to provide loans (except for the €48.5 billion lent in 2011-13 to 
Ireland and Portugal by the EFSM). It is merely negotiating on behalf of the member states, ie 
the Eurogroup (or the ESM Board of Governors), which provide the financial assistance.  
 
This has two significant implications for the Commission’s role in financial assistance. First 
of all, the Commission acts merely on behalf of the member states, rather than as an 
independent institution representing the general Community interest, which is its normal 
function. In the case of non-euro area EU countries, the decision to grant financial assistance 
is taken by the Council based on a Commission proposal, which comes from the College of 
Commissioners. By contrast, the College has no formal role in cases of assistance to euro-area 
countries. Commission services receive their negotiating mandate from the Commission vice-
President who is responsible for economic and monetary affairs and from the EWG President. 
Second, the dual role of the Commission as an agent of the member states but also as an EU 
institution could lead to tensions. For example, the Commission should enforce the Stability 
and Growth Pact's fiscal policy provisions. Yet, in the programme context, these rules are not 
a primary concern. A particularly interesting case is the dual role of the Commission in the 
context of financial assistance to support bank restructuring programmes. The Commission 
has a clear state aid mandate, with the objective of avoiding competitive distortions and 
                                                          
19
 In the case of Ireland, the UK participated in the financial assistance and was therefore part of the decision-
making body. In the case of both, Portugal and Ireland, EFSM money was involved leading to a different 
decision-making structure. 
20
 For the EFSM, the decisions are taken by the ECOFIN Council based on a formal proposal by the 
Commission.   
24 
 
ensuring the viability of banks and appropriate burden sharing. In the context of a programme, 
member states may have different objectives, potentially compromising the Commission's 
state aid mandate. 
 
The ECB’s role is less clearly defined than the Commission's. The legal texts refer to it in an 
oblique way, using the formula ‘in liaison with the ECB’. Reasons for European authorities to 
request ECB participation in the Troika are not spelled out explicitly, and there is no 
straightforward rationale for this involvement. When the IMF provides conditional assistance 
to a country, that country's national central bank is generally part of the negotiation, but on the 
receiving country’s side of the table. This is true also for assistance to euro-area countries, 
with the ECB being also present, but on the lending side. 
 
There are three possible reasons why the ECB was involved in the initial Greek negotiation. 
First, the ECB de facto had very significant exposure to the country without having any legal 
hold over the supervisory assessment of its banking system. Being part of the Troika meant a 
better assessment could be made of potential risks to the ECB’s balance sheet, and that the 
ECB could have a say over policy decisions that might affect it21. Second, the European 
leaders trusted the ECB and wanted it to be part of the European negotiation team alongside 
the European Commission. Third, the European leaders wanted to make it possible for the 
central bank to participate in the policy discussions because it was fearful of possible 
recommendations from the IMF that would have challenged ECB policies. 
 
3.3 Divisions of labour within the Troika 
 
There is no available systematic evidence on the division of labour within the Troika. The 
IMF and the Commission publish separate assessments and programme reviews, but they are 
closely coordinated. The ECB does not publish its own independent assessment of the country 
situation or progress made on the implementation of the programme. 
 
Our discussions with country teams and governments suggest that there is no strict division of 
labour between the three institutions. The IMF brought in the programme technology and it 
proceeds as customary in countries to which it is providing assistance. The Commission has 
learned the programme technology, with which it was not initially entirely familiar. The 
Commission naturally has in-depth expertise on a number of structural and sectoral policy 
areas (for example, product markets). In addition, it must pay attention to constraints resulting 
from the European framework (for example with regard to the Stability and Growth Pact)22. 
The Commission and the IMF compute the financing needs of the countries separately, 
thereby introducing checks and balances at a technical level. The ECB pays particular 
attention to financial-sector issues, especially the application of global capital standards. 
                                                          
21
 A significant part of the BOP financing is provided by the Eurosystem. De facto, lending decisions are 
therefore also taken by the ECB governing council because of its ability to impose limits to ELA (see for 
example the 31 March 2011 ECB press release on the suspension of the rating threshold for Irish government 
debt instruments). Moreover, governments issue T-bills that are used as collateral vis-à-vis the Eurosystem. 
While this is a monetary risk resulting from a central bank operation with a commercial bank, in case of failure 
of the bank, the central bank ends up being a creditor to the government. Also in the context of the Securities 
Markets Programme, the ECB de facto became a creditor. 
22
 Art. 13 (3) of the ESM Treaty indicates that “The MoU shall be fully consistent with the measures of economic 
policy coordination provided for in the TFEU, in particular with any act of European Union law, including any 
opinion, warning, recommendation or decision addressed to the ESM Member concerned”. This provision 
suggests that the Commission is compelled to include in the MoU conditions that are additional to those implied 
by a standard IMF programme. 
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4. The euro-area programmes in perspective: a comparison with earlier IMF 
programmes  
 
The financial assistance programmes in the euro area are not only special because of the 
Troika construction, the legal constraints and the economic specificities of financial assistance 
resulting from a monetary union. They are also different in terms of size, duration and shape 
compared to earlier IMF programmes. This chapter compares the average of the three euro-
area countries as well as the three euro area countries individually with all non-precautionary 
IMF programmes during 1993-2012 as well as with a subset of programmes in Latin America, 
and with the Asian crisis along a set of key economic indicators. The details of the 
methodology are explained in Box 3. 
 
Box 3: IMF financial assistance programme comparative statistics: the last 20 years 
 
We consider all non-precautionary programmes that have been put in place as Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBA, the workhorse of the IMF, “designed to help countries address short-
term balance of payments problems”) and Extended Fund Facilities (EFF, intended “to help 
countries address medium- and longer-term balance of payments problems reflecting 
extensive distortions that require fundamental economic reforms”, including the three euro-
area programmes). We thus do not include Low-Income Countries (the main target of a wide 
variety of other forms of IMF programmes), countries with very strong fundamentals for 
which a flexible credit line is used and other precautionary programmes that would have 
distorted our sample. 
 
This leaves us with a sample of 147 non-precautionary SBA and EFF programmes between 
1993 and 2012, of which 47 were implemented in central and eastern Europe (including the 
Baltic States), 37 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20 in sub-Saharan Africa, 16 in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, 14 in developing Asia, seven in the Middle East and 
North Africa, four in the euro area (counting Greece twice because there are two programmes; 
the same is done for other countries with more than one IMF loan including consecutive 
loans) plus Iceland and Korea. In all subsequent figures, we will refer to this sample as 'All 
IMF 1993-2012'. 
 
We define a new subset called 'Asian crisis' formed by Indonesia, Korea and Thailand in 1997 
and the Philippines in 1998. The second subset, with which we compare our three euro-area 
countries, consists of Brazil (1998), Argentina (2000) and Uruguay (2002), this subset is 
labelled 'LatAm' in all figures in this chapter. We chose these three Latin American cases to 
form the Latin American subset in our comparative statistics study because they were part of 
one single regional crisis, sharing the same stylised facts, and have strong links with each 
other, similar to the Asian Crisis subset and the euro-area subset. 
 
The three Latin American countries had some form of fixed exchange rate that ultimately 
proved to be unsustainable, because it produced a continuous loss of competitiveness since 
these countries had higher inflation than their trading partners, and their exchange rates were 
either completely anchored or going through a crawling peg with depreciation rates that were 
insufficiently rapid relative to their inflation and labour costs differentials. In all of three cases 
the IMF supported the rigid exchange rate policies implemented by these governments, in 
most cases explicitly in the official documents and in the Argentine case implicitly by not 
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opposing them. Figure 5 shows the development of the international reserves in Brazil, 
Argentina and Uruguay and the eventual abandonment of these rigid exchange rate regimes. 
 
Figure 5: International reserves and exchange rates in the LatAm subset  
 
Source: Datastream. 
For all the comparative graphs in the chapter, the time variable is defined in relation with to 
the IMF programme approval. T indicates the year of approval. If the programme was 
approved in the second half of the year, we take the calendar year as the year T. If the 
programme was approved in the first half of the year, we take the previous calendar year as T. 
We show a simple unweighted average of all programmes. Moreover, we plot one standard 
deviation of the entire sample of 147 programmes to provide a sense of statistical 
significance. 
 
The euro-area programmes are much larger and longer-lasting than previous IMF 
programmes. Figure 6 compares the size in percent of GDP and the duration in years. Euro-
area programmes are 15 percentage points larger with respect to each country’s GDP, and 
2.423 years longer than previous IMF programmes. They are also longer in duration and larger 
in size than those in the Latin American and Asian crises. 
 
Figure 6: Size and duration of IMF programmes by region 
 
Source: Bruegel based on IMF MONA database and IMF WEO (October 2012). Note: Includes only IMF loans; 
in the case of the euro-area countries the duration is as currently scheduled. 
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 The average (and mode) length of the IMF’s programmes between 2003 and 2012 was 3 years, the same 
length as the Irish and Portuguese programmes, while the average length of the whole non-precautionary subset 
(1993-2012) is 1 year; the Greek programme is 5.85 years long as currently scheduled.  
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Figure 7 shows the size of IMF loans to individual euro-area countries compared to previous 
loans. The loan to Greece in particular is considerably larger than previous loans. This holds 
both in terms of their size measured in per cent of GDP, as well as in terms of their absolute 
size. 
 
Figure 7: Size of IMF loans (1993-2012) 
 
Source: IMF MONA database and IMF WEO (October 2012). Note: The diameter of the circles indicates the 
absolute size of the loans in US dollars. 
 
The large size and long duration of the loans to euro-area countries implies that IMF lending 
activity has become increasingly focused on Europe and the euro area in particular. Figure 8 
shows the geographic distribution of outstanding IMF loans. While in the decade before the 
crisis, there was virtually no IMF lending to EU countries, by end of 2012, the EU share of 
outstanding IMF loans was more than 70 percent. Most of these loans went to the euro area 
(56 percent of total outstanding IMF loans). 
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Figure 8: Weights of Europe, the EU and three Troika programme countries in total IMF 
lending 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (February 2013) and Bruegel calculations. Note: Europe: Includes 
all EU27 countries plus Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Turkey. 
 
In summary, the three euro-area financial assistance programmes have drawn very 
substantially on the IMF's resources, even though IMF lending only contributed to about one 
third of the overall programmes, as shown by Figure 4. 
 
How do the three euro-area programme countries compare in terms of their macro-economic 
performance before and after the start of programmes? Given the size and duration of the 
programmes, one would expect an extraordinarily difficult macroeconomic situation. We first 
study whether the programmes came at a period of extraordinary global financial stress. We 
then show the development of debt, deficits, current accounts, GDP growth and the exchange 
rate from five years prior to the programme to five years after the start of the programme. For 
the euro-area countries, this means including two years of forecasts for Greece and three years 
of forecasts for Portugal and Ireland. 
 
We first look at indicators of the global environment such as global growth and financial 
stress in the year in which the programme started. Certainly, the euro-area crisis was preceded 
by a period of unique global financial stress. When the three programmes started, global stress 
as measured by the VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index) and the 
US sovereign-corporate bond spreads was still particularly high. 
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Figure 9: Financial stress at the time of programmes 
 
Source: Datastream, IMF Mona database and Bruegel calculations. Note: Average level of the stress indicators in 
the year when the programme starts. 
 
The euro crisis also happened at a time of a significant slowdown in global growth, though 
global growth had recovered significantly by the beginning of the programmes. However, it 
would be going too far to ascribe a significant role to these factors because the level of risk 
aversion was not much greater than in the other periods under consideration, and growth – 
while being lower – may have been comparatively high right before the great recession. We 
therefore doubt that the external environment explains the very significant size and duration 
of the programmes. 
 
Figure 10: Absolute and relative global real GDP growth  
 
Sources: IMF WEO October 2012, IMF Mona database and Bruegel calculations. Note: the right hand panel 
shows global real GDP growth in the year before the approval of each IMF programme relative to average global 
GDP growth in the previous 10 years.  
 
Turning to the debt-to-GDP ratio, average debt levels in the three programme countries was 
significantly higher (115 percent) than the average IMF programme country (61 percent). It 
was also higher than that in our Latin America (71 percent) and Asian crisis (44 percent) 
subsets. In Ireland, the debt-to-GDP ratio was significantly below that in an average IMF 
programme case five years ahead of the start of the programme. However, Irish indebtedness 
increased very substantially in the five years in the run-up to the programme, leading to a debt 
to GDP ratio above the average debt level of 61 percent in the year when the programme 
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started. Similarly, in Portugal, there has been a significant increase in the debt to GDP ratio 
pre and post the programme start date. 
 
Figure 11: Government debt-to-GDP ratios in IMF programme countries  
Source: IMF WEO (October 2012), IMF Mona database and Bruegel calculations. 
 
Corresponding to the substantial and increasing debt levels are very large fiscal deficits before 
the programmes started. The average deficit in the euro area one year ahead of the 
programmes was almost 19 percent of GDP, a number which is particularly high because of 
the high Irish deficit related to its bank bail-outs. Weymes (2012) estimates the impact of 
banking assistance in Ireland in 2010 to be 20.2 percent of GDP. But deficits were also much 
higher in Portugal and Greece than in typical IMF programme countries, and the levels are 
clearly higher than the standard deviation across the sample. 
 
Figure 12: General government net lending/borrowing 
Source: IMF WEO (October 2012), IMF Mona database and Bruegel calculations. 
 
The large deficits in euro-area programme countries resulted in part from major private-sector 
imbalances that were unwinding following the bursting of the credit and housing market 
bubbles. This was true in particular in Ireland, but large private sector imbalances that 
subsequently had an impact on public finances also existed in Greece and Portugal. 
 
The three euro-area countries also stand out in terms of their net international financial 
liabilities. Greece, Ireland and Portugal has external financial liabilities of close to 100 
percent of GDP at the onset of their programmes, well above the 43 percent that was the 
average in all countries in our sample at the start of their programmes. 
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Figure 13: Net international investment position  
Source: Bruegel calculations based on updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), and Eurostat. 
 
High external financial liabilities were largely a result of persistently high current-account 
deficits. Euro-area countries at the beginning of the programmes had with current-account 
deficits that were much more significant than in any of the other country groups examined. In 
the three euro-area countries, the reduction in current-account deficits started a couple of 
years before the programme began and amounted over the course of 10 years to a turnaround 
of around 10 percentage points of GDP (Figure 14). Current-account deficits were much 
smaller at the beginning of previous IMF programmes. Moreover, there is no clear change in 
the current account deficits in the 10 years around the programme. 
 
Figure 14: Current account balance  
Source: IMF WEO (October 2012), IMF Mona database and Bruegel calculations. 
 
Euro-area programme countries also stand out in terms of economic growth. Their growth 
rates dropped more significantly than in the Latin American and Asian cases, and remained 
very subdued during most of the period under consideration. 
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Figure 15: Deviation from GDP growth trend  
 
Source: IMF WEO (October 2012), IMF Mona database and Bruegel calculations. Note: The growth trend is 
computed as the average growth in the 10 years preceding the programme. 
 
In terms of the performance of the exchange rate, the euro-area countries are again different 
from the typical crises in Asia and Latin America. Figure 16 shows the dramatic depreciation 
seen during the Asian and the Latin American crises and the also very substantial decline in 
the real effective exchange rate around the time of the programme. In contrast, among the 
euro-area countries, only Ireland saw a significant exchange rate adjustment in real effective 
terms. Indeed, Irish prices and wages dropped dramatically during the course of the 
programme. By contrast, in Greece and Portugal, the price adjustment is relatively slow. 
 
Figure 16: Real effective exchange rates 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Darvas(2012). Note: The double depreciation of the average REER of the Latin 
American cases is mostly driven by the behaviour of the Argentinian peso. REER is based on CPI.  
 
Unemployment in the euro area during the course of the programme increased much more 
dramatically than it did during earlier IMF programmes, and exceeded very significantly 
historical standard deviations of unemployment increases. In the three euro-area countries, 
unemployment increased by more than 10 percentage points on average, with the greatest 
increase in Greece. 
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Figure 17: Unemployment rate relative to previous 10-year average 
Source: IMF WEO (October 2012), IMF Mona database and Bruegel calculations. 
 
Figure 18: Size of debt restructurings (1980-2012) 
 
Source: Juan J. Cruces and Christoph Trebesch (2011). Note: the diameter of the bubbles indicates the absolute 
size of the loans in US dollars.  
 
Overall, the comparative data shows the dramatic situation in the euro-area programme 
countries compared to the situation during previous IMF programmes. The imbalances at the 
start of the programme, in particular in terms of debt, external debt, deficits and current 
accounts, were much greater than those seen in previous programmes. In addition, average 
countries in earlier programmes saw significant depreciations in their real exchange rates, 
while price adjustment in euro-area countries has been moderate, except for Ireland. 
Unemployment increased much more dramatically in the three euro-area countries than in 
previous IMF programmes, and debt restructuring in Greece was the largest in history. 
 
Our findings are largely consistent with those of Barkbu et al (2012), who studied the 
historical record of financial crises and multilateral responses. They compare the 1980s debt 
crises, the Tequila crisis, the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis and the European crisis consisting 
of the eight recent European programmes. One of their findings is that emergency lending in 
the last forty years has tended to increase, while debt restructuring has tended to become less 
likely or has been delayed. 
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5. Assessing the three euro-area programmes 
 
5.1 Methodological issues 
 
The evaluation of assistance programmes raises a number of typical yet difficult 
methodological issues: 
 
1. Programmes are based on forecasts, and forecast errors are unavoidable and should not 
be confused with programme failures. A programme can, for example, fail to reach the 
pre-set targets because of a less-favourable-than-expected external environment, yet 
can be simultaneously successful in that the main goals – say, macroeconomic 
balance, financial soundness and market access – have been achieved;  
2. The programme parameters – say, the terms of financing or the associated conditions – 
are often subject to renegotiation. An assessment cannot take the initial parameters as 
given and neglect their evolution over time. In addition, this evolution can in part be 
regarded as an endogenous response to early results; 
3. Not all policy decisions taken by a country result from the assistance programme. 
National governments might have taken important policy-adjustment decisions before 
the programme negotiations, and might continue to take initiatives after them. 
Furthermore, the programme itself is only part of the overall international framework 
that affects policy decisions. Decisions by policy institutions taken outside the context 
of the programme can be of major importance for its outcome;     
4. Programme success is contingent on implementation by national authorities. Failure to 
implement does not necessarily imply that the programme was ill-designed, at least 
from a strictly economic standpoint. It may mean, however, that not enough attention 
was given to domestic political-economy factors and the need to ensure national-level 
ownership; 
5. Programme outcomes cannot be assessed in isolation because they are affected by 
spillovers from other countries. These can arise from economic interdependence 
channels such as trade and capital flows, and from contagion channels arising from the 
conclusions drawn by markets on the implications for a country of decisions taken in, 
or about, another country24. 
 
All five of these issues are highly relevant for the EU-IMF programmes in euro-area 
countries. To start with, all three programmes were initiated at a time when the euro area was 
expected to recover smoothly from the 2009 recession. Initial developments were in line with, 
or ahead of, expectations, but after mid-2011 the recovery stalled, capital markets got 
excessively nervous about the very survival of the euro, and the growth trajectory turned out 
to be significantly lower than forecast (Figure 19). When assessing the programme results, it 
is therefore important to discount the impact of a less favourable external environment, in 
particular after 2012. 
 
                                                          
24
 See Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002) for a discussion on the distinction between interdependence and 
contagion. They define contagion as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country. 
A classic example of contagion was the rise in emerging market spreads after the 1998 Russian default. This rise 
could only be explained by the fact that market participants had drawn general lessons from the treatment of the 
Russian crisis by the G7 and the IMF.  
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Figure 19: The changing euro-area growth forecast 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. Note: GDP growth projection vintages. 
 
Second, the euro-area programmes have been subject to constant renegotiation and 
redefinition, to a much greater extent than standard IMF programmes, for which the template 
is standardised and well-tested. The Greek programme, for example, started with the 
assumption that EU leaders had made up their mind and rejected the option of debt 
restructuring for euro-area members. Only five months later, in October 2010 in Deauville, a 
different stance was adopted, and after another nine months, in July 2011, debt restructuring 
was officially endorsed as an option for Greece. Yet the size of that restructuring was revised 
again three months later, in October 2011. Simultaneously, the interest rate on official 
European lending was revised several times. 
 
Third, major decisions were taken outside the framework of the programmes. In the Irish case, 
adjustment started before the negotiations with the Troika, and the programme did not alter 
the policy course in a fundamental way. In all three cases, decisions by EU institutions that 
were not formally part of the programmes still had a significant bearing on their outcomes. 
European Central Bank policy is the best example of this: neither the Securities Market 
Programme (SMP) of spring 2010 and summer 2011, nor the three-years Long-Term 
Refinancing Operation (LTRO) of end 2011-early 2012, nor the announcement of the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in summer 2012 were part of the 
programme design, yet they, in particular the LTRO and OMT, had significant effects on 
bond markets. 
 
Fourth, implementation by national authorities was very uneven. In Greece, especially, 
government support for the programme weakened at an early stage, a series of political 
upheavals affected the country’s willingness and ability to implement agreed measures, and 
negotiations with the Troika were regularly interrupted. The situation was different in Ireland 
and Portugal. 
 
Fifth, contagion between countries was particularly pervasive in 2010-12 when the euro area 
was in the process of setting the rules on the basis of case-by-case decisions. Repeatedly, 
decisions taken about the Greek debt problem affected bond spreads in other countries. Rating 
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agencies very explicitly linked assessments of the solvency of the weak euro-area sovereigns 
to the jurisprudence set in Greece25. Decisions taken on the treatment of Irish bank creditors 
also affected the funding conditions for banks in other countries. Caution should therefore be 
exercised when assessing country programmes one by one. 
 
The issue, in a nutshell, is that we are facing a major identification problem. There is no 
methodology that makes it possible to isolate precisely the set of policy initiatives that 
corresponds to an assistance programme and to evaluate their effects independently from 
changes in other relevant variables affecting the policy outcome. 
 
In what follows we make extensive use of the programme documents. For the euro-area 
countries, the IMF and the European Commission published, at the start of each programme, 
comprehensive documents presenting the Troika diagnosis, the strategy deemed appropriate, 
the list of policy measures subscribed to by the government, and associated economic 
forecasts. These documents were then updated every quarter on the occasion of the reviews 
carried out by the Troika to take into account international and domestic economic and policy 
developments. Together with actual data and other forecasts from other sources (in particular 
the IMF and the European Commission), these documents provide the basis for our 
assessment. 
 
However, for the reasons indicated above, comparisons between programme forecasts and 
outcomes provide only partial and biased indicators of success. In analysing them we aimed to 
determine:  
 
• What changed in the country’s economic policy and financing conditions when the 
programme was agreed; 
• Whether the economic strategy outlined in the initial programme was consistent and 
appropriate, given the information available at the time of its publication, and 
whether the policy instruments that the strategy relied upon were sufficient to reach 
the stated goals; 
• If outcomes turned out to be less favourable than expected, and if so, if this was due 
to flaws in the strategy, to implementation failures, or to changes in the external 
environment. 
 
It should be emphasised that we are not, however, providing a counterfactual analysis. This 
would have implied assessing actual Troika programmes against alternative programmes with 
different priorities or modalities. This is a real limitation, but one that is difficult to overcome 
in macroeconomic evaluations. In view of the particular conditions of the euro area, there are 
even fewer natural experiments we can refer to than for standard IMF programmes26. 
Moreover, developing alternative programmes and testing them with macro models is beyond 
the scope of our report. 
 
                                                          
25
 A May 2011 assessment of the consequences of a Greek default by Moody’s, the rating agency, concluded that 
“a confirmation that the euro area was willing to let one of its members default would inevitably cause investors 
to reassess the limits of euro area support. That, together with the assumption that other weak euro area 
sovereigns might be more likely to choose to take similar steps to Greece – particularly if a Greek restructuring 
were perceived as ‘orderly’ – could result in Ireland and Portugal, and perhaps stronger countries such as 
Spain and even Italy and Belgium, finding market access considerably more expensive”. Source: Moody’s 
Investors Service, 'Assessing the Effect of a Potential Greek Default', Special Comment, 24 May 2011. 
26
 The issue of counterfactuals has also been raised in assessments of the work of the IMF’s Independent 
Evaluation Office. See Lissakers (2006).  
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5.2 A very special context 
 
To evaluate financial assistance programmes in the euro area, it is necessary to start from the 
special circumstances of a monetary union. In chapter 4, we saw that financial assistance 
programmes in the euro area are larger and longer, and that unemployment increased much 
more significantly, than elsewhere. We also saw that in the euro area, programmes were only 
used to support public finances, whereas large balance-of-payments assistance was given to 
the private sector via the banking system’s access to the ECB liquidity window. So two 
questions need to be asked: why was the programme size so extraordinarily large, and why 
was the programme duration so long? The answer to these questions can be found in the 
specific situation in the euro area at the beginning of the crisis in terms of institutional set-up, 
degree of financial integration and size of imbalances. 
 
In the run-up to the crisis, financial markets regarded EMU as completely stable and 
dismissed the possibility of a liquidity – let alone solvency – crisis. Sovereign risk premia 
were largely absent and euro financial markets were highly integrated. While financial 
globalisation meant that cross-border financial holdings relative to GDP increased by 149 
percentage points in the US and 69 percentage points in Japan between 1999 and 2007, such 
cross-border financial holdings increased by 351 percentage points in euro-area countries. In 
other words, monetary union led to a very high degree of cross-border financial integration 
(Figure 20)27. 
 
Figure 20: Cross-border assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Bruegel estimations based on updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), IMF and Eurostat. Note: Euro area refers to the current 17 member states. Intra-euro area 
holdings are counted as cross-border. 
 
The high degree of financial integration was almost unanimously celebrated as a success of 
monetary union, by policy makers, market participants and academics. Yet, as the crisis 
unfolded, markets and policy makers realised that financial market integration was too 
advanced compared to policy integration and to the underlying level of political, social and 
institutional integration. It was also biased towards debt instruments rather than risk-
absorbing equity instruments. The appropriate infrastructure to regulate and supervise, let 
                                                          
27
 See European Commission (2012) and Lane (2012).  
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alone resolve, cross-border financial institutions was largely absent28. The banking system 
was also deeply exposed to government debt and the negative feed-back loop led to a 
significant deterioration of financial conditions. In short, the euro-area financial and banking 
system was extraordinarily fragile. 
 
Second, the counterpart of large downhill capital flows was a significant increase in the 
indebtedness of the corporate, household and government sectors. The combination of high 
debt levels and real exchange rate misalignments lead to the contradiction that countries 
would simultaneously need higher and lower inflation: higher inflation in order to reduce 
debt-to-income ratios and lower inflation in order to restore competitiveness. 
 
Third, in the absence of nominal exchange rate adjustment in a monetary union, wages and 
prices would need to be sufficiently flexible. With the inflow of capital into peripheral 
countries because of EMU, the three future programme countries witnessed significant 
booms, low unemployment rates and wage increases significantly exceeding productivity 
developments, especially in the non-traded sector. The over-valued real exchange rate has 
been difficult to correct in the programme countries, because of insufficient wage and price 
flexibility – the exception being Ireland. Lower inflation rates, in turn, mean that the real 
interest rate is too high compared to the cyclical situation. 
 
A fourth important aspect is the economic growth outlook in partner countries. Economic 
growth in the euro area in 2012-13 has been extremely weak. The EU has not provided a 
solution for the weak growth pattern resulting from expensive financing conditions in some 
major member states, the loss of confidence in the sustainability of the euro, relatively 
restrictive fiscal policies and, to some extent, deeply enshrined structural weaknesses. This 
combination had a deep impact on the design and success of the programmes. 
 
The fragility of the euro-area financial system left its mark on the programmes in three main 
ways: 
 
• The imposition of losses – on bank creditors or government bond holders – was 
considered highly dangerous for the stability of the system. As a result, the size of the 
programmes became larger and the cost imposed on taxpayers was also significant; 
• All euro-area countries had to be considered systemic because failure to succeed in 
any of them could have had major consequences for the resilience of the euro area as a 
whole. This was most apparent for Greece, where the Troika hardly had the option of 
walking out of difficult negotiation phases;  
• Financial instability in some parts of the euro area meant that other parts, including the 
programme countries, would be affected by contagion.    
 
The absence of the nominal exchange rate instrument, an important tool for adjusting real 
price misalignments in typical IMF programmes, resulted in the focus being put on a 
combination of structural and fiscal policy to achieve adjustment. The hope was that structural 
reforms would trigger significant aggregate productivity boosts that would help reduce the 
unit labour cost gap, even in the presence of a low degree of nominal wage flexibility. Fiscal 
consolidation was also seen as a way to trigger wage adjustment – in particular through public 
sector wage restraint. 
                                                          
28
 It is currently in the process of being built up, a policy agenda dubbed 'banking union'. At the time of writing, 
the banking union is not yet in existence. 
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As for growth, in typical IMF programmes the foreign growth environment can be taken as 
given. In the euro-area context, the fragility of the three programme countries, the contagion 
effects on other peripheral countries and the overall incomplete architecture of the euro area 
resulted in significantly worse euro-area growth than desirable for the success of the 
programmes. 
 
These factors were present alongside the difficult situation at euro-area level and in the 
individual countries. Every major political and economic set-back in Greece meant renewed 
calls by senior politicians in the north of Europe to stop the programme and eject Greece from 
the euro area. In turn, the political situation in the north of Europe had implications for the 
other programmes as well. The design of the programmes itself was significantly shaped by 
political motivations and decisions in the Eurogroup. Moreover, political uncertainty about 
the willingness of national governments to progress with further institutional reform to fix the 
birth defects of the euro area continues to be a major obstacle. 
 
In addition, procrastination by national and EU authorities in coming to terms with the 
necessity of financial assistance probably resulted in bigger programmes than if financial 
intervention had taken place before market access was lost, or even preventively. Support at 
an earlier stage could have been associated with continued market financing and therefore it 
could have resulted in smaller official financing packages. It could also have prevented the 
rise in financing needs for the financial sector. 
 
5.3 A horizontal overview 
 
It is against this complex economic and political situation that our evaluation has to be 
undertaken. Certainly at the beginning of the Greek programme, nobody could foresee the 
series of major policy choices that euro-area policy makers would be confronted with (See 
Annex 2: Timeline of events). We acknowledge that this has been a major difficulty for the 
Troika, which makes our assessment of its performance particularly challenging. 
 
Before getting into the details of the individual programmes, we provide some elements of 
comparison between them. Table 3 documents the considerable complexity in terms of 
different financial contributors. It also shows the extraordinary size of the Greek programme. 
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Table 3: Overview of the Financial Assistance Programmes in Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
 
 Greece Ireland Portugal 
 
1st programme 2nd programme   
Date May 2010 until 
June 2013 
March 2012 until 
end 2014 
December 2010 until 
end 2013 
May 2011 until mid-
2014 
Size €110 bn €164.5 bn29 €85 bn €78 bn 
Nature IMF: SBA 
EA: Greek Loan 
Facility 
IMF: part of EFF 
€28 bn30 
arrangement 
EA: EFSF 
IMF: EFF 
EA: EFSF 
EU: EFSM 
Bilateral  
Ireland  
IMF: EFF 
EA: EFSF 
EU: EFSM 
 
Contributors IMF (€30) 
Pooled bilateral 
from EA (€80  bn) 
 
IMF (€19.8 bn) 
EFSF (€144.7 bn) 
 
IMF (€22.5 bn) 
EFSF (€22.5 bn) 
EFSM (€22.5 bn) 
UK (€3.8 bn) 
Sweden (€0.6 bn) 
Denmark (€0.4 bn) 
Ireland: Treasury and 
National Pension 
Reserve Fund (€17.5 
bn) 
IMF (€26 bn) 
EFSF (€26 bn) 
EFSM (€26 bn) 
 
Source: DG ECFIN. Note: The abbreviations stand for SBA: Stand-By Arrangement; EFF: Extended Fund 
Facility; EFSF: European Financial Stability Facility; EFSM: European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism. 
 
Table 4 compares forecasts for 2013 at the outset of the programmes with the latest available 
forecasts for 2013. The table shows that programme projections were way off in Greece, but 
much less so in Ireland and Portugal. In all three countries, however, the increase in 
unemployment was underestimated. Moreover, in particular in Greece and Ireland, the 
contraction of domestic demand was significantly underestimated. In terms of inflation, the 
forecast changes were close to those realised in Ireland and Portugal, but for Greece, expected 
inflation was significantly lower than realised inflation rates. Finally, the improvement in the 
current account was generally better than predicted. 
 
  
                                                          
29
 Euro-area member states and the IMF approved an additional €130 billion for the term 2012-14; this was 
added to the undisbursed amounts (€34.5 billion) of the first programme (Greek Loan Facility). Hence, the total 
of the second programme amounts to €164.5 billion. 
30
 The IMF approved a four-year arrangement under the EFF for Greece in March 2012. €19.8 billion of this 
arrangement were contributed to the second Troika programme for Greece. The other €8.2 billion will be 
disbursed in the two years after the end of the Troika programme (ie 2015 and 2016). 
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Table 4: Economic indicators for 2013: projections vs. outcomes 
 
  Greece Ireland Portugal 
Source 
Programme AMECO Programme AMECO Programme AMECO 
May-10 Feb-13 Feb-11 Feb-13 Jun-11 Feb-13 
Projection* 2009-2013 cumulated 2010-2013 cumulated 2010-2013 cumulated 
Real GDP (% 
change) -3.5 -21.0 5.4 2.4 -2.8 -6.5 
Domestic demand 
(% change in 
volume) 
-11.8 -28.4 -3.4 -11.1 -10.5 -14.0 
HICP (% change) 3.4 8.3 2.6 2.8 6.9 7.0 
Projection 2013 2013 2013 
General 
government deficit 
(% of GDP) 
-4.9 -4.6 -7.5 -7.3 -3 -4.9 
Current external  
balance (% of 
GDP) 
-5.6 -4.3 2.6 3.4 -3.9 -1.4 
Unemployment (%) 14.8 27 11.6 14.6 12.4 17.3 
General 
government debt 149.7 175.6 120.5 122.2 108.6 123.9 
Net IIP (negative) 106.0** 97.6 n.a. n.a 123.4** 106.1 
 
Source: European Commission economic adjustment programmes, European Commission forecasts as of 
February 2013 retrieved from the AMECO database. Note: * Data for 2009, respectively 2010 refer to end of 
year data. The date is the year before the programme started. **Taken from IMF programme documents as not 
available in European Commission economic adjustment programme. 
 
So what can explain the better than predicted net export performance? We look at the 
development of total exports and compare them with EU27 export developments and world 
export developments. While Ireland and Portuguese exports have broadly performed similarly 
to EU exports overall, the Greek export performance has been worse (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21: Total exports (goods and services) at current prices. 
 
Source: WTO Statistics database. 
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When we look in more detail at what the programmes initially forecast for 2013, and compare 
that with the outcome according to the February European Commission estimate, two results 
stand out. First, export growth plays a significant role in the change of the current account in 
Ireland, and to some extent in Portugal and Greece, during the programme period (Figure 22). 
In Portugal and Greece, exports disappointed compared to what the programme initially 
predicted, while in Ireland, the export performance matched the forecast very closely. Second, 
the better than expected outcome in terms of the current account is to a significant extent 
determined by the greater than expected decline in Greek and Portuguese imports. In Ireland, 
by contrast, imports increased during the programme period contrary to the forecast 
contraction. Consistent with the erroneous projection of demand developments, the 
programmes did not project a significant contraction of Greek or Portuguese imports. 
 
Figure 22: Change in the current account during the programme years (as % of 2013 GDP) 
 
Source: AMECO winter forecast 2013, European Commission programme documents. Note: The durations of 
the programme are from the beginning of the programme until the most recent available data: 2010 to 2013 for 
Greece and Ireland, and 2011 to 2013 for Portugal. The projected data is taken from the European Commission's 
original Economic Adjustment Programmes. 
 
Current-account performance is of course related to the development of relative prices and 
costs. Figure 23 shows the very strong pre-crisis divergence relative to euro-area trading 
partners and the adjustment since the beginning of the crisis. Unit labour costs adjusted first in 
Ireland and later in Greece and Portugal, while the developments of the GDP deflator have 
been more muted. As discussed by Wolff (2012), producer prices thus seem to move more 
sluggishly than costs. The consequence has been a larger-than-planned reduction in real 
wages. 
 
In the individual country sections, we discuss the specific price adjustments. Yet, the 
horizontal view already indicates that lagging price adjustment may have been one of the 
reasons for the relatively slow pick-up in growth. 
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Figure 23: Real effective exchange rates, based on unit labour costs (left panel), and GDP 
deflators (right panel), performance relative to the rest of the former EU15: double export 
weights 
 
Source: Ameco, February 2013. Note: dotted lines correspond to the AMECO Feb-13 forecast. 
 
The programmes started at a time when risk premia in the sovereign bond market were rising 
fast. Figure 24 shows that after the start of the programme, the credit default swap (CDS) risk 
premia typically continued to rise until turning later on. The turning points came at different 
times. In Ireland, risk started to decline in the summer of 2011, while in Portugal, risk peaked 
in the spring of 2012. In Greece, the positive effect of the debt restructuring on yields is 
clearly visible. This could suggest that declining risk premia were not only the result of action 
at the European level but also reflect a reassessment of the economic situation of each 
country. 
 
Figure 24: 5-year credit default swaps and 10-year benchmark bond yields 
 
Source: Datastream. Note: The vertical lines indicate the approval of the IMF financial assistance programmes in 
each case. 
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5.3.1 Greece 
 
The Greek programme is by far the least successful of the three under review. Since its 
inception in May 2010, it has been held back by economic disappointment, financial about-
faces and political upheavals. The implementation of agreed measures has repeatedly 
disappointed the Troika. Economic performance has been dismal and social hardship much 
more devastating than expected. The restructuring of private claims on the Greek sovereign 
was repeatedly rejected as an option, only to be introduced in February 2012, yet it did not 
take long for the IMF to argue that there was a need to go further and contemplate also the 
restructuring of official assistance loans. In early 2012, the IMF and the euro area were forced 
to add €130 billion to the initial €110 billion programme, and to extend its duration far 
beyond the initial three-year horizon. Politically, the adjustment has proved domestically very 
controversial: after three general elections in three years, formerly dominant parties have seen 
their approval ratings dwindle and have been forced into a fragile coalition.  
 
Yet the adjustment programme continues, market nervousness has diminished since summer 
2012 and Greece is still part of the euro area. In this respect the programme has achieved what 
was perhaps its main aim. 
 
It is important to find out what explains this outcome. In the next section, we first provide a 
quantitative account of economic developments since the May 2010 start of the programme. 
We then examine possible explanations for this outcome, and offer a few conclusions. 
  
5.3.2 Anatomy of a setback 
 
Greece entered into a stand-by agreement in May 2010. The start of the programme was the 
provisional conclusion of a sequence that started with the disclosure of budgetary deficit 
figures far in excess of what had been communicated to the EU in the previous years. The 
country suffered at the same time from massive fiscal imbalances, excessive private credit and 
a severe deterioration in competitiveness. It was much less open than other European 
economies of similar size, its traded-goods sector was underdeveloped, rent-seeking was 
pervasive, the state machinery was largely ineffective and tax evasion was common. By any 
possible standard, ensuring adjustment within monetary union was bound to be a challenge of 
exceptional magnitude. 
 
The Troika and the Greek government designed a programme focused on fiscal rebalancing 
and competitiveness. Front-loaded fiscal adjustment was considered indispensable to restore 
confidence in public finances and bring about the rebalancing between domestic and external 
demand. A structural reform package was devised with the aim of restoring competitiveness 
in the medium term. It was expected that: 
 
• Growth would resume in 2012; 
• Unemployment would peak at 14.8 percent in 2012; 
• No debt restructuring would be needed; 
• The debt ratio would peak in 2013 at 149 percent of GDP; 
• Government would recover full market access in 2013. 
 
These hopes were unambiguously dashed by events. Three years on, the programme is off-
track by a wide margin (Table 5). 
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Table 5: Greece in 2013: expectations versus reality 
 
 Initial 
programme 
(May 2010) 
 January 
2013 
forecast 
Performance 
relative to 
expectations* 
Real GDP (2009=100) 96.5 79.6   
Nominal GDP (base estimate for 2009=100) 99.2 77.8   
Real domestic demand (2009=100) 89.7 72.5   
Gross fixed capital formation (2009=100) 82.6 56.6   
Unemployment rate (per cent) 14.3 26.6   
Government deficit (per cent of GDP) -4.8 -4.5   
Government gross debt (per cent of GDP) 149 178.5   
Exports of goods and services (billions of euros) 60.6 50.6   
Imports of goods and services (billions of euros) 57.5 51.2   
Current-account balance (per cent of GDP) -4.0 -1.2   
Source: IMF programme documents. Note: * red: worse than expected; yellow: as expected; green: better than 
expected. 
 
It is not unusual for IMF programmes to disappoint in comparison to initial forecasts, but 
orders of magnitude are usually much smaller. On the basis of an assessment of 159 
programmes, the IMF Independent Evaluation Office found that growth disappointed in about 
60 percent of programmes, and that the average output shortfall over a two-year period was 
1.5 percent and -6.4 percent in cases of capital account crises (IEO, 2003, Table 5.3). An 
output shortfall as large as Greece's could only be found in one percent of the programmes. 
 
The differences between performance indicators are also remarkable. Greece under the 
programme experienced a true collapse in domestic demand and especially of fixed 
investment. In January 2013, unemployment in 2013 was expected to be more than 12 
percentage points higher than foreseen at the outset of the initial programme. But the 
government deficit was expected to be 2 percentage points higher only and the current 
account was expected to be closer to balance. 
 
To monitor these developments in more detail, we look at key indicators and their expected 
evolution at roughly one-year intervals in the initial May 2010 programme, the March 2011 
third review, the March 2012 request for an extended agreement and the January 2013 second 
review of the extended arrangement. Unless otherwise indicated, all data is taken from IMF 
documents. 
 
Growth and employment  
 
As Figure 25 shows, the programme was still roughly on track at the time of the March 2011 
third review. However, there was a sharp deterioration between spring 2011 and spring 2012, 
and a further deterioration between spring 2012 and spring 2013. Instead of a slowdown in the 
pace of contraction followed by a stabilisation, as expected in March 2011, the decline in 
domestic demand accelerated sharply in 2011 and continued in 2012. In 2011 fixed 
investment declined by close to 20 percent. This collapse was not offset by foreign trade. On 
the contrary, exports performed worse than initially hoped. 
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Figure 25: Projections of real GDP and domestic demand 
 
Source: IMF programme documents. 
 
The same pattern can be seen for unemployment. Although a significant deterioration was 
thought likely in the initial programme, the unemployment rate was expected to peak in 2011. 
In fact the deterioration went much further. The projected increase in the unemployment rate 
between 2009 and 2013 is expected to be 17.2 percentage points in the January 2013 review, 
against 4.9 in the programme – more than three times more (Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26: Projections of the unemployment rate 
 
Source: IMF programme documents. 
 
Wages, prices and the real exchange rate 
 
The initial programme foresaw a moderation of inflation in 2010 and a small decrease in 
consumer prices in 2011, followed by a gradual convergence towards a one percent inflation 
rate (Figure 27). This scenario was compatible with a slow improvement in the real exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area. Competitiveness gains were, however, expected to take 
place, as a consequence of productivity-enhancing reforms affecting the traded-goods sector 
and the economy as a whole. 
 
In reality consumer price index (CPI) inflation increased in 2010, partly as a consequence of 
the rise in the VAT rate, and started to decline in 2012 only. By this measure the real 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro area is not expected to post a material improvement by 2013. 
The GDP deflator-based real exchange rate suggests improvement already in 2012, albeit a 
modest one. 
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Figure 27: Projections of CPI inflation and the real exchange rate 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF programme documents, European Commission Economic Forecast, 
Bruegel calculations. Note: As the first programme did not include projections for unit labour costs, we rely on 
consumer prices instead to compute the projected evolution of the real exchange rate. The CPI for the euro area 
is taken from the closest vintages of the IMF’s bi-annual World Economic Outlook.  
 
It is only for wage-based competitiveness indicators such as unit labour costs that the 
improvement is noticeable. Thanks mostly to downward wage adjustment, ULCs started to 
decline already in 2010 and the trend accelerated strongly in 2011-12. 
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Public finances 
 
Notwithstanding the February 2012 restructuring, the debt ratio in 2013 is expected to be still 
significantly above the initial target. As a proportion of GDP, the government balance is 
expected to be 1.9 percentage points worse than envisaged in the first programme (Figure 28). 
This gap, however, can be entirely ascribed to the fact that the actual 2009 deficit was itself 
notably worse than assessed at the time of the launch of the first programme. In terms of 
change, the 2009-13 evolution as foreseen in January 2013 is the same: almost 9 percent of 
GDP. 
 
Figure 28: Projections of the general government balance and primary balance 
  
Source: IMF programme documents. 
 
This is an extraordinary result in view of the sharp deterioration of the output forecast. It can 
be first explained by a large drop in the interest payments (€8.4 billion or 5.2 percent of GDP 
in 2013 according to the January 2013 forecast, instead of €18.9 billion as initially foreseen), 
which itself resulted from improvements to the terms of lending by the EFSF/ESM, and from 
the rescheduling agreement of February 2012. Second, the improvement in the primary 
balance has remained almost as strong as initially envisaged (€24.7 billion between 2009 and 
2013, instead of the initially expected €27.8 billion). As the economy shrank, Greece 
increased its efforts to meet the deficit targets and largely succeeded. 
 
Its performance is clearly less brilliant in terms of the public debt ratio, largely because initial 
conditions and the shrinking of the denominator mechanically affected the result. In spite of 
higher inflation, nominal GDP significantly falls short of the rebound expected in the first 
programme. In the initial programme it was expected to have returned by 2013 to the then-
estimated 2009 level. In the January 2013 forecasts, it was expected to be more than 20 
percent lower (Figure 30). 
 
Against this background, the Troika pushed for a meaningful privatisation plan. In the first 
Troika programme privatisation receipts were expected to be nearly negligible: €3 billion 
during the 2010-13 period, roughly 0.3 per cent of GDP per year, a target the IMF staff 
considered “disappointing”. As public debt concerns worsened, the Troika exerted increasing 
pressure on the government to be more ambitious, especially as public-sector assets – not all 
of which were marketable – were assessed to be worth nearly €200 billion (85 percent of 
GDP)31. It was hoped that in 2012-13, privatisation could raise about one percent of GDP per 
                                                          
31
 See Table 18 in the IMF’s Second Review, December 2010. 
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year. In addition, divestiture of state assets was expected to contribute to economic 
performance. 
 
Enthusiasm for privatisation was however dashed. Politically, the Troika was accused of 
pushing for the dismantling of state property. Economically, weak equity market conditions 
undermined potential revenues. In December 2011, the Troika recognised that results had 
disappointed but nevertheless set as a goal that privatisation proceeds should reach €11 billion 
by end-2012, €20 billion by end-2013 and €35 billion by end-201432. This was still quite 
ambitious. However the envisaged programme was not carried out in 2012, partly because of 
the two elections the country went through in the first semester. In early 2013, privatisation 
receipts for 2012 were assessed as negligible. 
 
Figure 29: Greek privatisation plans 
 
Sources: IMF programme documents. 
 
In retrospect, the Troika repeatedly proved to be too optimistic about the ability and 
willingness of the government and the privatisation agency to prepare and execute 
privatisation plans. 
 
Figure 30: Projections of the gross government debt ratio and nominal GDP 
 
Source: IMF programme documents. 
 
Table 6 details the contributions of various factors to the changes in the deficit and debt ratios 
between the 2010 commencement of the programme and the January 2013 review. 
Concerning the deficit, the very large revenue shortfall resulting from adverse growth 
                                                          
32
 See Annex Table 1 in the December 2011 Review  
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developments was largely offset by an additional fiscal effort estimated to be of the order of 
magnitude of 7 percentage points of GDP over four years, or almost two percentage points per 
year. This considerable consolidation came on top of the major effort already pencilled in in 
the first programme. Concerning the debt ratio, significantly worse initial conditions and the 
mechanical effects of a lower nominal GDP were the two main factors accounting for the gap 
between the initial and the final debt ratios. Restructuring contributed to reducing the 2013 
debt ratio by 25 percentage points, but this was nowhere near enough to offset the two adverse 
factors. 
 
Table 6: Greece - breakdown of the gap between May 2010 and Jan 2013 fiscal targets for 
2013  
 
(All variables expressed as % of GDP) 
  Primary 
balance 
Overall 
balance 
Gross debt 
2013 target as set in the May 2010 SBA 
programme 
3.1 -4.8 149.0 
-   Worse 2009 initial conditions -1.8 -2.0 14.3 
-   Revenue shortfall due to adverse GDP 
developments  
-9.0 -9.0  
-   Effect of lower nominal GDP  -1.0 38.4 
-   Interest rate on public debt  4.5  
-   Larger than expected overall deficits   1.733 
-   Fiscal consolidation effort (residual) 7.7 7.8  
-   Debt accumulation residual    1.7 
-   Debt restructuring   -26.6 
2013 result as forecast in the January 2013 review 0.0 -4.5 178.5 
 
Source: Bruegel calculations, IMF programme documents. Note: See methodology in Appendix 2. 
 
External account 
 
The external balance is the one indicator for which there have been positive developments 
during the last three years: the current-account deficit has shrunk faster than initially expected 
and it is expected to nearly vanish in 2013. This development is not due to an improvement in 
the trade balance, however: in 2013 Greece is expected to post a small (-0.3 percent of GDP) 
trade deficit instead of a 1.3 percent of GDP surplus. Exports that were supposed to grow at 
about 6 percent annually in volume terms stagnated in 2011-12 and are only expected to 
rebound modestly in 2013. Imports have contracted severely, in line with the collapse of 
domestic demand. So the Greek economy does not exhibit any sort of competitiveness revival. 
In comparison to the assumptions of the first programme, the improvement in the current 
account stems exclusively from lower interest payments – because of the restructuring and 
higher unilateral transfers. 
 
                                                          
33
 The deviations from the initially projected overall balance in 2010 and 2011 were partially compensated by the 
smaller than expected overall deficits in 2012 and 2013 as consequence of the debt restructuring. 
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Figure 31: Projections of the current-account balance and the trade balance 
  
Source: IMF programme documents. 
 
5.3.3 Reasons for setbacks 
 
The Greek programme may still achieve its ultimate goal of keeping Greece in the euro area 
and of making it able to recover and grow. But the IMF and the ESM have had to commit 
many more resources and for a much longer period than initially envisaged, and results 
remain deeply disappointing, and the ultimate outcome uncertain. 
 
It was not immediately obvious that things would turn out this way. As indicated already, 
macroeconomic evolution in 2010 was roughly in line with programme forecasts and the first 
evaluations by IMF services were positive: the first review in July 2010 spoke of an 
“impressive start”, the second, in December 2010, assessed the programme as “broadly on 
track”. But the situation took a turn for the worse in 2011. Against the background of 
heightened market concern, domestic demand and GDP growth underperformed markedly, 
investment collapsed and exports stagnated. The programme went off-track and the 
unsustainability of Greece's debt became obvious. 
 
In the following sections, we examine a number of possible explanations for this failure: 
 
• The external environment was more adverse than expected; 
• Euro-area policies were inconsistent; 
• Implementation by the Greek authorities was inadequate or insufficient; 
• Debt restructuring should have been front-loaded; 
• Fiscal austerity has been excessive; 
• Not enough weight was given to the structural reform and competitiveness 
objectives. 
 
Adverse external environment 
 
As shown in Figure 3, Greece, until summer 2011, benefitted from a rather benign external 
environment. Growth in the euro area remained positive, broadly in line with forecasts made 
in May 2010. The environment during the first fifteen months of the programme was thus 
significantly better than later, when the Irish and Portuguese programmes were in their early 
stages. 
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European policy indecision 
 
The Greek programme undoubtedly suffered from the hesitant European policy stance. The 
start of the programme was delayed by lingering uncertainty about the principle, procedures 
and terms of assistance. After Greece revealed on 16 October 2009 the extent of its budgetary 
misreporting, it took eight months to agree on an assistance programme. By the time the 
programme started, market access had been lost. The terms of European assistance were 
revised several times. The announcement in Deauville in October 2010 that debt securities 
would include collective action clauses from 2013 onwards sent confusing signals about the 
stance towards restructuring. Debt restructuring and the desirable extent of private-sector 
involvement were the subjects of numerous discussions, and less than four months after the 
heads of state and government agreed on a scheme in July 2011, it was replaced by another – 
deeper – scheme in October 2011. Even the desirability of adjustment within the euro area 
was a matter for open discussion, which contributed to market doubts about Greece’s 
membership of the euro. These vacillations created an atmosphere of uncertainty about the 
context in which the programme was being executed and its chance of success. The 
uncertainty impacted bond rates significantly and reverberated in the domestic policy debate. 
 
External factors, however, are certainly not the only reason why the programme went off 
track. Errors in its design and calibration and adverse domestic developments also played 
major roles. 
 
Inadequate and insufficient programme implementation 
 
Troika members are adamant that the major cause of the setback was lack of implementation 
on the Greek side. More precisely, they claim that the commitment of the Greek authorities 
started to waver towards the end of 2010, and stalled in late spring 2011. Quarterly reviews 
and press releases published by the Troika or the IMF indeed confirm that from this period 
until autumn 2012, the Troika repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the implementation of 
the programme, especially about structural reform (Table 6). 
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Table 7: Greece - Troika and IMF statements on programme implementation, 2011-12 
Date Document Statement 
11-12/2/2011 Troika statement The underlying fiscal and broader reforms necessary to 
deliver the program’s medium-term objectives are being 
put in place [..] Greece’s economic programme remains 
on track. 
3/6/2011 Troika statement Reinvigoration of fiscal and broader structural reforms is 
necessary to further reduce the deficit and achieve the 
critical mass of reforms needed. 
8/7/2011 Statement by the MD of the IMF The program is delivering important results: the fiscal 
deficit is being reduced, the economy is rebalancing, and 
competitiveness is gradually improving. However, with 
many important structural reforms still to be 
implemented, significant policy challenges remain.  
11/10/2011 Troika statement The reform momentum has not gained the critical mass 
necessary to begin transforming the investment climate 
[..] It is essential that the authorities put more emphasis 
on structural reforms in the public sector and the 
economy more broadly. 
5/12/2011 Statement by the MD of the IMF The program is in a difficult phase, with structural 
reforms proceeding slowly, the economy weak, and the 
external environment deteriorating. 
9/3/2012 Statement by the MD of the IMF Restoring competitiveness and a sustainable fiscal 
position will require Greece to undertake sustained and 
deep structural reforms over a prolonged period. 
5/8/2012 Troika statement Staff teams [..] concluded a visit to discuss with the new 
authorities the economic policies needed to restore 
growth and competitiveness, secure a sustainable fiscal 
position, and underpin confidence in the financial system 
in line with the objectives of the economic adjustment 
program. 
17/10/2012 Troika statement The authorities and staff teams agreed on most of the core 
measures needed to restore the momentum of reform and 
pave the way for the completion of the review. 
Discussions on remaining issues will continue. 
Source: IMF Website. 
 
Official press releases tended towards understatement. For more than a year, at a crucial 
juncture, implementation of agreed policies was deficient and the Greek authorities, the 
parliament and government bodies in charge of enforcement lacked ownership of the 
objectives and priorities of the programme.  
 
In hindsight, it is clear that lack of implementation was a major hindrance to policy reform. 
The Troika overestimated the effectiveness of the Greek government machinery and its ability 
to follow through on priorities and measures agreed in principle by Greece's political leaders. 
Without underestimating the responsibility on the Greek side, this suggests that the Troika 
could have made more effort at an earlier stage to build capacity and to tailor the programme 
in such a way that its implementation could be assured once agreed. 
 
True, technical assistance was provided, by both the Troika (for example to the tax 
authorities) and, later, the European Commission (through the Task Force on Greece). But it 
proved insufficient. 
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Delayed debt restructuring 
 
In retrospect, debt restructuring should have taken place at an earlier stage or should have 
even been front-loaded – at least, judging from the Greek viewpoint. In the initial programme, 
debt was expected to peak in 2012-2013 at 149 percent of GDP, an already perilously high 
figure, and the government was supposed to maintain for several years a 6 percent of GDP 
primary surplus, a performance in excess of what other OECD countries have been able to 
achieve (Darvas et al, 2011). By the time of the third review, in March 2011, it was already 
clear that revisions to the 2009 debt and deficit levels were making this scenario even more 
unlikely, even though the programme seemed to be on track from the growth and fiscal 
adjustment standpoints: in spite of its greater expectations for privatisation receipts, the IMF 
expected the debt ratio to peak 10 percentage points higher at 159 percent of GDP. As growth 
began to disappoint markedly during 2011, public debt unsustainability became obvious. 
 
Furthermore, there were two internal contradictions in the economic and public finance 
strategy. First, to restore sustainability Greece needed a nominal GDP growth rate that was 
unrealistic for an uncompetitive economy in need of real exchange-rate depreciation. The 
Troika correctly assessed in May 2010 that Greece suffered from a debt sustainability 
problem and a competitiveness problem, and it estimated its real over-valuation to be of the 
order of 20-30 percent. There was an inherent tension between the two objectives of debt 
sustainability and real depreciation, which was recognised in the first programme, when it 
noted that “policies to restore external price competitiveness, which in a monetary union have 
to rely on reductions in domestic costs and prices, will initially weigh on economic activity, 
government revenue and debt dynamics”. 
 
The second contradiction – in fact an avoidable inconsistency – was caused by European 
leaders rather than the Troika negotiators: the excessive stringency of lending conditions. 
European insistence that, in order to prevent moral hazard, financial assistance could only be 
provided at penalty rates, led credit to be priced at Euribor + 300 basis points (rising to 
Euribor + 400 basis points after three years)34. As recognised later, this lending policy was 
inconsistent with the aim of ensuring sustainability, and it helped fuel market expectations of 
an eventual restructuring. 
 
Restructuring was advocated early on by outside observers and market analysts. But 
according to participants in the negotiations between the Troika and the Greek authorities, it 
was not seriously considered as an option in the spring 2010 discussions, for several reasons: 
 
• First, the fiscal situation seemed significantly better than it was: as indicated in Table 
9, both the deficit and the debt ratio for 2009 were still underestimated.  
• Second, an early debt restructuring could have led Greek citizens to believe that they 
could shift the burden onto non-residents at no cost, which would have discouraged 
domestic consolidation efforts. 
• Third, an early restructuring could have had noticeable spillover effects on the rest of 
the euro area. Banks were vulnerable to the Greek sovereign risk both directly, as they 
were holding more than €50 billion in Greek government securities, and indirectly, 
through their exposure to the Greek banking system. 
                                                          
34
 In the words of the euro-area leaders “The objective of [the financial assistance] mechanism will not be to 
provide financing at average euro area interest rates, but to set incentives to return to market financing as soon 
as possible by risk adequate pricing” (statement on assistance to Greece, 25 March 2010). 
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• Fourth, debt restructuring would have set a precedent for other heavily indebted 
sovereigns.  
 
For these reasons the ECB and several euro-area governments were adamant that restructuring 
had to be avoided. Reportedly, none of the key players advocated it strongly. 
 
For the IMF, the decision not to advocate restructuring was difficult. As already discussed , 
the Greek programme involved exceptionally large loans from the IMF, far in excess of 
standard access limits. IMF rules state that lending in excess of the limits is only possible if 
“a rigorous and systematic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the 
member’s public debt is sustainable in the medium term”. This would have excluded Greece, 
for which the IMF appraisal was that “on balance, staff considers debt to be sustainable over 
the medium term, but the significant uncertainties around this make it difficult to state 
categorically that this is the case with a high probability”35. In a clear if implicit reference to 
Greece, the solution was to amend the rules to authorise the IMF to lend in excess of limits 
when “there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers”36. 
 
By the end of 2010, however, it was increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that a 
restructuring was unavoidable. Spreads on 10-year government bonds vis-à-vis Germany had 
remained close to or above 800 basis points for six months, and projections indicated that 
return to a safe debt ratio required implausibly high primary surpluses for an extended period 
(Darvas et al, 2011). The IMF’s third review of the programme mentioned “large risks” to 
sustainability, “including from growing contingent banking sector liabilities”37. By the time 
of the fifth review in July 2011, the IMF was advocating “deep private-sector involvement” 
(PSI) over and above that agreed on 21 July. But agreement on the principle of such a deep 
PSI had to wait until October 2011, and negotiations were only completed in February 2012. 
The delay had a high cost as more holders of government debt were reimbursed on par in the 
meantime, implying deeper net present value cuts for the remaining holders and limiting the 
impact on debt sustainability of the restructuring. Furthermore, uncertainty over the debt 
settlement clouded the policy agenda during 2011. 
 
Excessive austerity 
 
The fiscal stance is difficult to measure but the IMF, the European Commission and the 
OECD concur: between 2009 and 2013 Greece implemented an exceptionally vigorous fiscal 
consolidation package (Table 8). On average, retrenchment amounted to more than four 
percentage points of GDP per year. It was significantly more in 2010 as the programme called 
for a front-loaded adjustment. 
 
  
                                                          
35
 Greece: Staff Report on Request for Stand-By Arrangement, May 2010, p. 20.  
36
 Amendment of 9 May 2010 on access policy and limits. See Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the 
IMF, Thirty-Sixth Issue, 31 December 2011.  
37
 Third review under the SBA, March 2011, p. 9.  
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Table 8:  General government structural balance, Greece, 2009-13 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012(e) 2013(f) Change 
Initial programme 
(IMF) 
-10.0 -2.4 0.8 2.8 4.6 14.6 
Current estimates   
IMF -18.6 -12.1 -8.3 -4.5 -1.3 17.3 
European 
Commission 
-14.8 -8.1 -4.7 -0.5 1.8 16.6 
OECD -16.5 -9.3 -4.9 0.0 2.5 19.0 
Source: IMF WEO database, October 2012; European Commission AMECO database, March 2013; OECD 
Economic Outlook database, December 2012. 
 
Table 8 indicates that retrenchment went significantly beyond what was envisioned in the 
first, already very ambitious, adjustment planned in the first programme. The rationale for the 
initial strategy was that Greece needed a massive, front-loaded adjustment to put public debt 
on a sustainable path, stem excessive domestic demand, cut the external deficit and restore 
confidence. Furthermore, as Greece had lost market access, a slower pace of budgetary 
adjustment would have mechanically implied more official lending, for which there was no 
willingness among European leaders. The recessionary impact of these measures was 
recognised but it was hoped that in the short run they would be partially offset by a strong 
export performance and that domestic demand would start to recover in 2012. 
 
It is difficult to assess whether the programme went off-track because the macroeconomic 
impact of the fiscal adjustment exceeded what had been pencilled in, or for other reasons. 
Greece in 2010 was already in recession and it was evidently hazardous to impose a 10 
percent of GDP shock to a leveraged and uncompetitive private economy. Private demand 
could hardly replace public demand in a context in which banks, having been rendered fragile 
by their exposure to the sovereign and by the rising proportion of non-performing loans, were 
in the process of tightening access to credit. Further developments increased the severity of 
the banking problem, leading to additional credit tightening and adverse consequences for 
domestic demand. 
 
It is sometimes argued that the deterioration of the economic situation did not arise from 
austerity but from a confidence shock resulting from the confusing statements made by 
European policymakers at and after the Franco-German Deauville meeting. The increase in 
bond spreads and the rise in credit default swaps and the resulting worsening of the banking 
sector situation were factors in the programme's failure to reach its objectives. 
 
Monthly indicators give mixed messages (Figure 32). It is true that some indicators at the end 
of 2010 suggested a further deterioration of the situation after a period during which 
stabilisation at a low level had been observed. At the same time, the programme itself resulted 
in clear compression of domestic demand when it started in mid-2010. 
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Figure 32: Selected monthly indicators, Greece, 2009-12 
 
Source: Bank of Greece, Bulletin of Conjunctural Indicators. 
 
Competitiveness and structural reforms 
 
According to the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies annexed to the May 2010 
request for a stand-by arrangement, “the main objectives of the programme [were] to correct 
fiscal and external imbalances and to restore confidence”. The programme indeed started 
from the recognition that Greece suffered from a budgetary problem and a competitiveness 
problem. It also acknowledged that to correct fiscal and external imbalances at the same time 
was “challenging” and required a “major reorientation of the economy”. 
 
Addressing the first problem required nominal GDP to grow and to contribute to alleviating 
the debt burden. Addressing the second in the low-inflation context of the euro area and 
closing the competitiveness gap by the end of the programme required the GDP deflator to 
drop or at least to remain roughly constant, which, against the background of a real domestic 
demand adjustment, mechanically implied a significant worsening of the sustainability 
conditions. 
 
To reach these twin objectives, the strategy was to make the fiscal adjustment “the 
cornerstone of the programme”, to use income and social security policies to “buttress the 
fiscal adjustment effort and restoration of competitiveness” and to introduce structural 
reforms to “boost the economy’s capacity to produce, save and export”, while maintaining 
financial stability. The intended assignment was therefore to rely on a major, front-loaded 
fiscal adjustment effort to strengthen public finances, and to rely on a combination of public-
sector instruments (such as wage reductions) and private-sector reforms (such as the reform of 
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the wage bargaining system) to set in motion a unit labour cost reduction and disinflation 
process. 
 
From the outset there was an unmistakable asymmetry in the programme: while the correction 
of fiscal imbalances relied on a clearly defined set of budgetary instruments, the effectiveness 
of structural reforms in delivering the intended competitiveness gain was bound to be much 
more elusive. In particular, the programme did not rely on a fiscal devaluation strategy (for 
which it was probably estimated that the country lacked fiscal space). Initially, there was also 
to be a discussion on making the abandonment of the fourteenth month of salary38 a part of 
the programme conditionality, but this option was rejected. As a consequence, the GDP 
deflator was expected to experience a small decline in 2011 (-0.5 percent) and to grow at 
about one percent per year thereafter. This was insufficient to restore price competitiveness 
and led to reliance on optimistic assumptions about the ability of the tradable sector to 
engineer an export rebound. 
 
Almost two years later, in March 2012, the memorandum attached to the request for an 
extended arrangement under the EFF included an unambiguous recognition of failure on the 
competitiveness front. It spoke of “a good deal of primary fiscal adjustment” but only of 
“some improvements in unit labour costs” that left a competitiveness gap of 15-20 percent 
and highlighted the tension between these objectives. It noted that “the economy’s tendency to 
correct the competitiveness gap through wage and price reductions, and thus a deep 
recession, works directly against efforts to improve the fiscal position and financial stability. 
And efforts to improve the fiscal position, without a competitiveness boost, generate large 
negative multiplier effects (with no interest rate and exchange rate channels to offer offsets).” 
 
Recognising that “uneven progress towards restoring competitiveness [pointed] to a need to 
recalibrate the programme strategy”, the IMF concluded that “a shift in the structural reform 
strategy to directly prioritise internal devaluation”. The Commission was equally explicit, 
indicating that “in the second programme, the implementation of the growth-enhancing 
structural reform agenda [gained] prominence [...] while the debt restructuring and higher 
official financing [allowed] a slower fiscal adjustment and a more gradual privatisation 
process”39. 
 
Structural reforms and considerable slack in the labour market eventually resulted in nominal 
wage adjustment. According to the European Commission, the unit labour costs-based real 
effective exchange rate indicator relative to the rest of the euro area declined by 14 percent 
between the first quarter of 2010 and the third quarter of 2012. Troika-supported reforms have 
furthermore encouraged decentralised wage agreements and there is evidence of a deeper 
decline in firm-level wages. The problem is that indirect taxes, administrative prices and 
terms-of-trade factors, and the persistence of rents in protected sectors have contributed to 
keeping prices high. 
 
                                                          
38
 In the Request for Extended Arrangement (March, 2012), it is mentioned that “if competitiveness 
improvements remain elusive by end-year, it was agreed to consider more direct interventions (in this context, 
staff viewed a suspension of the 13th/14th monthly salaries as one way to deliver an upfront reduction in all 
relative wages).” But this was not mentioned in the First and Second Reviews under the Extended Arrangement 
(January, 2013).  
39
 See European Commission, “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece”, Occasional Paper 
94, March 2012. 
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A simple Phillips curve confirms these observations (Figure 33). It is apparent that in spite of 
the very high unemployment rate and the high degree of slack in the economy, disinflation 
until 2011-12 remained slow. Furthermore, wages adjusted much more than prices, implying 
higher-than desirable purchasing-power losses and a lower-than-desirable improvement in 
competitiveness. 
 
Figure 33: Phillips curve for Greece (1990-2013) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO data. Note: The Phillips curve is a standard representation of the relationship 
between wage or price inflation and the unemployment rate. 
 
This re-examination led the Troika to push for a much more detailed structural reform agenda. 
While the first programme merely indicated the key reforms deemed necessary, the second 
started from the observation that Greece “does not have the capacity” for a strategy of 
“rapid, full and effective implementation of reforms”. Consistent with this observation, the 
Memorandum on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (MSEPC) of March 2012 included 
an extremely detailed list of actions to be undertaken, each associated with a strict timetable. 
This list has continued to grow and the MSEPC of January 2013 includes 26 pages of 
conditions relative to structural reforms with budgetary relevance and 22 pages of conditions 
relative to labour and product markets. While the scope of reforms has admittedly remained 
the same, the programme now specifies the minutiae of what has to be done in which sector 
by what date. 
 
This move was the logical consequence of the need to rely on structural instruments as a 
substitute for the lack of an adjustable nominal exchange rate, and of the Greek authorities’ 
inability to implement enacted reforms. It is nevertheless in stark contrast with the IMF’s 
stated philosophy of ‘parsimonious conditionality’, adopted in the aftermath and on the basis 
of the experience of the Asian crisis. Instead of streamlining conditions and focusing on the 
“core area[s] of Fund responsibility” – financial stability, macroeconomic stabilisation and 
“closely related” structural measures, as advocated in the 2002 guidelines for conditionality, 
the Troika has immersed itself more and more in the sector-specific regulation of 
microeconomic behaviour. 
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5.3.4 Conclusions: Lessons from the Greek programme 
 
Correcting the major disequilibria that had accumulated in the Greek economy while keeping 
the country in the monetary union was bound to be an exceptionally difficult challenge: not 
only because both the fiscal imbalance and the real exchange rate misalignment were both 
very large, but also because the economy was rather closed and because the government 
machinery was ineffective. Furthermore, political ownership of reforms was partial at best. In 
2010-11 there were significant voices within government and the parliamentary majority that 
did not support the agenda proposed by the Troika. Finally, the EU was undecided on its 
stance towards Greece: the principle, timing, conditions and modalities of assistance were all 
matters for continuous and often inconclusive discussion. 
 
The Troika was not responsible for these extraordinarily adverse conditions. It was perhaps 
not even fully informed of the true extent of the economic, administrative and political 
challenges – although the past misreporting of budget numbers was enough reason to be 
cautious. The EU and the IMF learned from developments on the ground and accordingly 
adjusted the parameters of the programme. 
 
Nevertheless, what was known should have been enough to err on the side of caution and to 
calibrate a programme that would have had a greater probability of success. 
 
This did not prove possible. Political reluctance in Europe to start debt restructuring, the fear 
of potential moral hazard effects and the absence of effective mechanisms to contain its 
possible financial fallout made this option unappealing. The alternative, nearly-concessional 
lending within the framework of a large and long-lasting assistance programme, was not 
politically palatable either. This conundrum led the IMF and the EU to bet on the 
materialisation of optimistic tax revenue and privatisation assumptions. Instead of formulating 
a robust programme capable of withstanding adverse economic, political and financial 
developments, they did just the opposite. It is no surprise that these optimistic assumptions 
were not vindicated by events. 
 
In spite of significant economic and political setbacks, the programme was not derailed 
completely. A few months after the technical government of Lucas Papademos completed the 
PSI in early 2012, implementation stalemate ended in the aftermath of the June 2012 election. 
The new government endorsed a consolidation and reform agenda, which made it possible to 
unlock financial assistance. Speculation about a possible Greek euro exit has abated, halting 
(even reversing) deposit outflows and making it possible for the government to concentrate on 
the domestic agenda. However, the short-term economic outlook remains grim. 
 
Beyond macroeconomic achievements or the lack thereof, fairness has gradually emerged as a 
major issue, especially in connection with tax matters. As noted by the IMF, by early 2013, 
“the mounting sense of social unfairness [was] undermining support for the programme”40. 
Although the programme could not be characterised as unfair from a public finance 
standpoint, it did not correct pre-existing inequalities and the high degree of tax evasion41. 
Furthermore, the substantial absolute impact it had on the bottom deciles and the 
distributional effects of a very high level of unemployment added to the perception that there 
was a disregard for fairness. 
                                                          
40
 IMF, First and Second Reviews under the Extended Arrangement, January 2013.  
41
 See Avram et al (2013) on the distributional effects of fiscal consolidation in Greece and other European 
countries. 
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5.4 Ireland 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
When on 21 November 2010 Ireland became the second euro-area country to officially 
request financial assistance, it had already been in crisis for more than two years. The 
Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland was formally agreed in December 2010. It 
included a joint financing package of €85 billion for 2010-13 with contributions from the 
EU/EFSM (€22.5 billion), euro-area member states/EFSF (€17.7 billion), bilateral 
contributions from the United Kingdom (€3.8 billion), Sweden (€0.6 billion) and Denmark 
(€0.4 billion) and funding from the IMF (€22.5 billion). Moreover, there was an Irish 
contribution of €17.5 billion through the Treasury cash buffer and National Pension Reserve 
Fund investments42. 
 
The design of the Irish programme cannot be understood without being aware of pre-crisis 
developments. When Ireland entered the monetary union, its catching-up process was largely 
over. The 'Celtic Tiger' was among the top group of European countries according to a 
number of indicators, and GDP per capita was already above the euro-area average. Ireland 
then experienced a very large real estate boom (see Figure 34) accompanied by a massive 
credit expansion. The real estate boom resulted from a combination of (1) overly optimistic 
expectations, (2) lower interest rates, (3) capital inflows into the banking system, (4) tax 
incentives for property speculation and home buying, and (5) poor regulation of banks. The 
subsequent ECB rate cuts during the euro-area downturn in 2002-03 further added to the 
boom. The domestic construction sector grew very significantly. At the same time, Irish 
households increased their direct property holdings in the hope of continuing capital gains. 
Private sector balance sheets were inflated as a consequence. 
 
Figures 34 and 35 show the extraordinary expansion of private credit in Ireland, which 
according to Nyberg (2011) was quite concentrated in speculative property lending. 
Meanwhile, public debt had fallen to a very low level. However, public revenue was heavily 
dependent on the real estate boom. Public expenditure (wages, salaries, benefits) dramatically 
increased on the back of this artificial boost to revenues. While the headline budget was in 
balance, the underlying structural deficit was substantial (Regling and Watson 2010). 
 
                                                          
42
 Information taken from European Commission, Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/ireland/index_en.htm, retrieved on 17/03/2013. 
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Figure 34: Ireland, UK, Germany - house price index  
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Figure 35: Ireland – evolution of loans and gross national income  
 
Source: ECB, Eurostat. 
 
When the real estate boom came to a halt at the end of 2006, the economy entered a severe 
downward spiral. The most immediate effect was doubt about the banking system. Irish banks 
had tapped international capital markets on a large scale. When the global interbank market 
froze during the 2007-08 financial crisis, the Irish banking system started to experience 
liquidity problems. To prevent a banking system collapse, the Irish government at the end of 
September 2008 issued an almost complete guarantee protecting the creditors of all domestic 
Irish banks43. That guarantee protected all retail and corporate deposits (to the extent that they 
were not covered by existing deposit protection schemes), interbank deposits, senior 
unsecured debt, asset-covered securities and dated subordinated debt. Only undated 
subordinated debt was left out of the guarantee. The guarantee was valid for two years and 
was called the Credit Institutions Financial Support Scheme (CIFS). In December 2009, the 
government introduced a second scheme called the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee Scheme 
                                                          
43
 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2008/en.act.2008.0018.pdf 
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(ELG) to allow credit institutions to issue debt securities and take deposits with a maturity 
beyond September 2010, when the first scheme was due to expire. 
 
The decision to provide blanket guarantees to bank creditors was taken at a moment when the 
share prices of three major Irish banks had already declined dramatically (Figure 36). When 
the decision was taken, the prevailing view was that Ireland was a solid country with sound 
fundamentals that was subject to a liquidity run. A guarantee from a sovereign with one of the 
lowest debt levels in the EU was supposed to restore trust and end the liquidity crisis. Right 
after the introduction of the guarantee, Irish banks issued significant amounts of senior bonds 
and commercial paper. While the guarantee provided temporary relief, it did not allow banks 
to re-establish non-guaranteed market access44. 
 
Figure 36: Share prices of three major Irish banks 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters. 
 
The government guarantee initially led to a reversal of capital flows and an inflow into Ireland 
of additional capital from other EU countries. However, as the housing market continued to 
decline, it became increasingly clear that the banking system did not only have a liquidity 
problem but also that there was a question mark over its solvency. The government eventually 
had to bail out its banking system during 2009 and 2010, leading to a budget deficit of more 
than 30 percent in 2010, more than 20 percentage points of which was just for the banks. The 
overall cost of the banking crisis according to Laeven and Valencia (2012) amounted to 40 
percent of GDP. The Irish government deficit had already significantly deteriorated, from 
balance in 2007 to more than 7 percent in 2008, and almost 14 percent in 2009, in large part 
due to the collapse of revenues that had fed off the rising real estate market. In addition, by 
the time the programme started, GDP had collapsed by around 17 percent in nominal terms. 
 
When the government guarantee was approaching its end in September 2010, the six banks 
had significant re-financing needs as nobody was ready to provide longer-term funding. A full 
                                                          
44
 It can be debated, whether this initial guarantee was the real mistake in the Irish crisis. From the European 
point of view, there were concerns that deposit flights to Ireland would undermine stability elsewhere. When 
later the value of the guarantee became more doubtful, the guarantee was seen by some as preventing a more 
appropriate involvement of bank creditors. Yet, from the Irish point of view, at the moment the decision was 
taken, the problems were widely perceived as liquidity problems and the Irish government debt was very low so 
that the risks associated with the decision seemed minor. 
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vicious circle was in swing with significant capital outflows. Investors with funds in the banks 
no longer trusted the state guarantee because the government itself was under stress. 
 
Figure 37: Irish government bond yields 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Ireland. 
 
5.4.2 The Irish programme 
 
The Irish government had to ask for financial assistance in November 2010. The programme 
consisted of €85 billion: €50 billion to provide funding for the government and €35 billion in 
loans to the government earmarked for the banking sector. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) of 8 December 2010 committed the Irish government to policy 
conditionality in three key areas: fiscal reform, financial sector reform and structural reforms. 
 
Many of the fiscal reform measures stipulated in the programme were taken from the already 
planned Irish National Recovery Plan45, which were, of course, partly a result of discussions 
between the Irish authorities and the Troika in the three preceding months. The excessive 
deficit procedure already foresaw reaching the 3 percent target in 2014. In the National 
Recovery Plan, the government put significant emphasis on cutting expenditure overall while 
maintaining expenditure that was important for competitiveness. The key element on the 
fiscal side was a plan to bring down the large fiscal deficit to below 3 percent by 2015. This 
fiscal adjustment was deemed a necessary response to the large structural deficit that the 
country was exposed to following the bursting of the property bubble46. €21 billion of 
adjustment had already been undertaken during 2008-11. The programme essentially 
continued with the government's plan to adjust fiscal policy during 2012-14, in line with the 
national reform plans and with a bias towards expenditure reductions. The adjustment was 
required because government revenue from real estate had collapsed from almost 20 percent 
of total revenues (5 percent of GDP) to below 1 percent of GDP in 2010 (European 
Commission, 2011). On the fiscal side, the Troika was thus in a unique position of having a 
government as a negotiating partner that had already in great detail planned significant 
reforms that were consistent with Troika demands. 
 
                                                          
45
 The national recovery plan was published on 24 November 2010, i.e. at the beginning of the formal 
negotiations with the Troika following the official request for assistance of 21 November 2010. The plan can be 
found here: http://www.budget.gov.ie/The%20National%20Recovery%20Plan%202011-2014.pdf   
46
 IMF (2011) estimated the structural deficit for 2008 to be more than 11% of potential GDP. 
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The second key pillar was financial sector reform, which focused on downsizing and 
reorganisation of the banking sector while maintaining financial stability. The first step was a 
significant capital injection into banks and a transfer to NAMA, the National Asset 
Management Agency, which was established in December 2009 to absorb impaired bank 
assets. The second element was a stress test dubbed PCAR to assess banks’ balance sheets. 
The third element was a Prudential Liquidity Assessment Review” (PLAR), which had the 
declared aim of achieving an ambitious deleveraging and a much lower loan-to-deposit ratio. 
Moreover, legislative changes to improve bank resolution regimes and other more structural 
financial aspects were agreed. In terms of the downsizing, the plan foresaw a rapid 
deleveraging towards lower loan-to-deposit ratios (European Commission, 2011). The speed 
of deleveraging was later reduced. In terms of the reorganisation, the agreement foresaw the 
establishment of a resolution plan for Anglo Irish Bank and INBS. Both banks had borrowed 
very large amounts of liquidity under an ELA programme from the Central Bank of Ireland. 
The Irish Bank Resolution Cooperation (IBRC) resulted from the resolution of the two banks. 
The Irish government provided the IBRC with promissory notes that would result in a 
payment of the government to the IBRC that would then allow the repayment of the ELA 
liquidity47. The plan also foresaw the imposition of losses on shareholders and subordinated 
debt, but exempted senior debt holders. 
 
The third pillar of conditionality concerned a structural reform package to underpin growth. 
Here, the MoU mentions an array of measures that were designed in some detail, and that 
essentially took up what the government had put down in National Reform Plans sent to the 
EU previously. It would go beyond the scope of this study to further assess these elements. 
Certainly, the Irish economy was already one of the most liberalised and flexible economies 
in the EU before the crisis. The programme conditionality may have further helped to make 
Irish labour and product markets more efficient. 
 
5.4.3 Assessment 
 
Was the overall package appropriately designed based on the information available at the 
time? To what degree was it implemented? Was it adapted in response to economic or other 
developments? What were the main shortfalls? What accounts for them? 
 
In terms of the broad structure, the programme addresses all the key issues. The emphasis was 
rightly put on financial and fiscal reform, both of which were in need of significant overhaul. 
We turn first to the macroeconomic and fiscal adjustment and then to financial sector reform 
and the role of the ECB. 
 
5.4.3.1 Overall structure 
 
Starting with the fiscal part, the adjustment was based on fairly realistic forecasts. The Irish 
government's original plan foresaw a slightly quicker fiscal adjustment with the deficit falling 
below 3% in 201448. The Troika discussions thus led to a postponement of the 3 percent 
deficit goal by one year already at the beginning of the programme thereby giving somewhat 
more breathing space. 
 
                                                          
47
 See for example Whelan, Ireland’s promissory notes deal, Forbes 2/11/2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/karlwhelan/2013/02/11/irelands-promissory-note-deal/  
48
 The national recovery plan, published 24 November 2010. 
http://www.budget.gov.ie/The%20National%20Recovery%20Plan%202011-2014.pdf 
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Figure 38 shows that in contrast to Greece, the successive revisions for Ireland of GDP, debt 
and deficit forecasts were modest. The return to a 3 percent deficit was originally foreseen for 
2015. The promissory note announcement in February 201349 improves the general 
government deficit by 0.6 percent of GDP in 2014 and 2015 (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, 
2013)50. The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council foresees that because of the better-than-forecast 
performance in 2012 and the promissory note agreement, a deficit of 2 percent for 2015 is 
feasible if all budgetary measures are implemented. In that sense, the initial programme was 
appropriate and allowed a realistic time period for the fiscal adjustment. 
 
Moreover, price developments were not completely off the mark considering the entire 
period, even though the December 2010 and December 2011 GDP deflator estimates clearly 
predicted much faster adjustment early on and less later on. Despite this good performance, 
the unemployment rate rose to higher than expected levels. However, the current-account 
improvement was greater than expected, showing the remarkable capacity of the Irish 
economy to grow externally (Figure 22 in section 5.3 shows the contribution of exports to the 
adjustment of the current account. Exports were of major importance from 2010-13). 
 
  
                                                          
49
 The promissory note deal transformed the promissory notes that were transferred from the IBRC, when it was 
liquidated, to the Central Bank of Ireland. The promissory notes were transformed into long dated bonds of 
maturities between 27-40 years. The deal essentially alters the time profile of the fiscal costs. See Whelan 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/karlwhelan/2013/02/11/irelands-promissory-note-deal/ for more details. 
50
 Whelan (2012) points out that the interest rate on promissory notes has no impact on Irish public debt. 
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Figure 38: Projections for the Irish programme 
  
 
 
 
Source: IMF programme documents. 
 
This meant that the debt level forecast made at the start of the programme was quite accurate. 
As a result, the deviations between forecast and actual figures are relatively small (Table 9). 
This shows that the Irish programme was fully on track in terms of fiscal policy. By contrast, 
in terms of unemployment, the Irish programme has been disappointing. 
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Table 9: General government structural balance, Ireland 2010-13 
 
  Primary 
balance (incl. 
bank support) 
Overall 
balance 
Gross 
debt 
2013 target as set in the May 2010 EFF 
programme 
-1.4 -7.5 124.5 
-     Changed 2009 initial conditions 0.4 0.5 -0.4 
- Revenue shortfall due to adverse GDP 
developments  
-0.6 -0.6   
-     Effect of lower nominal GDP 
 -0.1 2.1 
-       Interest rate on public debt 
  -0.3   
-     Larger than expected overall deficits 
    
2.5 
-        Fiscal consolidation effort (residual) -0.2 0.5  
-      Debt accumulation residual   -6.2 
2013 figures as forecast in the Dec 2012 review -1.8 -7.5 122.5 
Source: Ireland: Request for an Extended Arrangement—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Staff Statement; and 
Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion, December 2010, International Monetary Fund. Ireland: Eighth 
Review under the Extended Arrangement; Staff Report; Staff Supplements; and Press Release on the Executive 
Board discussion, December 2012, International Monetary Fund. 
 
It is also worth emphasising that the Irish administration worked rather efficiently and 
implemented the reforms to a great extent as agreed. Our interviewees confirmed that one of 
the defining features of the Irish programme was the high degree of compliance of the Irish 
authorities with the agreed MoU. Some of the interviewees underlined that the programme 
and MoU actually had little impact on the fiscal adjustment path, because it was already 
largely decided on and planned before the Troika arrived in Dublin. In any case, the fact that 
the Irish authorities published their fiscal adjustment plan, which was more ambitious than 
that in the programme, at the beginning of the official Troika discussions shows that national 
ownership was a significant factor. 
 
Was the agreed speed of fiscal adjustment appropriate and was the mix of expenditure cuts 
and revenue increases the right one? For the Irish economy, a frontloaded fiscal adjustment 
approach was probably justified. The Irish economy is very open and flexible, and thus 
adjusted relatively quickly from a condition in which the construction and domestic sector 
was dominant to one in which the external sector played the central role. Domestic demand 
compression in Ireland played a relatively limited role in explaining the negative growth 
surprise in the forecasts (Vihriälä, 2013), which suggests that fiscal consolidation was perhaps 
not the primary concern for the Irish economy. Instead, since the export sector is so large, 
Ireland’s adjustment went ahead very quickly in the external sector. As predicted by the 
Optimum Currency Area theory, a highly integrated economy with a large trading sector 
would also have relatively flexible prices. This would then facilitate adjustment, which was 
clearly visible in Ireland where prices, and in particular wages, fell significantly. 
 
5.4.4 Financial sector reform 
 
Reform of the financial sector was needed because the financial sector was largely priced out 
of the market and was oversized relative to the size of the economy. The years preceding the 
programme can be characterised as a period of major overhaul of the banking system with 
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several banks running into serious difficulties, the creation of an asset management agency 
(NAMA) to purchase property loans and other difficulties (see for example, Honahan, 2012; 
and Donovan and Murphy, forthcoming). The government's pre-programme bank 
recapitalisation commitments were estimated by finance minister Michael Noonan to amount 
to €46.3 billion, of which €34.6 billion were used for IBRC (Anglo and INBS)51. It is very 
difficult to provide an overall assessment of the financial sector programme, in particular 
because many pre-programme decisions had already been taken and had a significant effect 
on the financial and fiscal outcomes of the programme. 
 
One issue was particularly controversial and was repeatedly brought up in conversations with 
key stakeholders: the non-participation of senior unsecured bond holders in absorbing bank 
losses. A further question was raised about the speed of deleveraging. Both issues, which we 
discuss below, have led to significant criticism of the ECB’s role in the Irish programme. 
 
Turning first to the issue of senior bond holder involvement, a number of points need to be 
made. The 2008 state guarantee was given by the government unilaterally and without outside 
interference. Yet this guarantee meant that for two years (September 2008- September 2010) a 
large portion of unsecured senior bonds was in effect untouchable. During this period already, 
some commentators argued that the state guarantee should have been abandoned. Yet, this 
would have meant that de facto the government would have defaulted on its guarantee, an 
option that was therefore rejected. Ahearne (2012) describes in detail that, nevertheless, 
significant losses were imposed on bank creditors, in particular shareholders and junior debt 
holders. Yet, senior debt was left untouched, even if issued before the guarantee and expiring 
after the end of the guarantee. 
 
In the autumn of 2010, a significant debate about the imposition of losses on senior unsecured 
and unguaranteed bond holders began. According to the Central Bank of Ireland, the total 
amount of unsecured and unguaranteed senior debt amounted to €16.4 billion in February 
201152. About €2.5 billion matured between September 2010 and February 2011 according to 
Coffey (2012)53. If this estimate is correct, about €19 billion of senior unsecured debt (ie 
about 12 percent of GDP) could have been used to reduce bail-out costs to taxpayers. Of this 
amount, a part was domestically held, eg by banks and pension funds, and would therefore not 
have reduced the savings for the national economy. 
 
The controversy was about the imposition of losses on this €19 billion of unsecured and 
unguaranteed senior debt. One key distinction made was between the going concern and the 
gone concern. Gone concern referred to the creditors of the two banks that were in the process 
of being wound down, Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society. Many argued 
that for gone concerns, financial stability considerations and contagion effects would be of 
minor relevance, in contrast to going concerns for which there was more fear about potential 
financial contagion. The amount of senior unsecured debt in those two institutions is reported 
                                                          
51
 Response by Noonan to question by Deputy Noel Grealish, 18 April 2012, 
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2012/04/18/00157.asp  
52
 http://www.financialregulator.ie/press-
area/Documents/Information%20Release%20Note%20and%20Table%20Senior%20and%20Sub%20Debt.doc.p
df and http://www.financialregulator.ie/press-area/press-releases/Pages/Clarification-
SeniorDebtandSubordinatedDebtIssuance.aspx . Both documents retrieved 12 April 2013. 
53
 http://www.independent.ie/opinion/comment/seamus-coffey-so-how-much-has-been-paid-out-to-unsecured-
unguaranteed-bondholders-in-the-irish-banks-26889017.html  
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at €3.7 billion54. A further important aspect was the size of the haircut that could have been 
imposed on this debt. Assuming that a haircut of above 50 percent is unlikely, we would 
speak of €1.9 billion for the gone concern and €9.5 billion for the total banking system. 
However, one has to acknowledge that at that time, the EU did not have clear resolution 
framework, rendering it difficult for the EU institutions to actually act on bank resolution. 
 
Several interviewees confirmed the ECB's firm opposition to the imposition of losses on both 
going and gone concerns. The ECB was worried that any such move would substantially 
increase funding costs for the Irish banking system but, even more importantly, for the euro-
area banking system. The Irish authorities could not act against the will of the ECB as they 
were dependent on significant ECB support in form of ELA55. In the eyes of the Irish public, 
the decision was perceived as a bail-out of French and German banks by Irish taxpayers 
(Ahearne, 2012), yet it is not clear if the owners of this debt really were euro-area banks. 
However, ECB board member Jörg Asmussen, in a 12 April 2012 speech, acknowledged that 
the bail out of Anglo Irish bond holders was “to ensure no negative effects spilled-over to 
other Irish banks or to banks in other European countries”56. 
 
However, the evidence that this decision was only due to ECB pressure is not entirely clear 
cut. One interviewee also pointed to the significant reservations of major IMF shareholders. 
Donovan and Murphy (2013) state that, while not on the public record, it is well known that 
US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner via the G-7 urged that a proposal to involve senior 
bondholders, which was being developed by the IMF negotiating mission in Dublin with the 
Irish authorities, be abandoned. The US position was driven by fears of the potential negative 
effects of any such moves on the CDS markets57. 
 
In any case, it is difficult to say whether the bail-out of senior bond holders was a mistake or 
not. From the Irish point of view, a more substantial contribution from senior bond holders 
would have been helpful. The Irish government paid a significant political price for paying the 
relevant creditors in full, in particular because, at the same time, significant fiscal adjustment 
was undertaken. The wiping out of senior unsecured debt of gone-concern banks could 
probably have been managed from a financial stability point of view, but this would have 
hardly affected the Irish government's debt burden. With regard to going concern banks, the 
imposition of losses on senior bond holders could have materially reduced the Irish state's 
debt. This could have potentially allowed for market access more easily but it could also have 
weighed on investor sentiment towards Ireland. More importantly, the financial system in the 
euro area at the time was very fragile. Large-scale and indiscriminate creditor bail-ins bear 
substantial risks that may ultimately lead to even higher costs. We therefore do not conclude 
that it was a mistake to use taxpayers’ resources to pay the relevant creditors, but 
acknowledge that the burden sharing certainly deserves discussion (see below). 
 
A second issue was the optimal speed of deleveraging, with some commentators pointing out 
that the speed of deleveraging of the Irish financial system agreed with the Troika was 
initially too high. It is difficult to assess whether this is true or not as this depends on a 
                                                          
54
 See Ahearne (2012) for a detailed discussion. Whelan (2012) emphasises that for the Irish Bank Resolution 
Cooperation, the entity emerging from Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide Building Society, €35 billion would 
almost be “dead money” that would not be returned to the state. The amount discussed as regards the senior 
unsecured bond holders is thus small compared to the actual cost to the tax payer of bailing out the two institutes. 
55
 See footnote 19 of Ahearne (2012) for more details. 
56
 http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120412.en.html retrieved on 12 April 2013. 
57
 Donavan and Murphy (2013). 
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difficult risk analysis. From an Irish point of view, the speed was fast at the beginning58 of the 
programme and was reduced only later59. The high speed of deleveraging also meant that 
early firesales of assets excessively reduced their prices since raising additional deposits was 
difficult. Donovan and Murphy (2013) report that the estimates in March 2011 by BlackRock 
Solutions showed that most of the increase in the bank recapitalisation needs resulted from the 
rapid asset deleveraging required under the bailout programme. On the other hand, the ECB 
insisted on a rapid deleveraging because it was concerned about its own exposure to Ireland. 
Lending to Ireland made up 25 percent of overall ECB lending with an estimated €35 billion 
in ELA60. The ECB felt that it was increasingly taking on risks that could ultimately become 
fiscal risks. It therefore had urged the Irish authorities to apply for a programme and it insisted 
on a significant part of the programme to be earmarked for banks61. In the winter review of 
March 2012, the European Commission confirms that on aggregate the Prudential Capital 
Assessment Review62 banks had met their deleveraging targets during 2011, and that 
correspondingly, reliance on Eurosystem funding had declined (European Commission, 
2012d). 
 
Overall, in our assessment, the Irish programme is broadly on track and this success has 
hinged on the high degree of ownership by the Irish authorities from the outset. The fiscal 
reforms were necessary. On the financial side, the programme initially made the mistake of 
pushing for hurried deleveraging. This arguably deepened the recession in 2011, but the 
alternative was politically controversial. The authorities then changed course on the speed of 
deleveraging, implicitly admitting that it had been too rapid. The Troika took a difficult 
decision not to impose losses on senior bond holders for financial stability reasons. A bail-in 
could have reduced the size of the debt burden for the Irish taxpayer by a maximum of €19 
billion on the basis that an unrealistic haircut of 100 percent would have been applied. 
Realistically, the relief might have ended up closer to between €5 billion and €10 billion. This 
would have alleviated fiscal sustainability concerns. Whether or not it would have been 
appropriate to take the risk of bailing-in private bond holders remains a matter of judgment. 
At any rate, since this decision was taken because of euro-area wide financial stability 
considerations63, and because of the reported concerns of the US Treasury Secretary, it would 
have been appropriate to share the burden with taxpayers in other euro-area countries. 
 
The ultimate aim of the Irish programme, namely full market access, is not yet fully ensured. 
The deal reached on promissory notes was an important intermediate step. Further support 
was demonstrated by the decision of the April 2013 ECOFIN meeting to extend the maturities 
of EFSM loans to Ireland by seven years. Ireland has recently been able to sell long-term 
government bonds in the international market at reasonable rates64. Yet, individual selling in 
the markets does not mean that full access is guaranteed. Certainly, the big fear is that the 
return to the markets will turn out not to be robust requiring a programme later on. Two 
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 European Commission (2011) speaks of “ambitious target loan-to-deposit ratios” for each bank. 
59
 European Commission (2012d) 
60
 Emergency Liquidity Assistance, provided by the national central bank against collateral that is usually of 
lower quality than that used for getting liquidity from the ECB directly. 
61
 European Commission (2011) provides the number of €35 billion as available funding to overhaul the banking 
sector. 
62
 The design of the Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR) was the responsibility of the central bank in 
cooperation with the Commission, ECB and IMF. It aimed to establish a true picture of the health of the banks. 
63
 http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120412.en.html retrieved on 12 April 2013. 
64
 The Irish Times reports a rate of 3.3 percent for a bond maturing in 2017: 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/markets/bonds/ireland-generates-2-5bn-on-bond-market-at-lower-yield-
level-1.955999  
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factors would reduce that probability. First, Ireland as a small open economy needs a 
favourable external growth environment. A deepening of the current euro-area recession 
would be a central problem for Ireland and its return to the markets. Second, Ireland could 
benefit from a deal with the ESM to sell Allied Irish Bank, which is currently almost 
completely state owned, to the ESM. Such an operation would not necessarily constitute a 
transfer depending on the price at which Allied Irish Bank is sold. It would shift risks from 
Irish to European taxpayers and would therefore be consistent with the June 2012 declaration 
of heads of state and government to de-link banks from sovereigns65. 
 
5.5 Portugal 
 
After several months of hesitation, the Portuguese authorities decided in April 2011 to make a 
formal request to the IMF and to European authorities for financial assistance. The country 
had no choice. It had lost affordable market access at a time when sizeable bond repayments 
were due. 
 
The reform programme proposed by Portugal is described in the Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies (MEFP) attached to the Letters of Intent addressed to the IMF and the 
European authorities. The stated objective was “to restore market confidence and to raise the 
potential of our economy to generate socially balanced growth and employment” (LoI, §1). In 
order to achieve this objective, Portugal proposed a “strategy [that] envisions bold and 
upfront structural reforms to improve competitiveness, an ambitious but credible pace of 
fiscal adjustment, and measures to ensure a stable and dynamic financial system” (MEFP, 
§2). The strategy was “backed by substantial international financing to meet balance of 
payments needs” (LoI, §1): €78 billion over three years, which corresponds to the public-
sector financing gap due to reduced market access (see Table 1). This amount is indeed 
substantial since it represents roughly 50 percent of the country’s 2011 GDP. 
 
More specifically, the programme concerns four separate areas: (1) fiscal policy aimed at 
reducing public debt and deficit; (2) structural fiscal reform to streamline the public sector; 
(3) financial and corporate sector policies aimed at protecting the financial system amidst 
deleveraging; and (4) structural reforms to enhance competitiveness and rebalance growth 
from the non-tradable to the tradable sector. 
 
This section examines three questions. First, was the programme well designed to meet the 
objective of restoring market confidence and regaining market access after three years? 
Second, was the programme well executed and is it on track two years after it was launched? 
Third, will Portugal be able to regain market access at the end of the programme and what are 
the country’s prospects thereafter? 
 
5.5.1 Programme design and risks 
 
Since joining the euro, Portugal suffered from weak structural conditions with low growth and 
rising imbalances, which made it particularly vulnerable to shocks. The financial crisis and 
the euro sovereign-debt crisis were major shocks that had a big impact on Portugal. 
 
The programme clearly recognised the nature of Portugal’s problem, stating that: 
“Competitiveness indicators have suffered, economic growth has been anaemic, and the 
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current account deficit is at 10 percent of GDP. The global crisis exposed Portugal’s weak 
fiscal and financial position with public debt at around 90 percent of GDP at end-2010 and 
private sector debt about 260 percent of GDP. Banks that financed this build-up in debt now 
have the highest loan-to-deposit ratio in Europe” (MEFP, §1). “Against th[is] background of 
the structural challenges facing the Portuguese economy and contagion from the sovereign 
debt crisis in other euro area countries, financial conditions facing the Portuguese sovereign 
and banks have sharply worsened” (LoI, §1).Although it clearly identified the measures that 
Portugal needs to adopt to boost growth and reduce imbalances, the programme probably 
lacked a full appreciation of the difficulty of implementing such measures within a monetary 
union undergoing a financial and a sovereign debt crisis. 
 
As a result, the programme was somewhat over-optimistic. According to IMF staff reports, 
Portugal started on an ambitious and comprehensive programme, the policy mix and the speed 
of adjustment were well calibrated and the fiscal programme was well-balanced and credible 
(IMF, 2011, §45-47). 
 
This likely over-optimism translated into over-optimistic projections of macroeconomic 
developments: 
 
• Real GDP was expected to contract in 2011 and 2012 due to fiscal adjustment and 
private deleveraging, but to subsequently rebound. 
• Unemployment was expected to rise in 2011 and 2012 but then to decline. 
• Inflation was expected to be high in 2011 and 2012 because of tax increases but low 
afterwards. 
• The fiscal deficit was expected to reach 3 percent of GDP by 2013 in line with the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure objective. Public debt was expected to peak at 115.3 
percent of GDP in 2013 and then to decline. 
• The current account deficit was expected to narrow gradually thanks to both 
decreasing imports associated with lower domestic demand and rising exports 
resulting from improved supply conditions. 
• The net international investment position (IIP) was expected to reach a peak of -123.4 
percent of GDP in 2013 and thereafter to improve.  
 
Projections for the period 2011-14 are shown in the left-hand panel of table 10. 
 
At the same time, IMF staff reports recognised that the programme entailed several important 
downside risks: (1) the programme might not alleviate sovereign debt concerns; (2) social 
support and political consensus in favour of the programme could erode; (3) lower growth 
than assumed by the programme could worsen substantially the public debt dynamics; (4) 
there could be unforeseen additional liquidity and solvency pressures on banks; and (5) there 
could be negative spillovers from deepening problems in other euro area countries (IMF, 
2011, §43). 
 
IMF staff reports also acknowledged that restoring competitiveness in a monetary union 
would be challenging (IMF, 2011, §51). In the absence of the exchange rate instrument, 
external rebalancing would require structural reforms to increase productivity and improve 
competiveness at given nominal wages. Otherwise rebalancing would entail a deep recession 
with a surge in unemployment and painful adjustment in nominal wages which “will be 
socially very difficult”. While acknowledging that a recession and a rise in unemployment in 
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2011-12 are unavoidable, the IMF staff considered that a gradual recovery in 2013 was 
feasible “provided that the ambitious reform programme is implemented as planned”. 
The IMF’s debt sustainability analysis (DSA) also insisted that Portugal’s public debt 
sustainability will be “highly dependent on the growth recovery starting in 2013 and, in the 
long-run, on the success of structural agenda reforms to boost potential growth” (IMF, 2011, 
Annex 1). 
 
5.5.2 Programme execution during the first two years 
 
How has Portugal performed since the implementation of the programme and what are the 
revised projections for the period up to 2014 according to the winter Commission forecasts of 
February 2013? The major macroeconomic developments are the following: 
 
• There was a slightly lower contraction of real GDP in 2011 than originally expected. 
On the other hand, the contraction will be 3.2 percent instead of the earlier predicted 
1.8 percent in 2012 and will remain around 2 percent in 2013. A shallow recovery is 
now expected only in 2014. For the period 2011-14, the accumulated loss of GDP 
growth compared to the initial expectation will be 6.8 percentage points, an average 
annual shortfall of 1.7 points.  
• Partly as result of the less favourable growth performance, unemployment is now 
expected to rise until 2013 instead of 2012, and to reach a much higher peak with a 
value of 17.3 percent in 2013 compared to an earlier predicted value of 13.4 percent.  
• Inflation is more or less on track, with high values of about 3 percent in 2011 and 
2012 and low values of about 1 percent thereafter. 
• The fiscal deficit was lower than expected in 2011 but Portugal will not meet the EDP 
objective of 3 percent of GDP by 2013. 
• As the IMF’s DSA had suggested, a lower than predicted growth performance risks 
jeopardising debt adjustment. Instead of reaching a peak of 115.3 percent of GDP in 
2013 as originally predicted, the Commission now predicts that Portuguese public debt 
will continue rising, reaching 124.7 percent of GDP in 2014.  
• On the other hand, the current account deficit is reducing much faster than expected. It 
stood at 7.2 percent of GDP in 2011 instead of the originally predicted 9 percent and 
should reach 1.4 percent in 2013. For the period 2011-14, the reduction in the external 
deficit compared to the initial expectation will be 10.4 percentage points, an 
impressive figure. 
 
Table 10 shows the details of these developments and their comparison with the programme 
forecasts. 
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Table 10: Portugal, selected macroeconomic indicators, 2011-14 (In percent of GDP, unless 
otherwise specified) 
 
 Programme June 2011 Projected February 2013 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Real GDP (percent change) -2.2 -1.8 1.2 2.5 -1.6 -3.2 -1.9 0.8 
Consumer prices (percent 
change) 
3.5 2.1 1.4 1.5 3.6 2.8 0.6 1.2 
Unemployment (percent) 12.1 13.4 13.3 12.0 12.9 15.7 17.3 16.8 
General government deficit 5.9 4.5 3.0 2.3 4.4 5.0 4.9 2.9 
General government debt 106.
4 
112.
2 
115.
3 
115.
0 
108.
0 
120.
6 
123.
9 
124.7 
Current account deficit 9.0 6.7 4.1 3.4 7.2 3.0 1.4 1.2 
Net IIP (negative) 116.
9 
123.
3 
123.
4 
121.
4 
103.
8 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: IMF programme request (June, 2011) and European economic forecast - winter 2013 
 
Figure 39 shows the differences between the initial (June 2011) projections and revised 
projections by the time of the third (April 2012) and sixth (January 2013) review missions. 
Once again the main elements are the disappointing growth and unemployment performance, 
and conversely the better than expected current account situation. 
 
Figure 39: Projections for the Portuguese programme 
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Source: IMF programme documents.  
 
Overall, Portugal’s macroeconomic performance justifies the 15 March 2013 Troika 
statement, following its seventh review mission to Portugal, that implementation of the 
programme is “broadly on track”. After nearly two years of programme implementation, the 
situation in Portugal exhibits two contrasting trends compared to expectations. First, the 
recession in 2012 and 2013 has been much deeper than expected. The March 2013 Troika 
statement acknowledges that growth in 2013 and 2014 will be slower even than indicated in 
Table 2 and that unemployment could peak at over 18 percent. The government is even more 
pessimistic. It predicts that unemployment will reach 19 percent by end 2013 and remain 
above 17 percent till 2016. This disappointing performance can be attributed to three main 
factors: fiscal austerity measures and deleveraging of private-sector balance sheets; slower 
than anticipated productivity growth and rebalancing of economic activity from the non-
tradable to the tradable sector; and continued weak demand in the euro area, especially in 
neighbouring Spain, which traditionally absorbs roughly one quarter of Portugal’s exports. 
 
The main problem is that, so far, the programme has not succeeded in boosting investment. 
On the contrary, investment performance has been extremely disappointing, with a 
contraction of more than 10 percent in 2011 and again in 2012, and a further contraction of 8 
percent now expected in 2013. Portugal's investment performance is far worse than Ireland 
and only slightly better than Greece. It is also far worse than anticipated by the programme, 
with an accumulated loss of investment growth compared to expectation of nearly 19 
percentage points for the period 2011-13. 
 
Disappointing growth has made the deficit targets unachievable. In order to allow the 
operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers, the government was forced to request an upward 
revision of the deficit targets in 2013 and 2014, which the Troika staff supported in their 
March 2013 statement. As a result, the original 2013 deficit target of returning below the 3 
percent excessive deficit threshold, which in 2012 was already postponed to 2014, was further 
postponed to 2015. Accordingly, public debt will rise further. In its March 2013 statement, 
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however, the Troika predicted that public debt will still peak at around 124 percent of GDP, 
as already predicted by the Commission in February 2013. The lack of an upward revision for 
the debt despite the worsening deficit was probably due to the expectation of the Troika that 
EU lenders would reschedule some loans, an expectation that was fulfilled by the ECOFIN 
Council in April 2013 (see next section). 
 
On the other hand, external adjustment has been much faster than expected, thanks to 
improved export performance and a fall in imports. 
 
The apparent contradiction between these two contrasting trends arises from the fact that 
exports to non-traditional destinations outside the euro area seem to have increased rapidly 
despite the lack of significant changes in supply conditions in Portugal. One explanation for 
this apparent contradiction in the performance of exports is the possibility noted by the IMF 
staff that “the improvement to date is simply cyclical [rather than] of a more durable nature” 
(IMF, 2012, §16). There is evidence that the sharp fall in domestic demand that has occurred 
since the beginning of 2011 is the main driver behind the recent improvement in export 
market share. There is also evidence that, in Portugal, the relationship between export 
performance and domestic demand is asymmetric, being stronger and more significant when 
domestic demand is falling than when it is increasing66. This would suggest that the recent 
gain in market share is durable and may not be lost (or at least not entirely) when domestic 
demand rebounds. 
 
5.5.3 Prospects for exiting the programme on time and for afterwards 
 
Portugal is conscientiously swallowing the Troika’s budgetary remedy, which was adapted in 
view of weaker growth prospects. Portugal's deficit will not return below 3 percent of GDP in 
2013 as originally foreseen by the programme, or in 2014, but it probably will in 2015. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio will probably peak also one year behind schedule in 2014, by which time it 
will be about 10 points higher than initially foreseen. 
 
The main reason for the slippage in public debt is the continuing growth under-performance. 
This is confirmed by the decomposition in Table 12, which indicates that four-fifths of the 
gap between the initial debt target for 2013 and the sixth review mission's revised estimate 
can be attributed to lower than expected nominal GDP. 
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Table 11: General government structural balance, Portugal 2011-13 
 
  Primary 
balance (incl. 
bank support) 
Overall 
balance 
Gross 
debt 
2013 target as set in the June 2011 EFF 
programme 
2.1 -3.0 115.3 
-     Changed 2010 initial conditions -0.9 -0.7 0.3 
- Revenue shortfall due to adverse GDP 
developments 
-1.8 -1.8   
-     Effect of lower nominal GDP 
 -0.2 5.4 
-        Interest rate on public debt 
  0.9   
-     Larger than expected overall deficits 
    0.7 
-        Fiscal consolidation effort (residual) 0.4 0.4  
-      Debt accumulation residual 
  0.5 
2013 outturn as forecasted in the Dec 2012 
review 
-0.2 -4.5 122.2 
Sources: Portugal request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility (June 2011), 
Portugal: 2012 Article IV Consultation and Sixth Review Under the Extended Arrangement and Request for 
Waivers of Applicability of End-December Performance Criteria – Staff Reports; Public Information Notice and 
Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Portugal (January 
2013). Bruegel calculations. 
 
Despite this situation, markets seem quite satisfied with Portugal. The country’s National 
Debt Agency successfully issued 3- and 12-month treasury bills in January and February 
2013. It also returned to the bond market with a 5-year issuance at a yield of 4.9 percent. At 
the same time, 10-year bond yields fell below 6 percent, a level last seen in October 2010 and 
well below the peak of more than 17 percent reached at the beginning of 2012. 
 
The positive market sentiment is explained by three factors. First, there is a strong domestic 
consensus in favour of the Troika programme, though it risks being severely tested in the 
course of 2013 as the austerity measures lead to record unemployment levels and tax 
burdens67. Second, and related to the first point, there is the perception of a high degree of 
mutual understanding, trust and close cooperation between the Portuguese authorities and the 
Troika, which our private interviews corroborate. Third, and related to the previous point, 
market participants feel, and we agree, that Portugal will receive all the necessary support to 
be able to exit the programme on schedule in 2014. Such support was demonstrated by the 
decision at the April 2013 ECOFIN Council meeting to extend the maturities of EFSM loans 
to Portugal by seven years. Moreover, in case of difficulty after it leaves the programme, 
Portugal could benefit from insurance in the form of precautionary financial assistance from 
the ESM via its enhanced conditions credit line (ECCL) facility, which would then probably 
qualify the country for the ECB’s OMT. 
 
The seventh Troika review confirmed the positive view of market participants, stressing that, 
“Provided the authorities persevere with strict programme implementation, euro-area 
member states have declared they stand ready to support Portugal until full market access is 
regained. Continued strong programme implementation and the envisaged adjustment of the 
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maturities of EFSF and EFSM loans to smooth the debt redemption profile will support the 
government's return to full market financing during 2013” (Troika, 2013). 
 
Despite some tough times ahead provoked by the austerity measures and the delay in the 
implementation and/or the effects of growth-promoting structural measures, Portugal seems 
likely to exit the Troika programme on schedule. This would clearly be a success for Portugal 
and for the Troika. 
 
Exiting the programme would not, however, be the end of Portugal’s problems. In 2014, 
Portugal should be able to stand on its own feet and issue long-term debt, but the economy 
will remain fragile. One way to appreciate this is to go back to the situation before the crisis, 
when “Portugal faced an unusually tough economic challenge: low growth, low productivity 
growth, high unemployment, large fiscal and current account deficits” (Blanchard, 2007). 
 
Table 10 compares the situation in 2004-08 with the situation that will prevail in 2014 
according to the 2013 winter Commission forecasts. The good news is that the fiscal and the 
current account deficits will be much reduced. The bad news is that unemployment and public 
debt will be considerably higher. Social and debt sustainability will, therefore, be fundamental 
after Portugal exits the programme. The key will be growth. Here the problem, which the 
Troika programme correctly identified, is that Portugal needs to radically change its pre-crisis 
growth model, which produced stagnation after the country joined the euro68. With nominal 
long-term interest rates of around 6 percent, Portugal will need nominal GDP growth of at 
least 4 percent (which implies real GDP growth of at least 2.5 percent) and a sufficient 
primary balance surplus to ensure debt sustainability. This will be a major challenge. 
 
Table 12: Portugal, selected macroeconomic indicators, 2004-08 averages and 2014 (in 
percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) 
 
 Actual 
(2004 – 08) 
Projected 
(2014) 
Real GDP (percent change) 1.2 0.8 
GDP deflator (percent change) 2.4 0.8 
Nominal LT interest rates 
(percent) 
4.0 6.0 
Productivity (percent change) 1.1 0.3 
Unemployment (percent) 8.4 16.8 
General government balance -4.4 -2.9 
Primary balance -1.6 1.6 
General government debt 70.0 124.7 
Current account deficit 10.4 1.2 
Source: European Commission, 2013. 
 
Reis (2013) points out that Portugal was an outlier among peripheral euro-area countries 
during the 1999-2007 period.  Like them, it witnessed huge capital inflows, but it saw no 
boom in production and employment. Reis ascribes Portugal’s poor growth performance 
during this period to a combination of two factors: underdeveloped domestic credit markets 
that misallocated most of the capital inflows to unproductive firms in the non-tradable sector, 
and rising employment taxes that were levied to finance an over-generous pension system and 
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that discouraged work. Another factor, pointed out by many observers, including the Troika, 
is the low degree of contestability in non-traded activities that makes them relatively more 
profitable than traded activities, which are also affected by the small size of firms and the 
difficulty of obtaining appropriate financing. The structural reform measures contained in the 
EU-IMF programme aim precisely at enhancing competitiveness and rebalancing economic 
activity from non-traded to traded activities. These measures, however, will take time to 
implement and bear fruit, especially in a weak macroeconomic environment. The capacity of 
the Portuguese authorities to pursue the necessary reforms after the end of the programme will 
be an important factor. 
 
Labour market reform is particularly crucial. Before the crisis Portugal had one of the euro 
area's strictest employment protection frameworks, one of the most generous unemployment 
benefit systems and one of the most rigid nominal wage arrangements. In addition, Portugal 
had one of the highest ratios of public to private compensation per employee in the euro area. 
The EU-IMF programme contains many reforms to correct this situation and the government 
has already taken significant steps to implement the reforms. However, a number of planned 
reforms have yet to be implemented. Also, the programme suffered a major setback in April 
2013, when the Portuguese constitutional court rejected the government’s attempt to reduce 
public sector pay, which would have helped improve the attractiveness of the tradable sector. 
Finally, even if and when the remaining reforms are passed, Portugal’s labour market will still 
require further reform even after the programme ends. 
 
5.4 A comparative assessment of the three programmes 
 
Our assessment of the progress of the three programmes highlights common threads and 
differences: 
 
• All three countries have one thing in common: the fall in domestic demand was 
generally larger or much larger than anticipated and unemployment increased much 
more. At the same time, the current account deficit improved more than originally 
forecast; 
• In Ireland, better export performance helped moderate the consequences for output of 
a decline in domestic demand. Imports actually increased, in contrast to what was 
expected. In Greece and Portugal, the contraction in demand found its way into a 
contraction of imports beyond what the programmes foresaw. 
• The Greek programme clearly stands out as the most disappointing and Greece's return 
to market is still far off. By contrast, in Ireland and to a lesser extent in Portugal, 
planned measures have been implemented to a great degree and a full return to market 
at the end of the three-year programme is seriously contemplated. 
 
There are several reasons why domestic demand fell more than anticipated. One was fiscal 
adjustment: all three countries implemented significant budgetary consolidation and mostly 
followed through on their initial commitments. The macroeconomic impact of this 
consolidation appears to have been underestimated in initial programme design (ie the fiscal 
multiplier might have been larger). The second important factor was credit constraints. As 
explained, the ECB’s collateral and ELA policies had a direct impact on credit supply. There 
was large-scale substitution of private lending by central bank liquidity, yet the credit supply 
was inevitably constrained, affecting domestic borrowers. Finally, the three countries all 
experienced adverse confidence effects, as indicated by elevated bond spreads and CDSs, 
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which suppressed investment even further and prevented foreign direct investment. In our 
approach we cannot assess the relative contribution of these three factors. 
 
It is less clear why unemployment deteriorated much more than anticipated. Its rise much 
above initial forecasts cannot be explained by adverse growth developments alone. A major 
reason for this discrepancy is likely to be the fact that job destruction took place in labour-
intensive sectors such as construction and traditional services. Sectoral rebalancing was an 
unavoidable dimension of the adjustment but its social consequences proved more serious 
than assessed ex ante. 
 
The speed of fiscal and financial adjustment has been a matter for controversy. From the point 
of view of the programme countries, the adjustment speed is naturally seen as having been too 
high and is associated with significant economic hardship. More fiscal leeway could have 
made it possible to frontload the rebalancing of competitiveness by devoting part of the higher 
indirect taxation revenues to cuts in contributions to social insurance. 
 
From the point of view of creditors, however, prolonging adjustment periods almost 
inevitably means providing more finance. This tension between the national perspective and 
the creditor perspective is unavoidable in all programmes and has been particularly 
pronounced in the euro area, where programmes have been exceptionally large by 
international standards. 
 
The Troika probably underestimated in its initial assessment the negative externalities across 
the euro area stemming from the spread of the crisis from the periphery to the core. Quite 
naturally, it expected the environment to be more stable than it turned out to be. Once Spain 
and Italy also came under stress, a significant part of the euro area was in turmoil and was 
applying austerity measures to try to keep bond yields under control. Addressing crises in 
individual euro-area countries on a case-by-case basis while the common monetary union was 
suffering from increased stress proved to be a shortcoming that affected all three programmes. 
 
Turning to differences, Greece stands out. Here, internal factors played a major role, as we 
have discussed: the size of imbalances and the lack of ownership of the programme by the 
Greek political system and state machinery were severe hindrances. The Greek programme 
also suffered from European contradictions: the country was partly a guinea pig for the 
creation of institutions and policies to address euro-area crises that were absent from the EU 
treaty. Against this background, the combination of European indecision and a severe 
competitiveness-sustainability conundrum led the IMF and the EU to bet on optimistic 
assumptions that failed to materialise. 
 
In Greece and Portugal, where competitiveness problems are most severe and where structural 
reform is most needed, there was probably too little appreciation of the fact that reform would 
take time to be implemented and to produce positive effects. As a result, the negative effect of 
austerity measures was greater than expected in these countries because their labour and 
product markets did not react quickly enough. By contrast in Ireland, where markets function 
much better, austerity measures have had less detrimental effects and the programme has been 
more on track than in Greece and Portugal. 
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6. Assessing the institutional set-up of assistance 
 
In spring 2010, when Greece officially requested international financial assistance, the EU 
and the IMF were already providing joint assistance to three EU countries: Hungary 
(November 2008), Latvia (December 2008) and Romania (May 2009). 
 
It was natural therefore to envisage that financial assistance to Greece would again involve 
EU-IMF cooperation. There were, however, three problems in implementing the same 
approach in Greece as in non-euro area countries. First, Article 143 of the EU treaty, which 
permits EU financial assistance to European countries, possibly together with the IMF or 
other international organisations, explicitly excludes euro-area countries. This situation was 
interpreted in two opposite ways in the political discussion inside the euro area. Some argued 
that Greece should only turn to the IMF, since the EU was not allowed to provide assistance. 
Others argued that Greece should only turn to members of the euro family, and exclude the 
IMF altogether. Neither option was feasible. The amount of financial assistance needed by 
Greece was well above what the IMF could provide on its own. However, the EU lacked the 
required expertise to design and monitor a financial assistance programme without IMF 
cooperation. The solution was EU-IMF cooperation. 
 
The second problem was the financial terms of the cooperation. In non-euro area countries, 
the IMF was the majority lender to Hungary and Romania and the minority lender to Latvia, a 
first for the Fund. In euro-area countries, there was no choice. The amounts involved and the 
politics obliged the IMF to accept participation as a minority lender, though at the risk of 
losing its leadership as provider of policy advice and setter of policy conditionality, thus 
creating potential difficulties for non-European IMF members. 
 
The third problem was the selection of EU institutions that should be involved in the design 
and monitoring of the programmes. In non-euro area countries, negotiations with national 
authorities were always conducted by the European Commission and IMF staff. In Greece, 
however, it was felt that the EU side should be represented by the European Commission “in 
liaison with the ECB”, resulting in the European Commission, ECB and IMF Troika. As 
already discussed in chapter 4, there are different possible explanations for the political 
decision to include ECB staff in the negotiation of EU-IMF programmes for Greece and other 
euro-area countries. The most convincing explanation is that the inadequate institutional 
arrangement in the euro area forced the ECB to operate as a quasi-fiscal actor in programme 
countries69. It is logical, therefore, that it sits at the programme table and on the lending side, 
whereas the national central bank of the country in question sits on the other side. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided in two parts. After a brief assessment of EU-IMF 
cooperation in non-euro area countries, we assess the functioning of the Troika from the 
perspective of each of its members and from the broader EU-IMF perspective. 
 
6.1 EU-IMF cooperation in non-euro countries 
 
The European facility providing Medium-Term Financial Assistance (MTFA) for member 
states having balance-of-payments difficulties was originally established in 198870. It was 
only used twice before the introduction of the euro: in 1991 for Greece, and in 1993 for Italy. 
After the introduction of the euro, the facility became only available for member states that 
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have not adopted the single currency. The facility was revised accordingly in 200271. The new 
facility was used for the first time in 2008 for Hungary and later for Latvia and Romania72. 
 
In principle, the Commission intervenes alongside the IMF in providing medium-term 
financial assistance and plays the same role as the IMF in the negotiation and monitoring of 
programmes, in the decision to provide assistance and in the actual lending. In practice, 
however, the Commission was the junior partner in Hungary and in Romania, mainly because 
it lacked experience in providing balance-of-payments assistance. The IMF took the lead in 
these two countries, providing more than 60 percent of the financing. 
 
In Latvia, however, the roles of the EU and the IMF were reversed. The Fund was now, and 
for the first time in its history, the junior partner in a lending programme, providing less than 
25 percent of the financing. The difference in approach between Hungary and Romania 
compared to Latvia reflected the difference in exchange rate regimes. Of the three countries, 
Latvia alone participated in the EU’s exchange rate mechanism (ERM II), in which the 
exchange rate of a non-euro area EU country is fixed against the euro, and is only allowed to 
fluctuate within set limits73. 
 
Entry into ERM II is based on an agreement between the government and central bank 
governor of the non-euro participating countries, and the Eurogroup and the ECB, which 
neither the Latvian nor the euro-area authorities wished to abrogate. As is well-known, the 
European Commission and the IMF had a significant difference of opinion over whether 
Latvia should have been required to devalue its currency as a condition for receiving 
assistance. Eichengreen (2012) cites Lannin (2009) who quotes Latvia’s prime minister as 
stating that the IMF favoured devaluation but that this was vetoed by the Commission. 
Eichengreen also cites Aslund and Dombrovskis (2011) who show that views within the IMF 
were not uniform. Apparently, the IMF’s mission chief in Latvia was in favour of avoiding 
devaluation, whereas other IMF staff took the opposite view and pressed the Latvians and 
other Europeans to consider it. At the end, as Henning (2011) reports, the IMF’s managing 
director and the responsible EU commissioner struck an agreement whereby the European 
position on this point was accepted and the EU contributed a larger share of a larger overall 
package than the IMF had envisaged. 
 
Apart from some tensions over (rather than in) Latvia, EU-IMF cooperation in the three non-
euro countries has worked fairly well. It was also a useful learning experience for the 
Commission and for EU-IMF cooperation relative to the assistance programmes in the euro-
area countries. 
 
6.2 Principles for assistance in euro-area countries: The EU and the IMF  
 
To assess cooperation between the Troika members, we start (in line with Merler, Pisani-
Ferry and Wolff, 2012) by describing the standard model used by the IMF in a financial 
assistance programme. Conditional assistance from the IMF is based on simple principles. 
Lending is intended: 
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“…to give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with 
opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting 
to measures destructive of national or international prosperity" (Art. 1 of Articles of 
Agreement). 
 
“Conditionality helps countries solve balance of payments problems without resorting 
to [such] measures. At the same time, the measures are meant to safeguard IMF 
resources by ensuring that the country’s balance of payments will be strong enough to 
permit it to repay the loan” (IMF Factsheet). 
 
The IMF model is therefore rather straightforward: the IMF acts as an independent principal 
that requests a country to implement policies that are conducive to: 
 
(a) correction of the imbalances that led it to request assistance, and 
(b) ensuring that the country will be able to repay the IMF, without resorting to 
measures that are harmful to itself or to other IMF members. 
 
This is a well-defined role that on the face of it is free from any conflict of interest. It is 
important to note that the IMF does not have other objectives than those stated above and that 
it is not part of the policy system of the countries it provides assistance to. 
 
In the euro area, the situation is different. To start with, the motivation for assistance is more 
specific. To quote from the ESM treaty, the purpose is: 
 
“(…) to mobilise funding and provide stability support under strict conditionality, 
appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM 
Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if 
indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its 
Member States”. 
 
Whereas in practice assistance has been granted in parallel to IMF assistance, in principle it 
also serves the purpose of preserving euro-area stability. 
 
Second, the EU is a policy system, which has set itself many goals and is equipped with rules 
and procedures. The very fact that ESM assistance is reserved to countries that have ratified 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) is telling in this respect. Policy 
conditionality reflects the explicit or implicit hierarchy of EU objectives and rules. 
 
Third, the ECB and the Commission are parts of the EU policy system, whereas the IMF is 
external to the policy systems of the countries in which it intervenes. Together with the 
existence of aims and procedures, this creates the potential for conflicts of interest between 
the policy initiatives a 'trusted adviser' would recommend to a government, and the policies 
that are either recommended by EU institutions on the basis of rules and procedures, or 
carried out by EU policy institutions. The former applies to the Commission and both apply to 
the ECB. 
 
Although they operate according to different logic and rules, the EU and IMF are bound to 
cooperate. From the EU side, the ESM treaty enshrines cooperation. Article 8 states: 
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“The ESM will cooperate very closely with the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 
in providing stability support. The active participation of the IMF will be sought, both 
at technical and financial level. A euro-area Member State requesting financial 
assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever possible, a similar request 
to the IMF.” 
 
There is obviously nothing similar in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, but there has been a 
clear wish on its part since the start of the financial crisis to assist its EU members, both 
outside and inside the euro area, and to cooperate with EU institutions. 
 
6.3 Assessing the role of the IMF in the Troika 
 
In the euro-area programmes, the IMF is a minority lender. It provides only one-third of the 
financing, while the other two-thirds are provided by EU countries. This is an awkward 
situation for the IMF which is used to being the sole lender – or at least to being a majority 
lender – and to applying its own rules. It is especially awkward in view of the fact that the 
scale of IMF lending to Greece, Ireland and Portugal was unprecedented both in absolute 
terms and compared to the borrowers’ quota. 
 
At the time of the first Greek programme, some considered that it was very risky for the IMF 
to accept a junior role. For instance, Morris Goldstein, a former deputy director of the IMF’s 
research department and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
told the Financial Times that: “This has the makings of a strange dog’s breakfast… If a 
regional grouping can set IMF conditionality, what is the point of the Fund anyway? This 
could create a very dangerous precedent” (Hughes, Beattie and Hope, 2010). 
 
In addition to accepting that programme conditionality be devised, negotiated and monitored 
by the Troika, the IMF decided to modify its Exceptional Access Policy (EAP) criterion on 
debt sustainability in order to make it possible to lend to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
 
The amendment to the EAP criterion on debt sustainability introduced during the same IMF 
board discussion that approved the Stand-by Arrangement requested by Greece in May 2010 
reads as follows (added text is underlined): 
 
A rigorous and systematic analysis indicates that there is a high probability that the 
member’s public debt is sustainable in the medium term. However, in instances where 
there are significant uncertainties that make it difficult to state categorically that there 
is a high probability that the debt is sustainable over this period, exceptional access 
would be justified if there is a high risk of international systemic spillovers. Debt 
sustainability for these purposes will be evaluated on a forward-looking basis and may 
take into account, inter alia, the intended restructuring of debt to restore 
sustainability. This criterion applies only to public (domestic and external) debt. 
However, the analysis of such public debt sustainability will incorporate any potential 
contingent liabilities of the government, including those potentially arising from 
private external indebtedness.  
 
As Committerri and Spadafora (2013) note: “Other joint EU-IMF rescue packages with 
exceptional access were subsequently justified by referring to this clause: for Ireland 
(December 16, 2010), Portugal (May 20, 2011), and once again for Greece (March 15, 
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2012). In all these cases, uncertainties about the future public debt paths made it difficult to 
state categorically that these countries’ debts were sustainable with a high probability.” 
 
Although the revised EAP criterion applies erga omnes to all IMF members, the fact of the 
matter is that so far only euro-area countries have benefitted from the new rule. This, together 
with the perception that programme conditionality has been more favourable for euro-area 
countries than it was during the Asian crisis, has created some resentment on the part of IMF 
members, especially in Asia and in Latin America, although the prevailing view is a sense of 
relief that the euro-area crisis has been contained partly thanks to IMF intervention. 
 
The revised EAP criterion also seems to have been a bone of contention between the EU and 
the IMF and within the IMF, almost from the time when it was adopted. Many at the IMF 
considered that Greece's debt should have been restructured, if not prior to the first 
programme, at least much sooner than what was eventually decided. On the EU side, 
however, there was much less appetite for even considering that a restructuring would be 
needed. There was a sense that debt sustainability analysis, a key feature of IMF programmes, 
was inappropriate or unhelpful in a situation like the euro-area crisis. And although the IMF 
line eventually prevailed, the revised EAP criterion has clearly left a mark on the IMF staff. 
 
Questions have also been raised about whether the IMF's junior position in the Troika has 
reduced its ability to conduct its role objectively. For instance, Arvind Subramanian, another 
former IMF official and senior fellow at the Peterson Institute, wrote in the Financial Times 
that “the IMF has toed the official European/German line on the crisis, possibly to the 
disservice of Europe and the world. It has not been a source of new ideas or critical 
thinking… [and] has failed to challenge orthodoxy, forfeiting its role as a valuable referee in 
the policy debates. If things turn bad, the IMF will have to bear responsibility for its 
complicity in the less-than-optimal policy choices made in Europe” (Subramanian, 2012). 
 
Others are even more sanguine, at least as far as the Greek programme is concerned. For 
instance, Guillermo Ortiz, a former Mexican central bank governor, stated that: “The IMF 
probably should have stayed on the sideline of this programme that is truly controlled by the 
[EU]. It is only risking damaging its reputation by intervening in a package in which it does 
not even have faith” (Ortiz, 2012). 
 
6.4 Assessing the role of the European Commission in the Troika 
 
In non-euro area programmes the Commission, like the IMF, is 'vertically integrated'. It 
carries out all the functions, from the negotiation and monitoring of programmes, to the 
decision to provide assistance and to actual lending. This is not the case in euro-area 
programmes, in which, as already discussed in chapter 4, the role of the Commission is both 
narrower and more complicated. 
 
It is narrower in the sense that the Commission acts merely as the agent of the Eurogroup, 
which decides whether to provide assistance and controls the actual lending through the ESM. 
This is in sharp contrast to the normal function of the Commission, which is to act as an 
independent principal protecting the EU interest. 
 
The Commission’s role is also more complicated for two reasons. First, the intergovernmental 
nature of the ESM, with its unanimity rule, makes the process highly political, involving not 
only finance ministers, but also heads of state and government and national parliaments. With 
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so many participants, the process is prone to constant renegotiation, which greatly 
complicates the Commission's task. Second, the Commission obviously retains its normal role 
of enforcer of EU decisions, including in areas that affect the implementation of assistance 
programmes. There is a significant potential in two areas for conflicts of interest, with the 
Commission acting as principal in charge of enforcing EU rules while also being the agent of 
the Eurogroup. Though fiscal policy is an important component of all EU-IMF programmes, 
EU fiscal rules have had to be relaxed in all three euro-area programme countries. Similarly, 
the Commission has found itself in a complicated situation in attempting to enforce state-aid 
rules to avoid competitive distortions stemming from financial assistance to distressed banks 
in programme countries while ensuring the banks' financial viability. 
        
Despite the complex institutional arrangement on the EU political side, which has greatly 
complicated its role within the Troika, the European Commission has been quite effective. It 
has learned from the experience it gained in the three non-euro area EU-IMF programmes and 
greatly improved its technical capacity to negotiate and monitor programmes. Also, it has 
been able to draw on the resources of its different services to take an active role in programme 
countries beyond macroeconomic and structural adjustment. In particular, the Commission's 
competition services have played an important role through the state aid control instrument in 
the restructuring of the banking sector. However, the Commission suffers from a lack of 
'vertical integration'. Its technical expertise at staff level does not feed easily into the decisions 
to provide actual lending, which are taken by the Eurogroup both directly and through the 
ESM. 
 
6.5 Assessing the role of the ECB in the Troika 
 
The role played by the ECB in the Troika is difficult to assess simply because it publishes 
little or nothing about its involvement in the programmes. Unlike the IMF and the European 
Commission it does not produce assessments or programme monitoring documents. It does 
not participate in programme lending, but relies on its own instruments (collateral policy and 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance) to provide vital liquidity to the banking system in 
programme countries. By relaxing its collateral standards when programmes are agreed, as 
done for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, or by tightening them, and by setting limits to ELA 
access, the ECB plays a role of its own in the programmes74. Evaluations of this role, and of 
the pros and the cons of the ECB’s participation in the Troika, have been done by Merler, 
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012) and by Whelan (2012). 
 
Anecdotal evidence obtained by Merler, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012) suggests that the 
ECB’s role in programme missions to Greece, Ireland and Portugal is mostly focused on the 
financial/banking side and on the fiscal side. The ECB does not appear to play a significant 
role in the actual computation of the financing needs of a country. This is mostly done by the 
European Commission and the IMF. On fiscal policy, the ECB usually adopted a rather strict 
line, urging more rapid consolidation than the IMF and the European Commission. For 
example, in Ireland, the ECB insisted on reaching a three percent deficit by 2013 while the 
other institutions leaned more towards achieving the goal in 2014. In Greece, the ECB also 
came out strongly against debt restructuring and, in particular, any form of involuntary 
restructuring of private claims on the Greek state. For the banking/financial component of the 
programmes, the ECB typically urged larger financial packages for banks to strengthen their 
                                                          
74
 See the ECB press releases of 3 May 2010, 31 March 2011 and 7 July 2011 on the relaxation of collateral 
standards for Greece, Ireland and Portugal issued on the occasion of programme agreements in the three 
countries. 
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capital base. Also, the ECB called for larger funds to protect bank depositors. In the design of 
the precise structural reforms that are part of the programmes, the ECB played only a 
supporting role to the European Commission, most likely because the Commission has 
broader and more detailed expertise in this area. 
 
It is a matter for discussion if the twin role of the ECB – as an influential institution within the 
European policy system and as the joint provider of advice to a euro-area government within 
the framework of a conditional programme – creates conflicts of interest that are significant 
enough to outweigh the potential advantages of ECB participation in the design and the 
negotiation of conditional assistance. 
 
There are three potential conflicts of interest. The first relates to the ECB’s prime activity, 
monetary policy. The ECB’s mandate is to secure price stability in the euro area as a whole. 
This means that the inflation performance of small countries such as Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal is essentially irrelevant for the fulfilment of the ECB's price stability mandate. Yet, 
by being closely involved in EU-IMF programmes, the ECB inevitably influences policies 
beyond monetary policy and starts to have different interests. The pursuit of such interests 
could lead to a conflict with its core mandate. The main danger is in relation to fiscal policy. 
The ECB might be tempted to deviate from its price stability objective in order to help 
improve budgetary sustainability in a given programme country. Or it might be biased 
towards fiscal consolidation because of its focus on price stability. 
 
A second potential conflict of interest arises over the ECB’s liquidity policy. Banks in 
programme countries are typically heavily stressed and need to rely on ECB liquidity for their 
operations or even their survival. In a financial assistance programme to a country outside a 
monetary union, the IMF would include liquidity management by the national central bank in 
its programme recommendation, advise the national central bank to provide liquidity to 
solvent but illiquid banks, and assist in the restructuring of insolvent banks. In the euro area 
however, the ECB decides on its own liquidity policy and influences the design of the 
programme on bank restructuring. Ex ante, the ECB might seek to minimise liquidity 
operations that constitute a risk to its own balance sheet, and to label banking problems as 
solvency problems that have to be addressed through budgetary support or by the bailing-in of 
private shareholders and creditors. Ex post however, the ECB might actually provide liquidity 
on soft terms as would any central bank interested in the success of the programme. 
  
Third, by buying government bonds in the framework of the Securities Market Programme 
(SMP) or, in the future, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the ECB 
becomes a creditor of the countries receiving financial assistance. This may influence its 
position in the negotiations on fiscal consolidation and private-sector involvement in debt 
restructuring. Ex ante, fear of such an outcome might lead the ECB to be tougher on fiscal 
consolidation than warranted on broader economic grounds. Again, this could turn the ECB 
into an interested party in discussions about the treatment of excessive public debt cases. 
Furthermore, as access to the OMT is explicitly conditional on the country's participation in 
an ESM programme (for which IMF involvement would probably also be sought), the ECB 
may end up making its actions conditional on a decision that it is itself part of75. This would 
be contrary to the separation, which the ECB considers essential, between monetary and fiscal 
decisions. 
 
                                                          
75
 See ECB press release of 6 September 2012 on the technical features of the OMT.  
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These three potential conflicts of interest are summarised in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Possible conflicts of interest 
ECB Role Ex ante (programme 
negotiation) 
Ex post (programme 
implementation) 
Monetary policy Too tough on fiscal 
consolidation 
Too soft on inflation 
Liquidity policy Too tough on bank solvency Too soft on liquidity 
provision 
Creditor (SMP/OMT) Too tough on fiscal 
consolidation; ECB risks 
conditioning its OMT-
related bond purchase 
decisions on its own 
programme decisions.  
Too soft on inflation, too 
timid on restructuring 
Source: adapted from Merler, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012). 
 
Based on available written material, it is difficult to assess if these conflicts have actually 
materialised in Greece, Ireland or Portugal. We are not aware of compelling evidence of 
conflicts of interest between the ECB's policy roles and its participation in the EU-IMF 
programme for Greece. On several occasions, however, the ECB has pursued conflicting aims 
and faced difficult trade-offs in Greece, such as when it redefined its collateral policy in 2010; 
in early discussions on debt restructuring in 2010-11; and in the 2011-12 negotiations on the 
contours of the restructuring. 
 
Whelan (2012) is less positive about the ECB’s role in the Irish programme. To begin with, he 
is not persuaded by the argument that the ECB plays a quasi-fiscal role that justifies its 
involvement in programme design and monitoring. Yet his main quarrel with the ECB’s 
involvement in the Troika is the ECB's insistence that private unguaranteed bondholders be 
repaid although the programme makes no reference to such requirement. In his view, the 
ECB’s position has meant that most Irish citizens believe that repayment of unguaranteed 
bonds is a condition of the programme, a perception which he claims has undermined the 
popularity and legitimacy of the programme. His conclusion is that the ECB should not be a 
member of a Troika tasked with monitoring any future financial assistance programme. 
 
6.6 Assessing the working of the Troika in EU-IMF programmes  
 
Cooperation between the EU and the IMF in euro-area programme countries is complicated 
by the fact that each provides financial assistance according to its own logic and rules. Three 
differences between the EU and the IMF are particularly relevant here.  
 
First, the ESM, like its predecessor the EFSF, can only grant financial assistance as a last 
resort. By contrast, the IMF tends to favour early intervention. It is fair to say that in all three 
euro-area programme countries, the late EU-IMF intervention was caused by the EU, while 
the IMF sought early intervention in each case. However, it would be unfair to view the EU 
institutions as solely responsible for the delayed intervention. The authorities in the crisis 
countries also bear significant responsibility because they were not keen to request early 
assistance for fear of the stigma linked to receiving IMF assistance. 
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The second difference is in the modus operandi of the EU and IMF. The IMF acts as a 
'vertically integrated' and independent principal. It has a clear and narrow mandate that 
renders it less vulnerable to conflicts of interest76. By contrast, the EU side is extremely 
messy. First, the EU is represented in the Troika by two institutions, though with a clear 
hierarchy since the European Commission operates “in liaison with the ECB”. Second, as we 
have seen, neither the European Commission nor the ECB are free from potential conflicts of 
interest. Third, as far as financial assistance to euro-area countries is concerned, the European 
Commission is neither 'vertically integrated' nor an independent principal. Instead, it acts as 
the agent of the Eurogroup through a complicated political process prone to constant 
renegotiation, which greatly complicates the Commission's task. In addition, the unanimity 
rule within the ESM causes delay in taking decisions to grant financial assistance. 
 
The third difference relates to the conditionality attached to an assistance programme. After 
the Asian crisis and the criticism of the IMF for imposing too many conditions (Stiglitz, 
2002), the IMF decided to embrace the philosophy of “parsimonious conditionality” (IMF, 
2002). Self-imposed guidelines adopted in 2002 included: programme-related conditions 
governing the provision of Fund resources will be applied parsimoniously; conditions will be 
established only on the basis of those variables or measures that are reasonably within the 
member’s direct or indirect control; conditions will normally consist of macroeconomic 
variables and structural measures that are within the IMF’s core areas of responsibility; and 
the IMF is fully responsible for the establishment and monitoring of all conditions attached to 
the use of its resources. There will be no cross-conditionality, under which the use of the 
IMF’s resources would be directly subject to the rules or decisions of other organisations. 
 
By contrast EU conditionality, contained in a Memorandum of Understanding on specific 
economic policy conditionality, is far more detailed and specific. And though the European 
MoU is consistent with the Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies addressed to the IMF, some of its specific conditions of a structural nature are a 
source of potential conflict with the notion of no cross-conditionality. The EU’s more 
extensive and detailed conditionality approach largely results from the nature of the EU policy 
system. It is in contrast to the standard IMF approach of parsimonious conditionality 
(Goldstein 2000). In the macroeconomic area, EU institutions are bound by EU fiscal rules 
such as the Stability and Growth Pact, the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack. The IMF is free to set 
the fiscal and, more generally, macroeconomic targets it considers appropriate, but the 
Commission and the ECB are much more constrained. In the structural area, the Commission 
has a duty to ensure that member states comply with EU treaty provisions and legislation in 
fields like financial services, energy or transport. 
 
These differences between the EU and the IMF have led to a number of frictions between 
Troika members, though not among mission teams, but at a higher, more political level. First, 
the IMF has often been frustrated with the EU’s procrastination in deciding that assistance 
was needed, and later in taking difficult but inevitable decisions, such as to restructure 
Greece's debt. Second, all three members have been frustrated by the messy EU system which 
has not only slowed down decisions but has often also made them sub-optimal. Finally, the 
different approaches to conditionality have also been a source of friction. This includes the 
greater flexibility of the IMF versus the treaty-bound approach of EU institutions, and the 
recourse to implicit (ie not specified in the programme) conditionality by the ECB, as in the 
                                                          
76
 It is worth recalling that one of the main objections against the proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism as proposed by Krueger (2002) was that it would create a conflict of interest for the Fund. 
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case of Irish bank senior bondholders. The exemption of the bondholders was - at least 
initially - opposed by the IMF. 
 
Finally, the different roles of the three institutions make communication with national 
stakeholders and public opinion more difficult than it would be for a single institution. At a 
time when the IMF doctrine emphasises transparency and ownership, the Troika does not 
make things easy. This has been particularly clear in Greece. Being composed of three very 
different institutions, the Troika is by essence unaccountable as an entity. There is 
accountability at national level for the commitment and use of ESM funds but the Troika's 
operations are not accountable because none of the participating institutions are accountable 
to national parliaments. The European Parliament can hold the Commission accountable, but 
the situation is unclear for the ECB, and the IMF is not accountable to regional entities. All in 
all, there is currently less transparency and accountability than is normally the case for IMF 
lending operations. 
 
Viewed against this background, cooperation within the Troika has been remarkable, at least 
on the ground between mission teams. All those we interviewed repeatedly emphasised two 
very positive points: first, the complementarity that exists between the three institutions based 
on their respective comparative advantages; and second, that there are checks and balances 
stemming from the respective roles and rules of the three institutions, and from their (implicit 
for the ECB) financial participation in the joint EU-IMF programmes. 
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7. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
7.1 Economic issues 
 
In 2012, GDP per capita was 5 percent below its peak level in Portugal, 10 percent below in 
Ireland and more than 20 percent below in Greece77. These numbers alone summarise the 
extent of the economic and social setback in the three countries receiving financial assistance. 
They do not, however, tell us whether the Troika programmes – by far the largest in the 
history of international financial assistance – have been successes or failures.  
 
The judgement of success or failure is less easy to make than it might seem. Such a judgement 
cannot be based on outcomes alone, because the circumstances of the programme countries 
were, and still are to a great extent, truly exceptional and were bound to make economic 
revival especially challenging. A judgement cannot be based only on a comparison between 
forecasts and outcomes, as the latter were affected by unforeseen developments in the euro-
area environment. Nor can it be based on comparisons with what an alternative strategy might 
have delivered, as it is impossible to construct a counterfactual and to benchmark the 
programmes against it. Furthermore, in none of the three countries has the Troika yet declared 
victory or admitted failure. 
 
Three conditions set the euro-area crises apart from earlier crises that required international 
assistance. First, the crises in the euro-area countries developed on the coattails of the Great 
Recession that followed the 2008 global financial crisis. Economic and market environments 
were therefore especially unstable and inauspicious to adjustment and recovery. Second, the 
three programme countries belong to a European policy system with an incomplete 
architecture that was partly responsible for the crisis they suffered from. These conditions also 
made crisis resolution particularly difficult and were at the origin of recurring changes in the 
principles and modalities of assistance that cannot be found in standard programmes. Third, 
the size of the macroeconomic imbalances at the beginning of the programmes was unique, 
and the challenge of adjusting within monetary union particularly daunting. Large net 
international liabilities, high public debt and substantial relative price misalignments meant 
that the process was bound to be painful and long. 
 
A simplistic judgement of programme effectiveness, based on a comparison between 
reasonable expectations and outcomes, would be that the Irish programme seems to have been 
successful. At the time of writing, Ireland is on track to exit the three-year programme and 
regain access to financial markets on time, though subject to risks. The programme in 
Portugal could also prove successful, though the Portuguese economy remains structurally 
weak and fragile against shocks. In Greece, however, the programme has been unsuccessful. 
Greece is on a totally different trajectory to Ireland and Portugal, and it would be right to 
ascribe this difference in trajectory to three factors. First, initial conditions were especially 
adverse in Greece. Second, Greece has a much weaker administrative and political system 
than the other two countries. Third, Greece suffers from having been the first country in need 
of financial assistance inside a monetary union that was totally unprepared for a crisis. 
 
This simplistic interpretation is, however, not satisfactory. A more subtle answer would be 
that the programmes have been successful in some respects and unsuccessful in others. The 
main success has been the current account, with deficits shrinking much faster than expected. 
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 Measured in GDP per capita, constant prices in Euro. Taken from IMF, WEO 2013 in  
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This can, however, be attributed to both positive and negative developments. The positive 
development, in particular in the Irish case, is the improvement in exports. The negative 
development is the collapse of imports, which relates to one of the failures of the 
programmes: a much deeper and longer recession than expected. 
 
The three countries have by and large adopted the austerity measures prescribed to them by 
the Troika. They had little choice, since lender countries were unwilling to provide more 
financing. 
 
The alternative to austerity would have been debt restructuring. In the Greek case, an earlier 
restructuring would have been preferable, at least from a Greek point of view. In the Irish 
case, the bail-in of bank senior bondholders might have been desirable from the Irish point of 
view, though it would have improved the programme’s sustainability far less than in Greece 
and it could have had significant negative implications for the funding of Irish banks. From 
the point of view of the rest of the euro area, the balance of costs and benefits was less clear-
cut. 
 
With hindsight, Greece should have restructured earlier. Delay led to the substitution of public 
for private creditors and thereby to the passing-on of losses to taxpayers. This is likely to be a 
major point of contention in the years to come when official European creditors will have to 
acknowledge that Greece is unable to repay its debt. 
 
The bailing-in of senior creditors of Irish banks would have sent a signal and further 
weakened fragile banks in the EU. The fundamental problem, however, was that Europe was 
much too slow to address its banking problems. Had banks been strengthened earlier, Ireland 
could have adopted a solution consisting of creditor bail-in now advocated as part of a 
systemic overhaul of bank resolution regimes. 
 
In the absence of expansionary measures elsewhere in the euro area, and with austerity 
measures in some surplus countries, austerity in programme countries, together with the loss 
of confidence and the fragmentation of the financial system, severely depressed growth by 
more than anticipated. The Troika, for sure, was not responsible for setting the policy course 
in non-crisis countries. But it was responsible for predicating the success of the programmes 
on favourable external conditions that failed to materialise. 
 
A final failure of the programmes is the level of unemployment, which is far greater than 
anticipated and which jeopardises the sustainability of the adjustment. Austerity measures are 
not the only reasons for such high unemployment levels in all three programme countries. 
Another reason is the malfunctioning of the labour market in two of the three countries 
(Ireland is the exception). Another is the fact that labour-intensive sectors, in particular 
construction, benefitted from the expansion during the boom years and now need to adjust. 
   
The period during which the programmes were implemented is associated with exceptional 
social hardship, though not only in programme countries, as the situation in Spain illustrates. 
It was beyond the scope of this study to analyse changes in income distribution and wealth, or 
the social implications of the large increase in unemployment. We also did not perform an 
analysis of the major increase in youth unemployment, which we see as one of the most 
dramatic fallouts of the crisis. 
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7.2 Institutional issues 
 
Institutional matters relating to EU-IMF cooperation have played a significant role in the 
design, monitoring and, ultimately, the implementation of the programmes. 
 
Though fraught with many potential problems, EU-IMF cooperation to deal with the crisis 
was inevitable in euro-area countries. From the EU side, despite political misgivings from 
some quarters – those who feared that the euro area would come under the influence of 
'Washington', and those who regretted that the EU was missing the chance to build a 
European Monetary Fund – recourse to the IMF was eventually deemed normal and 
necessary. It was normal because it had been applied just a year or two earlier in other EU 
countries and because participants in the euro each remain full members of the IMF; and it 
was necessary because the EU lacked expertise on, and experience of, crisis funding, and also 
lacked sufficient trust in its own institutions to act alone. All these factors explain why an 
explicit reference to the IMF was introduced in the ESM treaty. On the IMF side, there were 
also clear misgivings. Never before (except in the case of small Latvia) had the IMF been in a 
situation in which it would cooperate with a regional entity on a minority basis. Accepting the 
minority lender role represented a clear threat for the independence of the Fund, for its ability 
to treat all members on equal terms and for its role as a ‘trusted advisor’. At the same time, it 
was in the interest neither of the IMF nor of the global community to abstain from what was 
going on in the area posing the biggest threat to global stability.  
 
We have argued that despite a number of tensions stemming from their different remits and 
rules, the EU and the IMF have succeeded in cooperating in Greece, Ireland and Portugal.  
The one issue on which Troika members appear to have disagreed is the risk of financial 
spillovers between euro-area countries. The ECB and the European Commission seem to have 
been more sensitive than the IMF to such risks. This would explain why the two European 
institutions long opposed Greek debt restructuring and why the ECB was so opposed to 
imposing losses in senior bondholders of Irish banks, whereas the IMF viewed these options 
favourably.  
 
One interpretation of these differences is that the IMF was more concerned with debt 
sustainability and the success of programmes in individual euro-area countries, whereas the 
ECB and the European Commission were more concerned with the consequences of the 
programmes for the financial stability and sustainability of the euro area. Yet, the IMF did put 
forward major proposals to improve the financial stability and sustainability of the euro area 
in the medium term. This difference in approach was particularly visible in the discussions on 
Greek PSI and over the issue of senior bondholder involvement in Ireland. The different 
mandates of the two European institutions and the IMF is what led to their different views on 
the appropriate measures for handling Greek public debt and Irish bank debt. No similar 
problem arose in the case of Portugal. 
 
Based on these considerations, a number of lessons can be highlighted and proposals for 
reforms made. 
 
7.2.1 Lessons for the euro area 
 
As far as the euro area is concerned, it appears that EU-IMF cooperation will continue to 
operate whenever countries require financial assistance, as is the case in Cyprus at the time of 
writing. This is partly because of the ESM treaty, which explicitly calls for IMF involvement, 
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but is also because there is still insufficient trust in EU institutions, at least in some EU 
countries. 
 
But an agreement on the principle of EU-IMF cooperation in crisis countries does not 
necessarily mean that such cooperation will not change in the future. Compared to the 
situations that prevailed in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, several amendments are possible or 
desirable for each of the three Troika members. 
 
• To start with the IMF, as long as individual euro-area countries are IMF members, 
they are obviously entitled to seek its assistance, even if they also receive ESM 
assistance. How should the IMF respond to requests to collaborate with the EU? Three 
options seem possible: The IMF could retain an important lending role, at the level of 
one-third of the total programme, as was the case in the first Greek programme and in 
the Irish and Portuguese programmes. This option does not seem feasible, neither in 
view of the IMF’s resources, nor its global role. Non-European members are already 
complaining that the IMF has lent too much to Europe. Even more importantly, 
participation by the IMF as a minority, but substantial lender alongside the ESM raises 
questions about its independence. Should the IMF and Europeans disagree, the Fund 
can neither exit (because its share of lending is too large) nor prevail (because it is a 
minority lender);  
• The IMF could provide technical assistance to EU-led programmes but no financial 
assistance, leaving this role entirely to the EU. But who would be the recipient of the 
IMF’s technical assistance: EU institutions or the EU country in difficulty? 
Presumably it would be the latter since only individual EU countries are IMF 
members, but this would be problematic since the IMF and EU institutions would then 
be on opposite sides of the negotiating table rather than on the same side as is 
currently the case. The reverse, to have the IMF act as formal advisor to EU 
institutions, does not seem feasible. In practice this option would amount to leaving 
euro-area countries on their own, an odd solution as long as euro-area member states 
remain individual members of the IMF;  
• The IMF could function as a ‘catalytic lender’. Here it would provide the minimum 
financing to the programme necessary to exercise conditionality and would provide 
expertise to both the borrowing country and the EU institutions, while retaining the 
option of exit in case of disagreement. In other words, it would have enough money in 
the game to be a player, but as little as possible to avoid losing its independence. The 
right amount would probably be somewhere around ten percent of the total 
programme, the figure proposed by the IMF’s managing director for the Cyprus 
programme.  
 
We view the third option as the best choice for both the IMF and the EU. It would leave the 
IMF the option of agreeing or disagreeing. Most likely, the EU would seek IMF participation 
because of the Fund’s expertise and because of the credibility its involvement provides. But it 
could, financially and by now technically, go ahead without it. 
 
Nonetheless, we are aware that this solution does not fully solve the problems associated with 
the IMF's position as a minority lender and the potential accusations by other IMF members 
that it offers preferential treatment to EU countries. However, these other IMF members 
should recognise that their interests are better served by having the IMF participate in solving 
problems in the euro area, rather than by staying out altogether. 
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In our view, involvement of the IMF in euro-area programmes would remain advisable as 
long as euro-area governance is incomplete. Should the euro area become a member of the 
IMF – a development that we consider desirable for the medium term78 – and be able 
therefore to request IMF assistance directly (rather than through one of its member countries), 
the situation could be reconsidered. But in this scenario, assistance would in all likelihood be 
unnecessary, because the euro area would have acquired all the necessary institutions and 
policies to address its problems independently. 
 
Turning to the second Troika member, the European Commission, we view its current role in 
euro-area programmes as necessary but problematic. As discussed in chapter 6, it acts as an 
agent of the Eurogroup rather than as the independent principal protecting the EU interest that 
it should be. Its role in the Troika could create a conflict of interest with its normal and much 
more encompassing role of ‘guardian of the treaty’. 
 
A solution would be to give the Commission full responsibility for negotiation, financing and 
monitoring of EU assistance, as it is the case for non-euro area members. The Commission 
would thus become the vertically integrated counterpart of the IMF. The advantage of this 
option would be to give an EU institution pivotal responsibility in an area of vital importance, 
instead of relying on the intergovernmental ESM. The Commission would also be tasked with 
ensuring that programmes are in line with the Treaty. However, we see two objections to this 
solution. First, it would face considerable objections from the United Kingdom and other 
members of the EU who do not participate in the euro and do not want to share financial risk. 
Euro-area member states have also proved reluctant to give extensive powers to the 
Commission and there is no indication that they have changed their attitudes. Second and 
more importantly, it is not by accident that the IMF is a specialised organisation with a 
defined mandate and non-political governance. The IMF was built to fulfil its mission and if 
needed to be deeply unpopular in the countries where it intervenes. The Commission is a 
political institution with a broad mandate, which does not make it easy for it to play a role 
akin to that of the IMF. A more clearly defined and narrow mandate would help in fulfilling a 
specific function. 
 
We would prefer to give the responsibility for negotiation, financing and monitoring of EU 
assistance to a new EU institution, a European Monetary Fund (EMF), which like the IMF 
would be equipped with effective decision-making rules rather than being a technical 
subsidiary to the Eurogroup, as is presently the case with the ESM. The EMF would be one of 
the pillars of a European Treasury and would replace the intergovernmental ESM. This 
solution would only be feasible in the medium term since it would require a change to the EU 
treaty. The new European Monetary Fund (which may or may not deal with both euro and 
non-euro area programmes) should be a fully-fledged EU institution and operate like the IMF. 
It would define conditionality, though the Commission would be consulted to make sure that 
the conditionality is compatible with EU rules. 
 
EMF membership would include all euro-area countries and possibly other EU member 
countries. Its board (consisting, like the board of the European Investment Bank, of 
representatives of member countries and of the Commission) would decide whether or not to 
grant financial assistance by a qualified majority rather than by unanimity (or by an 85 
percent majority in emergency situations), as is the case for ESM decisions. Since the EMF 
would hopefully be far less active than the IMF, the EMF would need only a small permanent 
                                                          
78
 See Sapir (2007) and the chapter therein by Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry.  
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staff. It could obtain some Commission staff on secondment during crisis times. Such 
secondment would also ensure the coherence of staff surveillance in the context of EU 
procedures with the definition of policy conditionality in a programme. 
 
Turning finally to the ECB, we find the current situation perplexing. As already discussed in 
chapter 6, its formal role in the Troika, in which the EU is represented by the European 
Commission “in liaison with the ECB”, is not well defined. In fact it is rather confusing. The 
ECB does not formally take part in programme negotiations, it does not provide programme 
financing, nor does it, like the other two Troika members, issue reports about programme 
implementation. Yet it issues joint statements with the European Commission and the IMF 
about Troika missions. From the published documents, one cannot determine whether the 
ECB takes or does or does not take responsibility for programme decisions. 
 
The ECB is obviously a key player in programme countries. It decides whether or not to relax 
collateral standards, whether or not national central banks can provide ELA to domestic 
banks, and whether it is ready to provide OMT assistance to countries after they regain market 
access. The Cypriot case in March 2013 demonstrated that, by threatening to withdraw ELA 
access, the ECB can have very substantial leverage. 
 
With the creation of the EU Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) the ECB will acquire a 
key role in banking supervision. This will greatly improve its knowledge about the risks in the 
banking system. Yet, even with that information, the ECB will still need to have access to 
information about programme developments in order to be able to properly assess risks 
beyond banking. We consider, therefore, that it should continue to participate in Troika field 
missions. It should also be able to exercise its voice as far as its willingness to provide ELA 
and OMT assistance is concerned. But it should not be party to programme negotiations that 
by nature cover a scope that extends far beyond the remit of a central bank. It should thus 
become a (mostly) silent participant in the Troika. 
 
In order to avoid misunderstandings about its role and responsibility in the Troika, which 
should be limited to obtaining information and voicing concern, the ECB should not issue any 
statements (alone or together with the other Troika members) about programmes. Hence, 
while its role in programme countries is and will remain crucial it should be clearly delimited 
to its own instruments. 
 
Our proposal would also improve accountability. We would suggest that the European 
Monetary Fund be subject to the oversight of the European Parliament. We do not advocate 
the parliament having a vote on individual programmes – nor do we consider healthy the idea 
that programmes should be subject to the approval of national parliaments other than that of 
the programme country. But the European Parliament should be given right of oversight, 
including as regards the ex-post assessment of individual programmes and the included 
conditionality. 
 
7.2.2 Lessons for the rest of the world 
 
IMF intervention in the euro area alongside European institutions could offer lessons for other 
regions of the world that have already or may create regional institutions capable of playing a 
similar role. 
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Eichengreen (2012) considers that the lessons from IMF cooperation with the EU are of 
limited relevance to the rest of the world because no other region has a similar weight within 
the IMF, both formally and informally – because of history, tradition and intellectual 
background. While we tend to agree that Europe is a specific case, we nevertheless believe 
that lessons can be drawn from the current experience. 
 
The main lesson is that the IMF can – if not always easily – coexist with regional institutions. 
In retrospect, US and European opposition to the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund when 
the suggestion was made in the late 1990s was not justified. From an Asian standpoint, the 
fact that the IMF agreed to collaborate with the EU institutions is often regarded as illustrating 
an inequality of treatment. In the future, similar cooperation with regional entities should be 
possible, provided such entities are economically and financially meaningful, equipped with 
effective common institutions, and are capable of mobilising financial resources for dealing 
with member countries going through crises. Under such conditions regional entities should 
be allowed to collaborate with the IMF. 
 
The issues we have raised in this report about the principles and modalities of cooperation 
would still be relevant. The question of whether the IMF is again willing to act as minority 
lender and, if so, under what conditions would also need to be addressed. Inevitably, a case-
by-case approach would be required. But lessons learned and principles agreed on during the 
European crises could inspire crisis response in the future.      
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the financing needs of the three countries 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 Greece Ireland Portugal 
 
10Q2-13Q2 2010-2013 2011-2014 
5 GG deficit 53  22 
6 Debt amortisation 138.3  80.9 
B1) of which short-term 50  42.9 
B2) of which long-term 88.3  38.1 
7 Adjustment 1.5  2.1 
8 Gross financing need 
(A+B+C) 
192.8 98.9 105 
9 Rollover rate of short-
term debt 
94%  72% 
10 Rollover rate of long-
term debt 
34.99%  42% 
11 Debt issuance/Roll-over 93.5 48.9 47 
G1) of which short term 
(B1*E) 
47  31 
G2) of which long term  
(B2*F) 
30.9  16 
12 Privatisation 0.0 0.0 5 
13 Net Financing need  
(D-G-H) 
99.2 50 53 
14 Bank support 10 35 24.9 
J1) Of which Bank 
Solvency Support 
Mechanism 
  12 
J2) Of which other* 10 35 12.9 
15 Total Financing need (I+J) 109.2 85 78 
16 External loan 
commitment 
110 85 78 
Contribution IMF 30 22.5 26 
Contribution EFSM, 
EFSF, ESM, EA 
countries 
80 45 52 
Use of country’s 
financial buffers 
 17.5  
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Appendix 2: Methodology for Table 6 (Breakdown of gap between initial and actual 
fiscal targets for Greece)  
 
 
In order to disaggregate the impact of different variables over the government balance and 
debt, we start with the basic government balance equation B P I= + , where B is the overall 
government balance, P is the primary balance and I represents interest payments. 
 
j
iNGDP is the nominal GDP for year ias forecasted in year j . The difference between the 
currently (2013) and the originally (2010) forecasted government balance ratio in 2013 can be 
written as: 
 
2013 2010 2013 2013 2013 2010
2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
2013 2010 2013 2010 2010
2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
2013 2013
2013 2013 2013
2013 2010
2013 2013
Effect of lower nominal GDP (2a)
B B B B B B
NGDP NGDP NGDP NGDP NGDP
B B I
NGDP NGDP
−
− = − +
= − +
2013 2010 2013 2010
2013 2013 2013
2010 2010
2013 2013
Interest paymentseffect (3)
I P P
NGDP NGDP
− −
+
 
 
For the primary balance we use the European Commission's estimates of the tax revenue 
elasticity to output gap found in the 2012 edition of the Taxation Trends publication and 
assumed to be equal to the elasticity of tax revenues to nominal GDP ( ),T NGDPε . 
 
2013 2010 2013 2010
2013 2013 2013 2013
,2010 2010 Fiscal consolidation effort (residual) (5a)
2013 2013
Revenue shortfall due to adverse GDP developments (1)
100%T NGDP
P P NGDP NGDP E
NGDP NGDP
ε
 
− −
= × × + 
 
 
 
 
 
 (All variables expressed as % of GDP) Primary 
balance 
Overall balance Gross debt 
2013 target as set in the May 2010 SBA programme 3.1 -4.8 149 
-   Worse 2009 initial conditions -1.8 -2.0 14.3 
-   Revenue shortfall due to adverse GDP developments (1) -9.0 -9.0  
-   Effect of lower nominal GDP (2a), (2b)  -1.0 38.4 
-   Interest rate on public debt (3)  4.5  
-   Larger than expected overall deficits (4)   1.7 
-   Fiscal consolidation effort (residual) (5a) 7.7 7.8  
-   Debt accumulation residual (5b)   1.7 
-   Debt restructuring (6)   -26.6 
2013 outturn as forecasted in the January 2013 review 0 -4.5 178.5 
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Table 14: Tax revenue elasticity to output gap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Commission services 
 
For the debt ratio, the difference between the initially forecasted government debt-to-GDP 
ratio and the current forecast for 2013 can be written as: 
 
2013 2010 2013 2013 2013 2010
2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
2013 2010 2013 2010 2010
2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
Effect of lower nominal GDP (2b)
20
2010
2013 2010
20102013 2013
2010
2013
j j
j
D D D D D D
NGDP NGDP NGDP NGDP NGDP
B B
D D
NGDP
=
−
− = − +
−
−
=
13
2010 Debt restructuring (6) residual (5b)
2013
Larger than expected overall deficits (4)
R r
NGDP
+ +
∑
 
 
The effect of debt restructuring is calculated as the difference between the gross debt variation 
between 2012 and 2011 plus the overall government balance: 
 
2012 2011 2012 2013 2012 2013
2010 2010
2013 2013
2013 2011 2013 2012
2010
2013
100
100
D D B D D BR
NGDP NGDP
D D B B
NGDP
 
− + − +
= + × 
 
 
− + +
= × 
 
 
 Member 
State 
Percent change in tax revenues (as ratio to GDP) in reaction 
to a 1% change in the output gap 
Ireland 0.36 
Greece 0.42 
Portugal 0.41 
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Annex 1: Framework for cooperation between the IMF, the European Commission and 
the ECB 
 
Box 1 of the May 2010 report on Greece’s Request for Stand-By Agreement prepared by the 
IMF decribes the framework for cooperation as follows: 
 
Close cooperation between the three institutions is crucial in three areas: 
 
Programme design 
 
The authorities’ programme represents a coordinated framework for policy adjustment and 
financing supported by the EC, the ECB and the IMF. Programme discussions were 
conducted on a quadrilateral basis between the authorities and the three institutions, resulting 
in a unified and consistent set of macroeconomic and structural policy parameters. These are 
set out in the MEFP/TMU of the IMF and the MEFP/MoU of the EC. The MEFP focuses on 
macroeconomic policies and selected structural measures, while the MoU covers the full 
structural reform agenda agreed between the authorities and the EC. 
 
Programme monitoring 
 
Conditionality for Fund Board reviews is based on a standard quarterly framework of 
performance criteria and structural benchmarks. For the EC, conditionality is based on an 
overall assessment of progress against the structural agenda in the MoU as well as the 
macroeconomic targets. The EC conducts this assessment in liaison with the ECB, and then 
makes a recommendation to the Euro Group committee of finance ministers, to approve the 
disbursement. Conditionality for both the IMF and EC is set on the basis of regular end-
quarter test dates, with joint review missions consisting of IMF, EC and ECB staff and with 
disbursements intended to coincide to the extent possible in a fixed proportion of 3-8 between 
the Fund and the European financing mechanism, described next. 
 
Financing arrangements 
 
Bilateral support is provided by Greece’s 15 partner eurozone countries, in ratio to their 
shares in ECB capital. The loans will be governed by a single loan agreement between Greece 
and the euro countries, signed by the EC on their behalf, covering the full three years of the 
programme. The loans will have the same maturities as the Fund purchases, and will carry 
floating rate interest rates (3-month Euribor) plus a spread of 3 percentage points, rising to 4 
percentage points for amounts outstanding beyond three years. Each drawing is subject to a 
one-off service charge of 0.5 per cent. Greece has undertaken to draw on the IMF and EC 
facilities in a constant 3:8 ratio throughout the programme period. 
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Annex 2: Timeline of Events 
 
Greece 
 
December 2009 
23. Parliament adopts the 2010 budget setting a general government deficit target of 9.1 
per cent of GDP.  
 
January 2010 
15. Government submits the updated Stability Programme (SP), projecting a reduction 
of the government deficit of 4 percentage points to 8.7 per cent of GDP in 2010, and 
correction of the excessive deficit by 2012. The debt ratio was projected to peak at 121 
per cent of GDP in 2011. 
 
February 2010 
1. 2-year bond spreads reach 347 basis points; 10-years bond spreads reach 270 basis 
points. 
2. Greece announces a set of measures in addition to those announced in the SP 
(freezing wages and raising excises with the aim of reducing the government deficit). 
3. The Commission adopts a proposal for a Council Decision, in view of the excessive 
deficit correction in Greece by 2012, a draft Council Recommendation with a view to 
ending the inconsistency with the broad guidelines of the economic policies, and a draft 
Council Opinion on the SP. 
11. European Council invites the ECOFIN Council to adopt these documents, and calls 
on the Commission to monitor implementation of the Council decision and 
recommendation, in liaison with the ECB and drawing on the expertise of the IMF. The 
euro area Member States declare their readiness to take determined and coordinated 
action, if needed, to safeguard the financial stability in the euro area as a whole. 
16. Council adopts the above-mentioned documents, after discussion in the Eurogroup. 
 
March 2010  
3. Shortly after a visit of Commissioner Rehn to Athens, Greece announces new deficit 
reducing measures of over 2 per cent of GDP, including an increase in the VAT rates 
and other indirect taxes and a cut in the wage bill (through the reduction in allowances, 
and partial cancellation of the Easter, summer and Christmas bonuses, of civil servants). 
These measures are welcomed by the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. 
8. Greece submits a report on the progress with implementation of the SP and additional 
measures. 
9. The Commission concludes that Greece is implementing the Council Decision of 16 
February 2010 and the measures outlined in its SP, and that the additional fiscal 
measures announced by the Greek authorities appear sufficient to achieve the 2010 
budgetary targets. 
15. The Eurogroup welcomes the report by Greece. It embraces the Commission 
assessment that the additional measures appear sufficient to safeguard the 2010 
budgetary targets, if fully implemented. 
25. Heads of State and governments of the euro area countries reaffirm that they fully 
support the efforts of the Greek government and welcome the additional measures 
announced on March 3, which appear to be sufficient to safeguard the 2010 budgetary 
targets. 
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April 2010  
8. 2-year bond spreads reach 652 basis points; 10-years bond spreads reach 430 basis 
points. 
11. The Eurogroup reaffirms the readiness by euro area Member States to take 
determined and coordinated action, if needed. It clarifies the technical modalities 
enabling a decision on coordinated action, highlighting that the objective is not to 
provide financing at average euro area interest rates, but to safeguard financial stability 
in the euro area as a whole. 
15. Greece requests “discussions with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF 
on a multi-year programme of economic policies (…) that could be supported with 
financial assistance (…), if the Greek authorities were to decide to request such 
assistance.” 
23. Announcement that Greece missed the 2010 budget deficit target by a wide margin 
at 13.6 per cent. 
23. Greece requests financial assistance from the euro area Member States and the IMF. 
27. 2-year bond spreads reach 1552 basis points; 10-years bond spreads reach 755 basis 
points. 
 
May 2010 
2. Greece, the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF announce an agreement on 
a three-year programme of economic and financial policies. The Eurogroup 
unanimously agrees to activate stability support to Greece via bilateral loans centrally 
pooled by the European Commission. 
4. The Commission adopts a Recommendation for a Council Decision according to 
Articles 126(9) and 136 of the Treaty. The draft Decision includes the main conditions 
to be respected by Greece in the context of the financial assistance programme. 
6. The Greek Parliament votes to accept a series of policy measures included in the 
programme of economic and financial policies, including an increase in VAT and 
excises, as well as further reductions in public sector wages and pensions. 
6. ECB adopts temporary measures relating to the eligibility of marketable debt 
instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government. 
7. 2-year bond spreads reach 1739 basis points; 10-years bond spreads reach 1287 basis 
points. 
7. The Council adopts a Decision according to Articles 126(9) and 136 of the Treaty 
including the main conditions to be respected by Greece in the context of the financial 
assistance programme. 
9. IMF executive board approves the Stand-by arrangement (SBA). 
9./10. The Council and the EU Member States endorse a financial stabilisation 
mechanism. 
18. The euro area Member States disburse the first instalment (EUR 14.5 billion) of a 
pooled loan to Greece. 
 
August 2010 
5. 1st review mission finishes. Staff teams conclude that the programme has made a 
strong start and that the economy is contracting as projected in May.  
 
November 2010 
15. Greece’s 2009 budget deficit was revised upward to 15.4 per cent from 13.6 per cent 
as reported in April. 
23. 2nd review mission finishes. The overall assessment is that the programme remains 
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broadly on track. However, data revisions and weaker-than-expected revenue collection 
make 2011 deficit targets more difficult to achieve. 
 
December 2010 
7. IMF announces that it supports an extension of loan repayment for Greece and says 
that it is open to the idea of converting the programme to an extended fund facility 
(EFF). 
 
February 2011 
11. 3rd review mission finishes. The overall assessment is that the programme has made 
further progress towards its objectives. 
 
June 2011 
3. 4th review mission finishes. The mission reached agreement with the authorities on a 
set of economic and financial policies needed to meet programme objectives.  
 
July 2011 
3. Spreads increase to new highs after European finance ministers postponed any further 
decisions in regard to the Greek programme. 
 
October 2011 
11. 5th review mission finishes. Further measures are announced to bring the 
programme back on track in regard to the deeper- and longer-than-expected recession.  
27. Euro area leaders agree on a new deal in which creditors would accept 50 per cent 
losses on their Greek debt and Greece receives EUR 130 billion in additional loans in 
turn. 
31. PM Papandreou calls for a referendum on the new financial assistance programme. 
 
November 2011 
11. PM Papandreou resigns. 
16. Papademos forms a provisional government and wins the confidence vote in 
Parliament. 
 
February 2012 
21. Agreement on the disbursement of EUR 130 billion to Greece after the parliament’s 
approval of new austerity measures. 
 
March 2012 
14. Euro area finance ministers approve financing of a second Greek economic 
adjustment programme. The financing vehicle of the euro area will be the EFSF rather 
than bilateral loans as in the first programme. From the IMF side, financing shifts from 
a stand-by arrangement (SBA) to an extended fund facility (EFF) allowing a longer 
repayment period. Additionally, it was agreed on a private sector involvement (PSI), 
which will make a high contribution to make Greece’s debt sustainable.  
 
May 2012 
6. Parliamentary elections. 
 
June 2012 
20. A new unity government was formed and Samaras appointed as PM. 
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August 2012  
20. EUR 3.1 billion bond repayment to the ECB. 
 
November 2012 
7. Greek Parliament approves new austerity package and the 2013 budget. 
 
January 2013 
18. The IMF concludes in its 1st and 2nd Review of Greece’s EFF Arrangement that the 
programme is back on track. 
 
Ireland 
 
May 2010  
7. Irish 10-year bond yields peak at 311 basis points over German bonds, a euro area 
record, as the fear of contagion grows due to the Greek rescue. Spreads fall immediately 
but rise again through May and June as market concerns return. 
 
July 2010 
23. Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland, Ireland’s two largest banks, pass EU-wide 
stress tests. 
 
August 2010 
Concerns grow about losses in the banking sector and the imminent ending of the two-
year government bank guarantee cause spreads to rise, reaching 366 points by the end of 
the month. 
 
September 2010   
8. Bond spreads reach 386 points. Government announces plan to split Anglo Irish Bank 
into a funding bank and an asset recovery bank, and to provide an estimate of the final 
cost of restructuring and resolution of the bank.  
Minister for Finance signals that the fiscal correction required in 2011 would be of the 
order of EUR 3 billion. 
23. Second quarter national accounts for 2010 are published. They show a worse-than-
expected fall of 1.2 per cent in GDP quarter-on-quarter. Spreads reach 425 points.  
30. Final cost to the state of the banking sector of EUR 46 billion with a worst case 
scenario of EUR 51 billion is estimated. The Government announces that this cost will 
require further fiscal consolidation measures. Spreads fall in early October. 
 
October 2010  
26. Government announces that EUR 15 billion of consolidation is required over the 
period 2011-2014, up from the EUR 7.5 billion under existing plans. Spreads rise again 
to 401 points.  
 
November 2010  
4. Government announces that EUR 4 billion of consolidation is to be frontloaded in 
2011. Despite this, spreads go above 682 points by 11 November, a new high.  
21. Irish authorities make request to European Partners and the IMF for assistance in 
assembling a financial stability package.  
24. National Recovery Plan is published by the government, detailing fiscal 
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consolidation and structural measures from 2011 to 2014.  
28. Staff level agreement on financial stability support and macroeconomic adjustment 
programme for the period to 2013 is reached. 
 
December 2010  
7. Eurogroup and ECOFIN Council formally agree on a financial assistance package for 
Ireland and on an extension of the excessive deficit target to 2015 from 2014.  
15. Irish parliament votes on the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding.  
16. The programme is agreed by the IMF board. Irish spreads remain elevated at 531 
points. 
 
January 2011  
12. First instalment of the EFSM loan is disbursed to Ireland. 
 
April 2011 
5-15. 1st and 2nd review mission finish. Ireland is making good progress in overcoming 
the worst economic crisis in its recent history. Programme implementation has been 
determined, despite the period of political change and an uncertain external 
environment. The new government, through its ‘Programme for Government’ and its 
decisive approach to banking sector reforms, has taken full ownership of the goals and 
key elements of the EU-IMF-supported programme.  
 
July 2011  
6-14. 3rd review mission finishes. The authorities have continued to steadfastly 
implement programme policies. Tensions in sovereign bond markets have escalated 
during the visit, but programme financing is cushioning the impact of this shock on the 
Irish economy and public finances. 
 
October 2011  
11-20. 4th review mission finishes. The authorities had completed the key initial phase 
of the comprehensive financial sector reforms launched in March. 
 
January 2012  
10-19. 5th review mission finishes. The Irish authorities have continued to advance 
wide-ranging reforms to restore the health of the financial system so it can support 
Ireland’s recovery. Reforms to enhance competitiveness and support growth and job 
creation are moving forward. The substantial fiscal consolidation targeted for 2011 has 
been achieved with a margin. Budgetary measures of 3.5 per cent of GDP reduced the 
estimated general government deficit to about 10 per cent, well within the programme 
target of 10.6 per cent. 
 
April 2012 
17-26. 6th review mission finishes. Fiscal targets for 2011 were met with a “healthy” 
margin and consolidation remained on track in the first quarter of 2012. 
 
July 2012 
5. Ireland raises successfully EUR 500 millions in a short-term debt auction. 
12. 7th review mission finishes. The policy implementation is considered to be on track 
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despite challenging macroeconomic conditions. In line with the conclusions of the euro 
area summit statement of 29 June, EC/ECB/IMF teams are discussing with the 
authorities possible technical solutions to further improve the sustainability of its well-
performing adjustment programme.  
 
October 2012 
25. 8th review mission finishes. Ireland’s policy implementation has remained strong 
and its budget is on track towards the 2012 targets.  
 
February 2013 
7. The 9th review mission finishes. Rigorous programme implementation has 
contributed to substantial improvements in market access and foster economic recovery. 
On the same day, Ireland officially announces that it has reached an agreement with the 
ECB on restructuring its promissory notes. These notes, used to shore up Irish banks in 
2010, had left the state saddled with large repayment obligations over the following 
decade. Markets and rating agencies unanimously welcome the deal, which significantly 
eases Ireland’s financing burden. Following the announcements, Irish 10-year bond 
yields drop below 4 per cent for the first time since 2008. 
 
March 2013 
13. Ireland returns to the 10-year bond market and raises almost EUR 5 billion for an 
interest rate of 4.15 per cent. 
 
Portugal 
 
December 2009 
2. EU Council addresses recommendations to Portugal in accordance with Article 
126(7) TFEU with a view to bring an end to the situation of an excessive government 
deficit by 2013.  
 
May 2010 
8. Portugal announces a revised target of 7.3 per cent of GDP for the 2010 deficit, 2.1 
percentage points below the 2009 deficit outturn.  
13. The 2011 deficit target was revised to 4.6 per cent of GDP reflecting the 
consolidation measures announced on that day.  
 
November 2010 
25. The Parliament passes austerity budget aimed at bringing down high public debt 
levels. The budgetary deficit target for 2011 is set at 4.6 per cent of GDP.  
 
February 2011 
23. The Portuguese government announces that it had successfully achieved a 2010 
deficit below 7.3 per cent of GDP. 
 
March 2011 
11. The Portuguese government addresses to European Commission and ECB a note in 
which it engages to undertake substantial fiscal and structural measures. 
23. Stability Programme spelling out the measures included in the note sent to the 
Commission and the ECB fails to be approved in Parliament. 
24. The Portuguese government resigns, but remains as a caretaker government. 
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29. Portugal's statistical office (INE) reports a government deficit of 8.6 per cent of 
GDP for 2010, above the target of 7.3 per cent, as a result of the statistical rulings on the 
booking of two defeasance structures, a guarantee that was called and the inclusion of 
three state-owned enterprises in the government accounts. 
31. S&P downgrades Portugal's credit rating to BBB-. 
 
April 2011 
6. Interest rates for 2-year bonds exceed 10 per cent, while 10-year bonds reach yields 
of nearly 9 per cent. 
7. Portugal requests financial assistance from EFSM/EFSF and IMF. 
8. The President of the Republic calls general elections for 5 June. 
11. Technical mission of Troika starts discussions with Portuguese authorities.  
23. Portugal's statistical office (INE) reports a government deficit of 9.1 per cent of 
GDP for 2010, as a result of the statistical re-classification of three PPP contracts. 
 
May 2011 
3. The Programme is agreed at technical level between Troika mission and Portuguese 
authorities. 
17. Signature of the Memorandum of Understanding. 
20. The Programme is agreed by the IMF board, which approves a EUR 26 billion 
extended arrangement for Portugal. 
30. Council adopts Implementing Decision on Granting Union Financial Assistance 
amounting to EUR 78 billion. 
 
June 2011 
5. National elections.  
7. Request for a three-year arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). 
16. Social Democratic Party and People’s Party sign an agreement for a government. 
Pedro Passos Coelho is appointed PM.  
 
August 2011 
12. 1st review mission to Portugal finishes. Staff teams welcome the new government’s 
commitment to the programme and conclude that the programme is on track.  
 
November 2011 
16. 2nd review mission to Portugal finishes. The mission concludes that the programme 
is off to a good start. Yet, staff members see difficulties in implementation of the 2011 
budget due to spending overruns relative to programme objectives. Additionally, they 
stress the importance of continued reform implementation to improve Portugal’s 
competitiveness.  
 
February 2012 
28. 3rd review mission to Portugal finishes. Staff teams conclude that the programme is 
on track but challenges remain. They warn of weaker exports as demand from abroad is 
likely to weaken. Nevertheless, the fiscal deficit target for 2012 of 4.5 per cent of GDP 
is expected to be met. In regard to structural reforms, they conclude that important 
measures have been implemented in particular in the labour market. They identify, 
however, a structural reform backlog in the service sectors. 
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June 2012 
4. 4th review mission finishes. Staff teams conclude that the programme remains on 
track as the authorities are implementing the reform policies broadly as planned and 
external adjustment is proceeding faster than expected. The 2012 fiscal deficit target of 
4.5 per cent of GDP remains within reach. They recommend further policy action in 
regard to the surge in unemployment.  
 
September 2012 
11. 5th review under the EFF arrangement finishes. As a result of a weaker than 
expected macroeconomic outlook, the fiscal targets have been revised. The budget 
deficit target has been revised upward to 5 per cent of GDP in 2012 and to 4.5 per cent 
in 2013. The threshold of 3 per cent will be met in 2014. 
22. After massive protests in Lisbon, the Portuguese government agrees to look for 
alternatives to a social security tax rise proposed some days ago that would have 
increased the workers’ wage deduction and cut the tax for employers. Some days later, 
the government decided to change the tax brackets instead. This will result in a sharp 
increase in the average tax rate. 
 
October 2012 
3. Portugal successfully exchanges a bond with maturity in 2013 for one with maturity 
in 2015. The authorities plan a return to market financing during 2013. 
 
November 2012 
19. 6th review mission finishes. Staff teams conclude that the programme is broadly on 
track and that the fiscal consolidation efforts are in line with the revised deficit targets.  
 
March 2013 
15. 7th review mission finishes. Staff teams conclude that the programme 
implementation remains broadly on track and the end-2012 fiscal deficit target of 5 per 
cent of GDP has been met. Against the background of difficult economic conditions, the 
deficit targets are suggested to be revised up from 4.5 to 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2013 
and from 2.5 to 4 per cent in 2014. 
 
April 2013 
5. Portugal’s constitutional court rejects four out of nine contested austerity measures 
that the government had introduced as part of its 2013 budget as being unconstitutional 
as they are discriminating against public-sector workers. Thereafter, prime minister 
Coelho announced further spending cuts on social security, health, education and state-
owned companies and ruled out further tax increases. 
 
 
